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This thesis comprises three essays on international finance, focusing on international
capital flows, foreign exchange market and official foreign exchange intervention.
The first chapter assesses the relative contribution of common (push) and country
specific (pull) factors to the variation of bond and equity flows from the US to
55 other countries. Using a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model, we find that
more than 80% of the variation in bond and equity flows is due to push factors
from the US to other countries. Hence global economic forces seem to prevail over
domestic economic forces in explaining movements in international portfolio flows.
The dynamics of push and pull factors can be partially explained by US and foreign
macroeconomic indicators respectively.
The second chapter presents new evidence on the microstructure of exchange
rates in emerging markets. Using a novel dataset that records all spot US dollar
transactions in the Chilean foreign exchange intraday market over 4 weeks in 2008
and 6 weeks in 2009, we investigate the relationship between exchange rates and
order flows. We find supporting evidence that the contemporaneous relationship
between exchange rates and order flows is time-varying. In this market, interbank
order flow only accounts for a small portion of the exchange rate impact of total order
flow, and the central bank orders influence private order flow behaviour. Compared
to advanced economies, cointegration tests and long run relationship estimations
between exchange rate and order flow indicate slow reversion from long run trend
deviations.
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In the third chapter, we examine the intraday effects and success rates of official
intervention in the Chilean foreign exchange market. The impact of official inter-
vention on exchange rate daily returns has been widely revised in the literature,
confirming in many cases the signalling channel for the transmission of the interven-
tion effects. Our investigation at a higher frequency indicates that microstructure
channels also work for the Chilean case. Specifically, the central bank’s order flow
directly affects the exchange rate returns contemporaneously and within a 2 hours
range around the intervention event. In addition, actual interventions affect the
price impact of private order flows, and are successful at moderating its trend.
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Overview
This thesis comprises three essays on international finance, focusing on international
capital flows, foreign exchange market and official foreign exchange intervention.
What drives international portfolio flows? This is an important question that lies at
the center of a long-standing debate in international economic policy and research.
The overall level of international capital flows (that includes foreign direct investment
and portfolio flows) has risen dramatically over the years, from an average of less
than 5 percent of global GDP during 1980-1999 to a peak of about 20 percent by
2007 (IMF, 2012). In the context of an increasingly globalized world with a high
degree of international capital mobility, portfolio flows can have a significant effect
on domestic asset prices and economic growth prospects. For example, a surge in
portfolio inflows can lead to a real estate boom and inflation, whereas a sudden stop
can lead to slow growth, higher interest rates and a sharp currency depreciation.
It is therefore critical for recipient countries to be able to manage to some extent
the size, direction and volatility of international flows. Understanding the dynamic
determinants of international portfolio flows can help countries design an effective
policy mix that may consist of structural reforms, targeted macroeconomic policies
or capital controls.1
The literature typically distinguishes between two types of determinants for in-
1For instance, countries may implement a combination of the following: structural reforms that
increase the capacity of their domestic capital markets or improve the transparency of the regulatory
framework; macroeconomic policies such as accumulating reserves or allowing their currency to
appreciate; and different types of capital controls such as discriminating financial activity on the
basis of residency, differentiating transactions on the basis of currency or imposing minimum holding
periods and taxes in certain investments (IMF, 2011). See also Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Kose (2010)
and Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2010) for the macroeconomic implications and policy responses
to surges in capital flows.
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ternational capital flows: push factors and pull factors (see, e.g., Calvo, Leider-
man, and Reinhart, 1996; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Age´nor,
1998; Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi, 1998; Forbes andWarnock, 2012; Fratzscher,
2012).2 Push factors reflect the global economic forces that push capital flows from
the US to other countries, and may be related to low US interest rates, low US
potential growth, low global risk aversion and international portfolio diversification.
Pull factors reflect the domestic economic forces that pull capital into a country
and hence capture the relative attractiveness of different destinations for investment
opportunities. These factors include high domestic interest rates, low domestic in-
flation, high potential growth and trade openness. In other words, push factors are
external to the economies receiving the flows, whereas pull factors are internal to
these economies.3
Building on a large literature in international economics, the first chapter em-
pirically assesses the relative contribution of push and pull factors to the variation
of international portfolio flows. In particular, we focus on monthly bond and eq-
uity flows from the US to 55 other countries for the period of January 1988 to July
2009. The main contribution of our empirical analysis is the use of a dynamic latent
factor model, which is designed to separate the common from the country-specific
components of movements in international portfolio flows. This is a sophisticated
and flexible model that is used for the first time in the study of international port-
folio flows.4 More importantly, the dynamic factor model allows us to provide a
comprehensive answer to the initial question of what drives international bond and
2Literature related to this explores the role of contagion in the context of push and pull factors (e.g.
Forbes and Chinn, 2004). For studies of cross-border equity flows, see Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz
(2004), Portes and Rey (2005), Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2008), Hau and Rey (2008), and Tong
and Wei (2011).
3Consistent with the broad literature on capital flows, we use the terms “global” and “US” inter-
changeably. This is a sensible convention because the data are portfolio flows from the US to 55
other countries. Having said that, we certainly recognize that the US does not fully capture global
economic forces.
4For example, Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003, 2008) employ this dynamic factor model to esti-
mate common components in aggregate output, consumption and investment across countries.
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equity flows. The model specifies three types of latent persistent factors, which are
independent of one another: (i) the global factor that is common to all countries
and all flows; (ii) two asset-specific (or flow-specific) factors, one that is common
to all bond flows and one that is common to all equity flows; and (iii) a set of 55
country-specific factors. The contribution of the push factor to the variation of bond
flows is captured by the global and bond factors, whereas the push factor for equity
flows is captured by the global and equity factors. The pull factor is simply the same
as the model’s country-specific factor.
The model is highly flexible as it can deal with a large cross-section of countries
over a long sample period for two types of portfolio flows.5 More importantly, it
specifies latent factors that capture the different types of common and country-
specific variation without having to rely on a limited number of relevant observed
macroeconomic variables that may not capture the full effect of push and pull factors.
The high flexibility of the model comes at the cost of being high dimensional: for
two types of flows and 55 countries, it requires estimation of 397 parameters. We
estimate the parameters of the dynamic factor model using the Bayesian Monte
Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm of Kose et al. (2003, 2008), which builds
on the procedures developed by Otrok and Whiteman (1998). Bayesian estimation
offers the advantage of dealing effectively with the high dimension of the model and
making estimation feasible and efficient.
Our main finding is that for both bond and equity flows the push factor tends to
contribute more than 80% to the variance in international portfolio flows, whereas
the pull factor contributes less than 20%. In fact, for more than half of the countries,
the push factor contribution is higher than 90%. Over the past 20 years, therefore,
global economic forces seem to prevail over domestic economic forces in explaining
movements in international portfolio flows. Overall, the contribution of the push
5Prior literature has typically dealt with few countries over shorter sample periods using less general
factor specifications. See, for example, Sarno and Taylor (1999).
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factor tends to be slightly higher for equity flows (89% on average across all countries)
than for bond flows (83%). However, the regional variation is more pronounced for
bond flows: for example, countries that belong to the G8, the G20 and the BRICS
tend to have a lower push factor (and hence a higher pull factor) than the other
countries.6 Furthermore, over the crisis period of July 2007 to March 2009 the role
of the push factor diminishes as, on average, the contribution of the pull factor to
the variance of flows effectively doubles. Finally, countries with very high or very
low interest rates that are typically involved in the foreign exchange carry trade tend
to have a pull factor that is considerably above the world average.
We also find that the push factor for bond and equity flows is significantly related
to US macroeconomic variables such as industrial production, interest rates, stock
market performance, and measures of market volatility and liquidity. Similarly, the
pull factor can be explained by domestic macroeconomic variables such as the growth
rate, interest rates, stock market performance and the Chinn and Ito (2008) measure
of capital account openness. Note, however, that observed macroeconomic indicators
can account for about half of the variation of the latent push factors and about 10%
of the variation of the latent pull factors. This provides further justification for
adopting a latent factor approach.
Our empirical analysis provides results for 55 countries and several groupings of
countries based on geography or economic development. This makes it rather im-
practical to provide an in-depth discussion of the implications of our findings for each
particular country. For this reason, we discuss in greater depth our results for three
prominent emerging economies: China, India and Brazil. These countries belong to
the G20, are members of the BRICS and, due to their fast-growing economies in
recent years, have emerged as global economic powerhouses. For example, it is in-
teresting to note that the three countries exhibit different patterns as the pull factor
6The BRICS are five large emerging economies that include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa.
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for bond flows is extremely high in Brazil, close to the world average for China and
well below average for India. Our country analysis provides further details on what
can potentially explain these differences.
The first chapter of this thesis is especially related to two recent studies. First,
Fratzscher (2012) provides a similar analysis by identifying the relative importance of
push and pull factors in weekly portfolio flows based on a large cross-section of bond
and equity funds from 50 countries. The analysis of Fratzscher (2012), however,
substantially deviates from our chapter in a number of ways: (i) it uses data on
individual mutual funds and hedge funds rather than country-level portfolio flows;
(ii) it focuses on the recent global financial crisis using a much shorter 5-year sample
from 2005 to 2010; and (iii) it relies exclusively on few observed macroeconomic
variables to capture the push and pull factors with particular emphasis on global
risk and liquidity variables. Consistent with one of our results, Fratzscher (2012)
finds that push factors capture most of the variation of flows before and during the
crisis (65% and 73% respectively), but after the crisis pull factors are more important
(55%) than push factors (45%).
Second, Forbes and Warnock (2012) use 30 years of quarterly data on gross
inflows and outflows to analyze waves in international capital flows. They identify
episodes of“surge”, “stop”, “flight”and“retrenchment”as measures of sharp increases
(or decreases) in gross capital inflows (or outflows). Forbes and Warnock (2012) also
find that global factors, and especially global risk, are the key determinants of waves
in international capital flows, while domestic factors are generally insignificant.
More generally, our analysis is highly related to a recent global policy debate
culminating in November 2012, when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pub-
lished its new institutional view on how to manage and control international capital
flows. This view states that “[t]he IMF has developed a comprehensive, flexible,
and balanced view on the management of global capital flows to help give countries
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clear and consistent policy advice.”7 Indeed, the new view of the IMF constitutes a
historical shift, as after years of calling for the abolition of capital controls, the IMF
agreed that capital controls may be a useful tool for managing inflows and may be
used on a case-by-case basis in appropriate circumstances.8
The institutional view of the IMF is consistent with two implications of our main
empirical finding. First, if global economic forces are the primary drivers of interna-
tional portfolio flows, then an effective policy mix for managing these flows should
include capital controls. And second, targeted domestic macroeconomic policies
have a rather limited role in determining international portfolio flows. Therefore, al-
though we do not provide direct evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls, our
empirical results show the predominance of the push over the pull factor, and hence
support the new institutional view of the IMF that capital controls may indeed be
a useful tool for managing flows.
The second chapter of this thesis presents new evidence on the microstructure of
exchange rates in emerging markets through investigating the relationship between
exchange rates and order flows in Chile. Understanding the associations between
exchange rates and order flow9 in different markets has been a concern amongst
researchers for several reasons. Firstly, examining the explanatory power of order
flow for exchange rate has allowed literature on exchange rate modelling to solve
differences between theoretical models and empirical findings. Thus considering
order flow as a key determinant of exchange rate returns could improve policy and
investment assessments. Secondly, research on the interrelations between order flow
7See IMFSurvey (2012).
8Key features of the IMF institutional view include: (i) a recognition that capital flows can have both
substantial benefits and risks for countries; (ii) capital flow liberalization is generally more beneficial
for countries that have surpassed a certain threshold of financial and institutional development; (iii)
liberalization needs to be well planned, timed and sequenced, especially for countries with long-
standing measures to limit capital flows; and (iv) rapid capital inflow surges require appropriate
policy responses both for recipient countries of capital flows and for countries from which flows
originate. For a recent discussion of monetary, macroprudential and financial policies, see also
Gourinchas and Kose (2011), and Gourinchas, Kose, and Claessens (2012).
9Order flow is the net of buyer-initiated orders and seller-initiated orders.
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and exchange rate also provides evidence regarding price formation and market
participant dynamics.
Several studies have addressed microstructure questions in the context of ex-
change rates for developed countries. Data limitations have constrained research
on emerging market economies (EMEs) using a microstructure approach. However,
knowledge on EMEs have become more valuable recently, as these countries have
experienced increasing participation in the global economy, shown resilience during
the global crisis, and in some cases become strongly financially developed (Kose and
Prasad, 2010).
Our research aims to contribute to the literature with new empirical evidence
about EMEs through the analysis of the associations between exchange rates and
order flow in the Chilean Foreign Exchange (FX) market. Chile is a small open
economy under inflation target and flexible exchange rate regimes, and one of the
largest copper producer countries in the world. Furthermore, one of the few countries
that used official FX intervention as unconventional policy response during 2008-2009
financial crisis. In addition, we count with a novel dataset at tick frequency which to
the best of our knowledge has never been analysed before. We propose to answer the
following questions: What is the contemporaneous relationship between order flow
and exchange rate movements in the Chilean FX market? Are there non-linearities
in the order flow impact on exchange rate? Is there an anticipation, pressure or
feedback effect? Is there evidence of the degree of informativeness behind the order
flow of different participants? Is there a long-run relationship between order flow
and exchange rates? In doing so, we aim to provide directions for the development
of FX microstructure research for other EMEs.
The association between order flow and exchange rates has been extensively
documented. In their seminal paper, Evans and Lyons (2002b) analyse the contem-
poraneous relationship between the Deutsche mark - US dollar (USD) rate and order
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flow, and show that interdealer order flow has strong explanatory power for exchange
rate returns at daily frequency. Whilst Evans and Lyons (2005, 2006, 2008) have
further analysed the features of their micro-based model, several other studies have
confirmed the link between order flow and exchange rate for other currency pairs.10
In this setting, causality runs strictly from order flow to price, which is consistent
with all the canonical models (see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985),
where price innovations are a function of order flow innovations. In these models,
the underlying driver of order flow is non-publicly available information, such as
uncertain demands or payoffs, and order flows are the channel through which this
type of information is incorporated into prices.
However, the timing of order flow in relation to price adjustments can be seen in
three ways: (1) order flow precedes price adjustments; (2) order flow is concurrent
with price adjustments; (3) order flow lags price adjustments. These three adjust-
ment mechanisms are known respectively as the anticipation, pressure, and feedback
hypotheses. Statistically, they translate into three possible causality patterns: the
first hypothesis implies that order flow causes prices changes; the second allows for
bi-directional causality; the third implies that price adjustment causes order flows.
Empirically, these causality patterns between order flow and exchange rate returns
have been examined for the French franc - Deutsche mark rate by Killeen et al.
(2006). They find that, under a flexible exchange rate regime, order flow Granger
causes returns, but not the other way round. However, Dan´ıelsson and Love (2006)
argue that feedback trading is an inevitable result when aggregating the data. Fur-
thermore, Sager and Taylor (2006) proposes that in the FX market there are push
and pull customers. The former initiate price rises and falls, the latter are those
10In fact, there is a large list of papers that examine the relationship between exchange rate and
order flow from different perspectives and using different estimation strategies. Some relevant pa-
pers for this study are Payne (2003), Bjønnes, Rime, and Solheim (2005), Boyer and van Norden
(2006), Dan´ıelsson and Love (2006), Killeen, Lyons, and Moore (2006), Berger, Chaboud, Cher-
nenko, Howorka, and Wright (2008), King, Sarno, and Sojli (2010), and Chinn and Moore (2011).
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agents that are attracted by these movements in prices.
Indeed, the price impact of order flow can vary with agent types. Osler (2008)
explains that opposite price impacts of commercial and financial customers order
flow are due to the nature of their trade responses, i.e. whether they are driven by
demand pressures of goods or assets. Bjønnes et al. (2005) observe that the different
relationships between exchange rates and financial or non-financial customer order
flow indicate the side from which liquidity is provided. King et al. (2010) note
that the order flow of financial clients are always positively related to exchange rate
returns and those of commercial clients are negatively related. This is due to the
fact that commercial and non-financial clients are liquidity providers, matching the
financial client demands.
Besides the different disaggregated order flow effects on exchange rates, it has
also been seen that the price impact can vary throughout the day and across time
(see, e.g., Berger et al. 2008). In addition, the goodness of fit of such linear mod-
els usually improves at lower frequencies, benefit that arises with the reduction of
microstructure noise.11 Knowledge on the relationship between order flow and ex-
change rate has also been enriched with the investigation of short versus long-run
relationships. Studies of this kind usually test for cointegrating relationships be-
tween exchange rate and the order flow accumulated from a fixed initial period in
each point in time (see, e.g., Bjønnes et al., 2005; Boyer and van Norden, 2006;
Killeen et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2008; and Chinn and Moore, 2011). Most of
the cases, a long-run relationship between order flow and exchange rate cannot be
rejected.
There are not many studies on FX microstructure available for EMEs. For in-
stance, the cases of Brazil, Czech Republic and Russia are studies by Wu (2012),
Scalia (2008) and Melvin, Menkhoff, and Schmeling (2009) respectively. The find-
11Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006) provide a broader framework in which they note that changes in
horizon would impact the strength of the relationship between exchange rates and order flow.
20
ings for different EMEs have differed and led to ambiguous evidence for this group
of countries. In fact, Menkhoff and Schmeling (2008) examine the permanence of
the order flow effects on price for different countries, concluding that the effects
of order flows on exchange rate returns vary across regions. Therefore, relying on
the literature to characterise the Chilean FX market is not plausible. There are no
studies on the intraday behaviour of its FX market in a microstructure framework
for the Chilean case.12 Hence examining the relationship between exchange rate and
order flow in this market is both a contribution to the literature and of interest for
policy makers.
The data we employ in this chapter records all spot USD transactions in terms
of Chilean pesos (CLP) in the Chilean FX market during two periods of time: July
2008, and June to mid July 2009. These data consist of price and volume for each
transaction recorded, the exact time at which each transaction was executed, the
trader category for each transaction, and the type of transactions (sell or buy). The
type of transactions allows us to construct an order flow series and investigate its
relationship with exchange rate returns. Combining the several approaches men-
tioned above in the context of the intraday CLP/USD market, our findings are
listed as follows. First, we find evidence supporting the contemporaneous relation-
ship between exchange rate returns and order flow found in the literature at different
frequencies. That is, net purchases of CLP are associated with appreciation of the
Chilean currency. Second, we also evaluate the time-of-the-day effect on the relation-
ship between exchange rate returns and order flow. We find that the more active the
market is the lower the impact of order flow on exchange rate returns. This coincides
with the liquidity patterns throughout the day and is consistent with the findings
of Payne (2003) and Berger et al. (2008). Furthermore, a rolling window estima-
12The available studies for the FX market in Chile are by Tapia and Tokman (2004), Schmidt-Hebbel
(2006), Abarca, Alarco´n, Pincheira, and Selaive (2007) and Cowan, Rappoport, and Selaive (2007).
Of these studies, none analyse the market intraday features, nor focus on the relationship between
exchange rate and order flow.
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tion suggests that the effects of order flow varied throughout each sample analysed.
Third, Granger causality tests support the anticipation hypothesis found in most
of the literature for major currencies, and remain unaltered when considering only
interbank trading activity. As throughout the analysed period the Central Bank of
Chile (CBC) also carried out interventions, we also evaluate the causality dynamics
between private order flow and the CBC order flow: Granger causality tests provide
evidence of causality from order flows of CBC to the rest of the market in 2008.
Fourth, we evaluate the impact of order flow of different market participants, find-
ing that interbank trades have a much smaller effect on exchange rate returns than
total order flow. We observe that the inclusion of the CBC order flow dampens the
effect of private order flow. Additionally, we find that a decrease of 1 minute in the
average trading intensity is associated with an extra increase in exchange rate return
of over 10 basis points. Fifth, our examination of the existence of cointegration rela-
tionships between exchange rate and cumulative order flow through the estimation
of a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) suggested by Johansen cointegration
tests indicates that between 0.2% and 0.4% of the deviations from a long-run trend
dissipate each 15 minutes.
In the third chapter of this thesis, we examine the intraday effects and success
rates of official intervention in the Chilean foreign exchange market. What are the ef-
fects of official intervention in FX markets? This question has motivated researchers
and policy makers for many years generating a wide range of literature on the topic,
mainly for advanced economies. However, in the last decade FX intervention had be-
come more popular amongst developing economies compared to the developed world,
particularly after the latest global financial crisis, when FX intervention has been
one of the main policy responses of EMEs (Ishii, Canales-Kriljenko, Guimara˜es, and
Karacadag, 2006; Menkhoff, 2012). Intervention in the FX market occurs for differ-
ent reasons, such as to stabilise a misaligned exchange rate, calm stressed markets,
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or accumulate international reserves (Ishii et al., 2006).13 Therefore, a comprehen-
sive examination of the effects of FX intervention on all aspects of FX markets is
necessary in order to assess whether this policy response has improved the market’s
condition beyond having moved the target towards the desired direction.
The literature in this field usually focuses on understanding through which chan-
nel sterilised FX intervention14 is most effective. According to the literature, these
channels are: portfolio balance, signaling or expectations, co-ordination, and order
flow or microstructure channels (see, e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Archer, 2005).
The portfolio balance channel suggests that the sterilisation operations alter the com-
position of the portfolios of the agents in the economy. The signalling or expectations
channel suggests that agents change their exchange rate expectations responding to
communication of policy decisions. This channel is seen as effective when interven-
tion announcements are followed by unusual daily changes in the exchange rate. The
co-ordination channel suggests that monetary authorities’ communications that are
co-ordinated with market views help moving the target in a desired direction. The
order flow or microstructure channel suggests that interventions alter the order flow
dynamics in the domestic FX market when the monetary authority places its own
orders as part of the intervention programme. Neely (2008) surveys a heterogeneous
sample of 22 central banks in order to capture their beliefs on the effects of FX
intervention. In his study, most central banks usually agree that intervention affects
exchange rates through co-ordination and signaling channels.15
Typically, the effectiveness of an intervention in the FX market is measured by
13In other words, FX intervention can be seen as an alternative or complementary policy tool against
inflation in periods of turmoil, for example, when misalignments of the exchange rate require changes
in interest rates that are not consistent with output gap and inflationary pressures.
14In most cases, policy makers that choose to intervene in the FX market opt for sterilised intervention.
Sterilised intervention occurs when the monetary authority complements orders in the FX market
with operations involving other assets, in order to offset the effects of changes in official foreign
asset holdings on the domestic monetary base.
15These beliefs are supported by the literature for advanced economies. For instance, Beine, Bos,
and Laurent (2007) find evidence supporting the signalling channel, and Reitz and Taylor (2008)
provide evidence in favour of the coordination channel.
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its effect on the level or volatility of the exchange rate. For instance, an interven-
tion consisting of selling (purchasing) foreign currency would expect the domestic
currency to appreciate (depreciate) with respect to the foreign currency sold (pur-
chased). Moreover, the intervention can be carried out in order to accelerate, mod-
erate or reverse an appreciation or depreciation trend. With respect to the volatility,
usually a reduction is expected with the intervention (see, e.g., Payne and Vitale,
2003; Dominguez, 2006; Dominguez and Panthaki, 2007; Fratzscher, 2005, 2006,
2008; Fatum, 2008; Neely, 2011).
In addition, evidence suggesting that FX intervention can increase volatility in
the short run and affect other currencies has been found.16 Furthermore, the lit-
erature suggests that oral interventions in advanced economies are more effective
than actual interventions, and that intervention effectiveness increases when there
is co-ordination amongst central banks, or in periods of high volatility and market
uncertainty (see, e.g., Payne and Vitale, 2003; Dominguez, 2006: Dominguez and
Panthaki, 2007; Fratzscher, 2008). There is also evidence on the effects of inter-
ventions on trading dynamics. Dominguez and Panthaki (2007) find that FX inter-
vention impacts the trading frequency of intraday operations. Fatum and Pedersen
(2009) and Fatum, Pedersen, and Sørensen (2013) find that unannounced interven-
tions have an effect on the market perception, thus affecting exchange rate spreads.
Marsh (2011) finds that the relationship between the exchange rate and order flow
varies during intervention periods.
Emerging markets are interesting cases of study. Usually, their currency markets
are smaller than those of advanced economies. Therefore, central bank interventions
could be more effective (for instance, through the portfolio channel) compared to
16In his survey, Neely (2008) indicates that central banks mostly agree that intervention affects
currencies other than the one in which it is conducted, and it is effective on reducing (or at least
not increasing) its volatility and restoring liquidity. Beine et al. (2007) also show that intervention
tends to primarily raise volatility, whilst Nikkinen and Va¨ha¨maa (2009) notes that intervention
ultimately increases the correlation between the domestic currency with foreign currencies other
than the one purchased.
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the effects that actions of monetary authorities in advanced economies could have on
their currency markets. However, most of the papers available analyse the impact of
intervention on FX markets using daily data for advanced economies, who intervene
on a regular basis, or whose data is publicly available. For developing countries,
interventions occur more sporadically, hence research on the effects of intervention
on their FX market is rare. This gap in the literature may be due to both data
availability issues and the scarcity of intervention events.17 Overall, the evidence
found for EMEs is mixed. On the one hand, in most of the cases announcements
have an impact on exchange rate returns. On the other hand, actual interventions
could in some cases move the exchange rate levels, reduce its short-term volatility and
spreads, and change the price impact of private order flows. However in other cases
a reversal or slowing down of the appreciation trend is not obtained and increases
in volatilities are observed.
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of official interventions in the Chilean
FX market at intraday frequency. Since the adoption of a flexible exchange rate
regime, the Chilean monetary authority kept its right to intervene in the FX market.
However, it had not actively participated nor intervened in the market for several
years until the early signs of the last global financial crisis. When it did intervene,
in 2008 and 2011, these policy responses were previously announced as precaution-
ary actions of international reserve accumulation.18 Chile is an inflation-targeting
small open economy, whose real sector strength relies heavily on commodity trade
(copper), and official intervention is discretional yet pre-announced. There is not
17Recent theoretical papers that study the intervention strategies of EMEs focus on modelling these
economies assuming that their unconventional monetary policy responses are driven by exchange
rate rules (see, e.g., Parrado, 2004; Ho, 2004; Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2005; Kumhof, 2010; Benigno
and Fornaro, 2012; Benes, Berg, Portillo, and Vavra, 2013). However, given the heterogeneous
nature of the intervention mechanisms observed in the developing world, such theoretical models
lack applicability. Unfortunately, comprehensive empirical work on FX intervention of EMEs has
been limited. The most common country cases studied are: Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Mexico, Russia, and Turkey. We expose a more comprehensive literature review on intervention in
EMEs in Section 2.
18In addition, the intervention in 2011, was the largest in terms of duration in the Chilean history.
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much work focussing on the effects of intervention on the Chilean FX market during
and posterior to the financial crisis at a microstructural level.19 Given the lack of
research available for Chile and the novelty of our data, we believe that this chapter
contributes to the literature on official intervention with new evidence that provides
some directions for other EMEs.
For our analysis, we continue to explore our novel dataset that records all spot
USD transactions in the Chilean FX market during two subperiods within 2008 and
2009 respectively. Our intraday data report price, volume and type of each trans-
action, and the exact time of transaction. The characteristics of this dataset allows
us to analyse the impact of intervention from different perspectives: first, we eval-
uate the effect of central bank order flow on exchange rate returns through linear
regression analysis;20 then we carry out an event study where we incorporate leads
and lags of intervention into the order flow regressions in order to examine time
delay/anticipation of the effect of intervention on intraday exchange rate returns.
Last, we examine the effectiveness of intervention in 2008 and the effects of central
bank trades in 2009, according to the different success criteria for exchange rate
movements and order flow changes. We find that the impact of central bank order
flows on the intraday returns of the spot rate is significant but small in comparison
with the effects of the order flows of other agent types. Central bank order flows
also have an indirect impact in the private order flow dynamics, which corroborates
intervention effectiveness through microstructure channel. Furthermore, our event
study on an intraday basis shows that the effect of the participation of the central
bank in the market is incorporated two hours prior to its occurrence when precau-
tionary intervention takes place. Finally, the rates of intervention success indicate
that intervention is successful in moderating exchange rate and order flow trends.
19The existing studies for Chile are by Morande´ and Tapia (2002), Gregorio and Tokman (2004),
Tapia and Tokman (2004) and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006). These studies provide a description of the
effectiveness of interventions and announcements up to 2004, using daily data.






What drives international portfolio flows? This is an important question that lies at
the center of a long-standing debate in international economic policy and research.
The overall level of international capital flows (that includes foreign direct investment
and portfolio flows) has risen dramatically over the years, from an average of less
than 5 percent of global GDP during 1980-1999 to a peak of about 20 percent by
2007 (IMF, 2012). In the context of an increasingly globalized world with a high
degree of international capital mobility, portfolio flows can have a significant effect
on domestic asset prices and economic growth prospects. For example, a surge in
portfolio inflows can lead to a real estate boom and inflation, whereas a sudden stop
can lead to slow growth, higher interest rates and a sharp currency depreciation.
It is therefore critical for recipient countries to be able to manage to some extent
the size, direction and volatility of international flows. Understanding the dynamic
determinants of international portfolio flows can help countries design an effective
policy mix that may consist of structural reforms, targeted macroeconomic policies
or capital controls.1
1For instance, countries may implement a combination of the following: structural reforms that
increase the capacity of their domestic capital markets or improve the transparency of the regulatory
framework; macroeconomic policies such as accumulating reserves or allowing their currency to
appreciate; and different types of capital controls such as discriminating financial activity on the
basis of residency, differentiating transactions on the basis of currency or imposing minimum holding
periods and taxes in certain investments (IMF, 2011). See also Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Kose (2010)
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The literature typically distinguishes between two types of determinants for in-
ternational capital flows: push factors and pull factors (see, e.g., Calvo, Leider-
man, and Reinhart, 1996; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Age´nor,
1998; Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi, 1998; Forbes andWarnock, 2012; Fratzscher,
2012).2 Push factors reflect the global economic forces that push capital flows from
the US to other countries, and may be related to low US interest rates, low US
potential growth, low global risk aversion and international portfolio diversification.
Pull factors reflect the domestic economic forces that pull capital into a country
and hence capture the relative attractiveness of different destinations for investment
opportunities. These factors include high domestic interest rates, low domestic in-
flation, high potential growth and trade openness. In other words, push factors are
external to the economies receiving the flows, whereas pull factors are internal to
these economies.3
Building on a large literature in international economics, this chapter empirically
assesses the relative contribution of push and pull factors to the variation of interna-
tional portfolio flows. In particular, we focus on monthly bond and equity flows from
the US to 55 other countries for the period of January 1988 to July 2009. The main
contribution of our empirical analysis is the use of a dynamic latent factor model,
which is designed to separate the common from the country-specific components
of movements in international portfolio flows. This is a sophisticated and flexible
model that is used for the first time in the study of international portfolio flows.4
More importantly, the dynamic factor model allows us to provide a comprehensive
and Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2010) for the macroeconomic implications and policy responses
to surges in capital flows.
2A related literature explores the role of contagion in the context of push and pull factors (e.g. Forbes
and Chinn, 2004). For studies of cross-border equity flows, see Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004),
Portes and Rey (2005), Goldstein, Razin, and Tong (2008), Hau and Rey (2008), and Tong and Wei
(2011).
3Consistent with the broad literature on capital flows, we use the terms “global” and “US” inter-
changeably. This is a sensible convention because the data are portfolio flows from the US to 55
other countries. Having said that, we certainly recognize that the US does not fully capture global
economic forces.
4For example, Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003, 2008) employ this dynamic factor model to esti-
mate common components in aggregate output, consumption and investment across countries.
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answer to the initial question of what drives international bond and equity flows.
The model specifies three types of latent persistent factors, which are independent
of one another: (i) the global factor that is common to all countries and all flows; (ii)
two asset-specific (or flow-specific) factors, one that is common to all bond flows and
one that is common to all equity flows; and (iii) a set of 55 country-specific factors.
The contribution of the push factor to the variation of bond flows is captured by
the global and bond factors, whereas the push factor for equity flows is captured
by the global and equity factors. The pull factor is simply the same as the model’s
country-specific factor.
The model is highly flexible as it can deal with a large cross-section of countries
over a long sample period for two types of portfolio flows.5 More importantly, it
specifies latent factors that capture the different types of common and country-
specific variation without having to rely on a limited number of relevant observed
macroeconomic variables that may not capture the full effect of push and pull factors.
The high flexibility of the model comes at the cost of being high dimensional: for
two types of flows and 55 countries, it requires estimation of 397 parameters. We
estimate the parameters of the dynamic factor model using the Bayesian Monte
Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm of Kose et al. (2003, 2008), which builds
on the procedures developed by Otrok and Whiteman (1998). Bayesian estimation
offers the advantage of dealing effectively with the high dimension of the model and
making estimation feasible and efficient.
Our main finding is that for both bond and equity flows the push factor tends to
contribute more than 80% to the variance in international portfolio flows, whereas
the pull factor contributes less than 20%. In fact, for more than half of the countries,
the push factor contribution is higher than 90%. Over the past 20 years, therefore,
global economic forces seem to prevail over domestic economic forces in explaining
5Prior literature has typically dealt with few countries over shorter sample periods using less general
factor specifications. See, for example, Sarno and Taylor (1999).
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movements in international portfolio flows. Overall, the contribution of the push
factor tends to be slightly higher for equity flows (89% on average across all countries)
than for bond flows (83%). However, the regional variation is more pronounced for
bond flows: for example, countries that belong to the G8, the G20 and the BRICS
tend to have a lower push factor (and hence a higher pull factor) than the other
countries.6 Furthermore, over the crisis period of July 2007 to March 2009, the role
of the push factor diminishes as, on average, the contribution of the pull factor to
the variance of flows effectively doubles. Finally, countries with very high or very
low interest rates that are typically involved in the foreign exchange carry trade tend
to have a pull factor that is considerably above the world average.
We also find that the push factor for bond and equity flows is significantly related
to US macroeconomic variables such as industrial production, interest rates, stock
market performance, and measures of market volatility and liquidity. Similarly, the
pull factor can be explained by domestic macroeconomic variables such as the growth
rate, interest rates, stock market performance and the Chinn and Ito (2008) measure
of capital account openness. Note, however, that observed macroeconomic indicators
can account for about half of the variation of the latent push factors and about 10%
of the variation of the latent pull factors. This provides further justification for
adopting a latent factor approach.
Our empirical analysis provides results for 55 countries and several groupings of
countries based on geography or economic development. This makes it rather im-
practical to provide an in-depth discussion of the implications of our findings for each
particular country. For this reason, we discuss in greater depth our results for three
prominent emerging economies: China, India and Brazil. These countries belong to
the G20, are members of the BRICS and, due to their fast-growing economies in
recent years, have emerged as global economic powerhouses. For example, it is in-
6The BRICS are five large emerging economies that include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa.
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teresting to note that the three countries exhibit different patterns as the pull factor
for bond flows is extremely high in Brazil, close to the world average for China and
well below average for India. Our country analysis provides further details on what
can potentially explain these differences.
This chapter is especially related to two recent studies. First, Fratzscher (2012)
provides a similar analysis by identifying the relative importance of push and pull
factors in weekly portfolio flows based on a large cross-section of bond and equity
funds from 50 countries. The analysis of Fratzscher (2012), however, substantially
deviates from our chapter in a number of ways: (i) it uses data on individual mutual
funds and hedge funds rather than country-level portfolio flows; (ii) it focuses on the
recent global financial crisis using a much shorter 5-year sample from 2005 to 2010;
and (iii) it relies exclusively on few observed macroeconomic variables to capture the
push and pull factors with particular emphasis on global risk and liquidity variables.
Consistent with one of our results, Fratzscher (2012) finds that push factors capture
most of the variation of flows before and during the crisis (65% and 73% respectively),
but after the crisis pull factors are more important (55%) than push factors (45%).
Second, Forbes and Warnock (2012) use 30 years of quarterly data on gross
inflows and outflows to analyze waves in international capital flows. They identify
episodes of“surge”, “stop”, “flight”and“retrenchment”as measures of sharp increases
(or decreases) in gross capital inflows (or outflows). Forbes and Warnock (2012) also
find that global factors, and especially global risk, are the key determinants of waves
in international capital flows, while domestic factors are generally insignificant.
More generally, our analysis is highly related to a recent global policy debate
culminating in November 2012, when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pub-
lished its new institutional view on how to manage and control international capital
flows. This view states that “[t]he IMF has developed a comprehensive, flexible,
and balanced view on the management of global capital flows to help give countries
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clear and consistent policy advice.”7 Indeed, the new view of the IMF constitutes a
historical shift, as after years of calling for the abolition of capital controls, the IMF
agreed that capital controls may be a useful tool for managing inflows and may be
used on a case-by-case basis in appropriate circumstances.8
The institutional view of the IMF is consistent with two implications of our main
empirical finding. First, if global economic forces are the primary drivers of interna-
tional portfolio flows, then an effective policy mix for managing these flows should
include capital controls. And second, targeted domestic macroeconomic policies
have a rather limited role in determining international portfolio flows. Therefore, al-
though we do not provide direct evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls, our
empirical results show the predominance of the push over the pull factor, and hence
support the new institutional view of the IMF that capital controls may indeed be
a useful tool for managing flows.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we
describe the dynamic latent factor model and how it is used to capture the push and
pull factors. Section 1.3 briefly reviews the Bayesian estimation methodology. The
data and the empirical results are discussed in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 highlights
the effect of the foreign exchange carry trade in determining portfolio flows, whilst
Section 1.6 analyzes in more detail three country cases: China, India and Brazil.
In Section 1.7, we relate the push and pull factors to macroeconomic variables in
the US and other countries. Finally, Section 1.8 summarizes the key results and
concludes.
7See IMFSurvey (2012).
8Key features of the IMF institutional view include: (i) a recognition that capital flows can have both
substantial benefits and risks for countries; (ii) capital flow liberalization is generally more beneficial
for countries that have surpassed a certain threshold of financial and institutional development; (iii)
liberalization needs to be well planned, timed and sequenced, especially for countries with long-
standing measures to limit capital flows; and (iv) rapid capital inflow surges require appropriate
policy responses both for recipient countries of capital flows and for countries from which flows
originate. For a recent discussion of monetary, macroprudential and financial policies, see also
Gourinchas and Kose (2011), and Gourinchas, Kose, and Claessens (2012).
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1.2 Modeling International Portfolio Flows
1.2.1 The Dynamic Latent Factor Model
Our empirical analysis uses a linear dynamic latent factor model, which is designed
to separate the common from the country-specific components of movements in
international portfolio flows. The model specifies three types of latent factors, which
are independent of one another: (i) a global factor that is common to all countries
and all flows; (ii) two asset-specific (or flow-specific) factors, one that is common to
all bond flows and one that is common to all equity flows; and (iii) a set of country-
specific factors. In this model specification, the common component of bond flows is
captured by the global and bond factors, whereas the common component of equity
flows is captured by the global and equity factors. The country-specific factors are
the idiosyncratic (or domestic) component of bond and equity flows. All factors are
specified as latent persistent processes that follow a normal distribution.
Define yj,n,t as the international portfolio flow of type j = 1, ..., J , for country
n = 1..., N at time t = 1, ..., T . Our data set is for J = 2, where j = 1 denotes
bond flows and j = 2 denotes equity flows, and all flows are from the US to N = 55
other countries. A positive flow is a flow from the US to another country (i.e., a US
outflow), whereas a negative flow is a US inflow. The flows are in millions of US
dollars. The model is specified as follows:





where β0;j,n is a constant, β1;j,n is the global factor loading, gt is the global factor,
β2;j is the flow-specific factor loading, aj,t is the flow-specific factor (i.e., a1,t is the
bond factor and a2,t the equity factor), cn,t is the country-specific factor, and the
error term εj,n,t is Gaussian white noise with constant variance σ
2
ε . Note that cn,t is
the country-specific regular (i.e., persistent and hence predictable) component and
εj,n,t is the country-specific irregular (i.e., random and unpredictable) component.
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In this model, there is one global factor, J = 2 flow-specific factors and N = 55
country specific factors. The factor loadings are all constant over time.
The factors are persistent and follow an AR(2) process:
gt = ρ1,ggt−1 + ρ2,ggt−2 + ug,t, (1.2)
aj,t = ρ1,ajaj,t−1 + ρ2,ajaj,t−2 + uaj ,t, j = 1, 2 (1.3)
cn,t = ρ1,cncn,t−1 + ρ2,cncn,t−2 + ucn,t, n = 1, .., N (1.4)
where ug,t ∼ NID(0, σ
2
g), uaj ,t ∼ NID(0, σ
2
aj




error terms are independent to each other.9
For this model specification, it is straightforward to show that the factor vari-
ances are given as follows:
V ar (gt) =
σ2g




V ar (aj,t) =
σ2aj
1− ρ21,aj − ρ
2
2,aj
, j = 1, 2 (1.6)
V ar (cn,t) =
σ2cn
1− ρ21,cn − ρ
2
2,cn
, n = 1, .., N. (1.7)
The structure described so far does not uniquely identify a factor model as there
is an indeterminacy on the factor rotation. This implies that the sign and the scale
of each dynamic factor is not separately identified from that of its factor loading.
Following Kose et al. (2003, 2008), we solve the sign problem by requiring the first
element of each vector of factor loadings to be positive, and the scale problem by














• B = (β0, β1, β2), where β0 ∈ ℜ
J×N , β1 ∈ ℜ
J×N , and β2 ∈ ℜ
J ;
• ρ = {ρg, ρaj , ρcn}, where ρg ∈ ℜ
2, ρaj ∈ ℜ
J×2, and ρcn ∈ ℜ
N×2; and
9In estimating different versions of the model, we find that AR(2) factors work well. Adding more
lags did not change our results qualitatively but made the model less parsimonious and hence more
difficult to estimate.
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, σ2cn}, where σ
2
ε ∈ ℜ, σ
2
g ∈ ℜ, σ
2
aj
∈ ℜJ , and σ2cn ∈ ℜ
N .
For J = 2 and N = 55, as in our sample, we must estimate 222 parameters for
B, 116 for ρ and 59 for σ2, for a total of 397 parameters.
1.2.2 Push and Pull Factors
The dynamic factor model allows us to investigate the extent to which the bond and
equity flows from the US to another country are due to: (i) a push factor captured by
the global and asset-specific factors, which together reflect the global economic forces
that push capital from (into) the US into (from) another country; and (ii) a pull
factor captured by the country-specific factor that reflects the domestic economic
forces that pull capital into or out of a country other than the US. The extent to
which push or pull factors determine international portfolio flows has important
policy implications. For example, if countries wish to exert some control on the size,
direction and volatility of their capital flows, it is helpful to know whether their
policies need to be coordinated globally or whether instead they should focus on
improving their domestic institutions and macroeconomic policies.
For each type of flow j and country n, the push factor is defined simply as:
Pushj,n,t = β1;j,ngt + β2;jaj,t, j = 1, 2; n = 1, .., N. (1.8)
Note that there is a push factor for the bond flows of every country and another
push factor for the equity flows of every country.
For each country n, the pull factor is defined as:
Pulln,t = cn,t, n = 1, .., N. (1.9)
Note that for a given country n there is one pull factor that is the same for both
bond and equity flows.
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1.2.3 Variance Contributions
The model implies that the variance of each flow j for each country n is equal to:
V ar(yj,n,t) = β
2
1;j,nV ar(gt) + β
2
2;jV ar(aj,t) + V ar(cn,t) + V ar(εj,n,t). (1.10)
Recall that all factors are independent of one another, and hence no covariance terms
enter the equation above.
We are interested in assessing the relative contribution of each factor to the total
variation of yj,n,t that we can explain by the model. This will allow us to evaluate
the extent to which each of the global, asset-specific and country-specific factors
can explain the variance of international portfolio flows. We compute the variance
contribution of each factor for each flow j and country n as follows:
V Cj,n (gt) =
β21;j,nV ar(gt)
β21;j,nV ar(gt) + β
2
2;jV ar(aj,t) + V ar(cn,t)
, (1.11)
V Cj,n (aj,t) =
β22;jV ar(aj,t)
β21;j,nV ar(gt) + β
2
2;jV ar(aj,t) + V ar(cn,t)
, (1.12)
V Cj,n (cn,t) =
V ar(cn,t)
β21;j,nV ar(gt) + β
2
2;jV ar(aj,t) + V ar(cn,t)
. (1.13)
In this setup, the push factor contribution to the variance of flow j for country
n is given by V Cj,n (gt) + V Cj,n (aj,t). The pull factor contribution to the variance
of flow j for country n is given by V Cj,n (cn,t).
1.3 Estimation
We estimate the dynamic factor model using the Bayesian MCMC algorithm of Kose
et al. (2003, 2008), which builds on the procedures developed by Otrok and White-
man (1998) and Chib and Greenberg (1994). The algorithm constructs a Markov
chain with data augmentation, whose limiting distribution is the target posterior
density of the parameters. Bayesian estimation offers two important advantages in
estimating our model specification. First, the Markov chain is a Gibbs sampler in
which large blocks of parameters are drawn sequentially from their full conditional
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posterior distribution. This aspect of the algorithm deals effectively with the high di-
mension of the model and makes Bayesian estimation feasible and efficient. Second,
data augmentation provides a straightforward way for sampling the latent factors
conditional on the data. The sampled factors are then used as an intermediate step
for sampling the model parameters conditional on these latent factors. The Gibbs
sampler is iterated 10,000 times and the sampled draws, beyond a burn-in period of
1,000 iterations, are treated as variates from the target posterior distribution.




and a set of latent factors ft = {gt, aj,t, cn,t}, where the latter must be estimated as
an intermediate step for estimating Θ. The MCMC algorithm sets initial values for
the latent factors and their parameters, and implements three steps:
1. Sample the latent factors ft from the full conditional posterior distribution
p (ft | yt,Θ), which can be shown to be a normal distribution, thus implement-
ing the data augmentation method of Tanner and Wong (1987).
2. Sample all parameters Θ from the full conditional posterior distribution p (Θ | yt,, ft)
using the method of Chib and Greenberg (1994).
3. Repeat for 10,000 iterations, beyond a burn-in period of 1,000 iterations, and
use the sampled draws to compute the posterior means of the parameters.
We implement the Bayesian MCMC estimation algorithm using the following
priors set out by Kose et al. (2003, 2008). For all factor loadings B we use
the prior N(0, 1). For the factor autoregressive parameters ρ we use the prior
N(0, diag {1, 0.5}), thus placing zero prior mass on ρ values which are non-stationary.
Finally, the prior for the factor variances σ2 is IG(6, 0.001). All priors are diffuse.10
10We have experimented with alternative priors and our results remain qualitatively the same.
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1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 International Portfolio Flows Data
Our empirical analysis uses an extensive data set of monthly international bond
and equity flows from the US to 55 other countries. The data are taken from the
Treasury International Capital System (TIC) of the US Treasury Department. The
bond flows are defined as the sum of gross sales by foreigners of their domestic
bonds to US residents. The equity flows are defined as the difference between gross
purchases and gross sales by foreigners of US corporate stocks.11 A positive flow is
an inflow into a country other than the US (i.e., a US outflow), whereas a negative
flow is a US inflow. All flows are in millions of US dollars. Our sample includes
the 55 countries listed in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, and ranges from January 1988 to July
2009.
One advantage of our data selection is its coverage. This data set comprises
a relevant fraction of the capital accounts of several countries over more than two
decades on a monthly basis. Furthermore, the TIC is a reliable source for it con-
sists of all capital in and out flows reported to the US Treasury. Given the above,
we believe the data set chosen is a good representation of a great portion of the
world’s dynamic on capital flows and helps tackle issues that have important policy
implications to the global economy. Despite the fact that the TIC also includes
data on foreign direct investment (FDI) and commercial bank claim flows, one of
the reasons for not including these flows to our data selection is that their frequency
and coverage differ from portfolio flows. Further to that, as we build on a long
literature that uses the same data – as in Sarno and Taylor (1999) – our choice
assures the comparability of our results to earlier research. Besides, whilst bank
flows are very sensitive to liquidity constraints and FDI are more long-termed fo-
11Following a number of studies, we use a gross measure of bond flows and a net measure of equity
flows. For bond flows it is preferable to use a gross measure in order to abstract from the effect of
sterilization policy actions and other types of reserve operations by the monetary authorities (see,
e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 1999).
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cused, portfolio flows are intermediate cases since they do not react as straightaway
as the bank flows, but are more sensitive than FDI (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).
Although total portfolio flows are as prone as bank flows to suffer sudden stops
(Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mej´ıa, 2008), there are not many documents examining how
portfolio flow categories differ from each other. A limitation of our data is that it
considers only bilateral transactions with the US. Ideally, research would consider
international financial trade with the rest of the world. However, being the US the
largest international investor to other countries, we consider these data useful and
appropriate in the current context.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 report descriptive statistics. For bond flows, about half of
the countries on average experience inflows and the other half outflows. In contrast,
most of the equity flows are on average negative, i.e., they are flows into the US.
Equity flows are much larger than bond flows: $25 billion of equity flows on average
left foreign countries and entered the US every month, compared to $676 million of
bond flows. The highest bond flows are from the US into Japan and Brazil, and
from the UK and the Netherlands into the US. The highest equity flows are from
the UK by far, then from Japan, China and Hong Kong.
The tables show that most flows exhibit high standard deviation, negative skew-
ness and high kurtosis. They are also quite persistent with a first order serial corre-
lation ranging from −0.34 to 0.66 for bond flows, and from −0.14 to 0.63 for equity
flows. This motivates the specification of the dynamic latent factors, which are de-
signed to capture the persistence of flows. It is interesting to note that the standard
deviation of equity flows is of the same magnitude as their mean, but for bond flows
the standard deviation is 13 times higher than the mean. This is reflected in Fig-
ure 1.1, which displays the time-variation in the cross-country average of flows (i.e.,
what we refer to as World in the tables). As seen in the figure, flows have been
increasingly volatile in recent years, which is especially true for bond flows.
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Before estimating the dynamic factor model, it is important to establish that
portfolio flows are stationary. Otherwise, the model will not be suitable for capturing
the push and pull factor components of the variation in portfolio flows. To this end,
we perform a series of unit root tests applied to the panel of all flows. The Breitung
(2002) and Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) tests are for the null hypothesis that there
is a common unit root in all portfolio flows. In contrast, the panel Augmented
Dickey-Fuller, Phillips and Perron (1988) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) tests
allow the serial correlation to be different across flows. The unit root tests can be
performed with or without fixed effects and linear trends. The results for this battery
of tests are reported in Table 1.3, which shows that non-stationarity is rejected in
all cases. Hence there is overwhelming evidence that international portfolio flows
are stationary.12
As the last diagnostic of our preliminary analysis, we perform principal compo-
nent analysis to determine how many common components are needed to capture
the variation of bond and equity flows. We find that three principal components
explain 75% of the variance of flows: the first component 59%, the second one 12%,
and the third one 4%. The three principal components are plotted in Figure 1.2.
This analysis provides a static decomposition of the variance of portfolio flows, and
hence it is not directly related to our specification of the dynamic factor model. It
does, however, motivate our core empirical analysis as it suggests that few common
factors can capture a large part of the movements in international portfolio flows.
In what follows, we explore this in more detail as we discuss the empirical results
from estimating the dynamic factor model.
12Some earlier studies find a unit root in international capital flows (e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 1999).
In contrast to these studies, we use panel (as opposed to individual) unit root tests for a much
longer sample period, which adds significant power to the tests and allows us to clearly reject non-
stationarity. This is reassuring since it is generally difficult to explain why capital flows would be
non-stationary.
40
1.4.2 The Dynamics of Factors
The main feature of the dynamic factor model is that it decomposes the time varia-
tion of flows into a push factor (captured by global and flow-specific factors) and a
pull factor (captured by the country factor). The factor dynamics are captured by
their serial correlation at two lags (ρ1 and ρ2) as specified in Equations (2)-(4). Es-
timates of these serial correlations are reported in Table 1.4 for the common factors
as well as groupings of the country-specific factors based on geography and economic
development.
The regional groupings of countries are formed as follows. Europe includes Aus-
tria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. North America is Canada and
Mexico. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Asia and Ocea-
nia include Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand
and Turkey. Africa includes Egypt, Liberia, Morocco and South Africa.
We also report results for the G8 vs. the non-G8 countries, the G20 vs. the non-
G20 countries, and for the large emerging economies collectively known as BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) vs. the non-BRICS countries. Fi-
nally, World is the average across all 55 countries in the sample.
As shown in Table 1.4, ρ1 revolves mostly between 0.3 and 0.4, and ρ2 mostly
between 0.2 and 0.3. Notably, the global factor has the highest serial correlation,
whereas the bond factor is more persistent than the equity factor. The country
factors seem to have similar persistence across geographic regions and the G8, G20
and BRICS groupings of countries. To provide a visual illustration of some of these
results, Figure 1.3 plots the three common factors (global, bond and equity factors)
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over time. The global factor (top panel of Figure 1.3) shows an interesting behaviour.
Its notable downward trend in late 2000s possibly reflects a retrenchment of US flows,
consistent with the analysis on the US dollar shortage by McGuire and von Peter
(2009), who explain how the sudden redemptions faced by the US dollar money
market was experienced by international banks during the last financial crisis. As
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) point out, investors repatriated funds invested abroad
during the financial crisis, and that “[t]he collapse in capital flows reflects an active
reduction of the portfolio share of foreign assets by investors, and not just a portfolio
adjustment following a reduction in wealth.”
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) also note that this retrenchment of capital flows
from countries with weakest fundamentals and higher exposure to financial sector
did not performed equally across flow types. Whilst bank flows behaved globally
as severely affected, portfolio flows were not as vulnerable to these constraints in
liquidity. In fact, one of their main findings is the heterogeneity with which the
pull-back of capital flows was observed amongst flow categories: bank flows showing
the most severe reaction, FDI the least severe response, and portfolio flows observing
moderate retrenchment during the last financial crisis. In light of this, our estimated
bond and equity factors (middle and bottom panel of Figure 1.3) also show inter-
esting features. One the one hand, the bond factor becomes more unstable during
the 2008-2009 crisis, although its volume is much smaller than the equity factor
across time, except in the late 2000s. The equity factor is more volatile and reflects
larger swings than the bond flows: one around the dotcom bubble, and the other
around the 2008-2009 crisis. After the dotcom bubble, the equity factor also shows
a positive trend, in line with the increasing financial integration observed in the last
decade, driven by increases in actual investment and steady raise in portfolio share
during early 2000s (see, e.g., WorldBank, 2006b; McGuire and von Peter (2009);
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011)). It is reassuring to note that, as expected, the bond
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and equity factors seem to have similar time-variation to the actual bond and equity
flows, respectively, illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1.4.3 The Variance Contribution of Push and Pull Factors
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to determine the contribution of push
and pull factors to the variation of international bond and equity flows. The push
factor is the sum of the contributions of the global and bond factors for bond flows
or of the global and equity factors for equity flows. The pull factor is simply the
contribution of the country factor. We estimate the dynamic factor model and use
the parameter estimates to compute the variance contribution of each factor as in
Equations (1.11)-(1.13). The results for all 55 countries are reported in Table 1.5
for bond flows and Table 1.6 for equity flows.
Our main finding is that the push factor tends to contribute more than 80%
to the variance of portfolio flows, whereas the pull factor tends to contribute less
than 20%. For bond flows, the push factor contribution is higher than 90% for
half of the countries, whereas for equity flows this is the case for two thirds of the
countries. For example, the pull factor can be as low as 0.7% for Argentina (bonds),
the Philippines (equities) and Singapore (equities). Overall, the contribution of the
push factor tends to be higher for equity flows than bond flows.
In addition to the country results in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, we also report regional
results in Table 1.7. Across regions, the push factor for bonds ranges from 77.3%
for Europe to 88.5% for North America, and for equities from 86.3% for Europe
to 98.0% for North America.13 Finally, for the World, the push factor is 83.0%
for bond flows and 89.0% for equity flows. Hence, irrespective of which region we
examine, our main finding remains that about 80% or more of the variation in bond
and equity flows is driven by common factors.
13The high value of the push factor for North America is not surprising. North America includes only
Canada and Mexico, which are the two economies most highly integrated with the US economy.
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A similar picture emerges if we group countries by their level of development.
Let us first consider bond flows, where the regional variation is the largest. For the
G8 countries, the push factor contributes 73.6%, whereas for the non-G8 countries
84.3%. Therefore, although the push factor remains high, it is higher for developing
countries. The gap closes a bit when we consider the G20 countries (77.9% for push
factor) vs. non-G20 countries (85.2%). However, for the BRICS the gap remains
high at 73.7% vs. 83.9% for non-BRICS countries. It is interesting to note that the
decomposition of push-pull factors for the bond flows of the BRICS is the same as
for the G8. The differences are slightly less pronounced for equity flows.
Recall that the sample period used in our main analysis ranges from January
1988 to July 2009. In Table 1.8, we provide further results using a subsample that
captures the recent financial crisis period beginning in July 2007 and ending in March
2009. This sample range is consistent with the crisis period examined by Fratzscher
(2012).14 The results indicate that, over the crisis period, the contribution of the
push factor falls and that of the pull factor rises. However, although clear, this
change is not dramatic in the sense that the size of the push factor still overshadows
that of the pull factor. For example, the World push factor for bond flows falls from
83.0% to 67.7%, whereas for equity flows it falls from 89.0% to 75.8%.15 Finally, over
the crisis period, the push factor remains higher for developing economies outside
the G8, G20 and the BRICS. In short, we conclude that the push factor dominates
the pull factor even during the recent financial crisis, albeit to a lesser extent.
1.5 Bond Flows and the Carry Trade
The carry trade is a popular currency trading strategy that invests in high-interest
currencies by borrowing in low-interest currencies. This strategy is at the core of
14Fratzscher (2012) defines the financial crisis from August 7, 2007 to March 15, 2009.
15It is interesting to note that the reduction in the push factor is almost exclusively driven by a
reduction in the flow-specific (bond or equity) factor, not a reduction in the global factor. In other
words, the common component of the variation across all countries and all flows (i.e., the global
factor) is the same before and during the crisis.
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active currency management and is designed to exploit deviations from uncovered
interest parity (UIP). If UIP holds, the interest rate differential is on average offset
by a commensurate depreciation of the investment currency and the expected carry
trade return is zero. There is extensive empirical evidence dating back to Bilson
(1981) and Fama (1984) that UIP is empirically rejected. In practice, it is often
the case that high-interest rate currencies appreciate rather than depreciate. As a
result, over the last four decades, the carry trade has delivered sizeable excess returns
and a Sharpe ratio more than twice that of the US stock market (e.g., Burnside,
Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo, 2011). It is no surprise, therefore, that the
carry trade has attracted enormous attention among academics and practitioners.
Indeed, by early 2007 it was estimated that about one trillion US dollars was at stake
just in the yen carry trade (Economist, 2007), where investors borrow in Japanese
yen at very low rates to fund investments in high-interest currencies. In short, carry
trades (interest rate differentials) are likely to be very important drivers of bond
flows.
The carry trade strategy for a particular currency (or a portfolio of currencies)
can be implemented in one of two equivalent ways. First, the investor may buy a
forward contract now for exchanging the domestic currency into foreign currency
in the future. She may then convert the proceeds of the forward contract into the
domestic currency at the future spot exchange rate. Second, and alternatively, the
investor may buy a foreign bond and, at the same time, sell a domestic bond. The
foreign bond yields a riskless return in the foreign currency but a risky return in the
domestic currency of the investor. Hence the investor who buys the foreign bond is
exposed to foreign exchange risk. It is straightforward to show that the returns to the
two strategies are exactly equal due to the covered interest parity (CIP) condition
that holds in the absence of riskless arbitrage. As a result, there is an equivalence
between, on the one hand, trading currencies through spot and forward contracts
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and, on the other hand, trading international bonds.
In this context, it is interesting to use our empirical results to examine the size of
the push and pull factors for the bond flows of some of the countries most affected by
the carry trade in foreign exchange. As interest rates, the drivers of the carry trade,
are predominantly determined by domestic monetary policies, we would expect that
countries most affected by the carry trade would have a higher-than-average pull
factor in their bond flows. In a recent paper, Cenedese, Sarno, and Tsiakas (2012)
find that two prominent low-interest countries involved in the carry trade are Japan
and Switzerland, whereas two prominent high-interest countries are Australia and
South Africa. For these countries, the size of the pull factor for bond flows as
shown in Table 1.5 is as follows: 19.1% for Japan, 36.8% for Switzerland, 38.1% for
Australia and 44.3% for South Africa. These values are substantially higher than
the world average of 17%. We conclude, therefore, that the carry trade is a likely
contributor to the higher-than-average effect of the pull factor in determining bond
flows for countries with the lowest and highest interest rates.
1.6 Country Cases
In this section we analyze a subset of our results in greater depth by focusing on
three of the most prominent emerging economies: China, India and Brazil. These
countries belong to the G20, are members of the BRICS and, due to their fast-
growing economies in recent years, have emerged as global economic powerhouses.
An interesting aspect of our empirical analysis is that in terms of portfolio flows
the three countries exhibit different patterns. For example, the pull factor for bond
flows is extremely high in Brazil, close to the world average for China and well below
average for India. Our country analysis follows with further details.
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China
China is the world’s second largest economy by nominal GDP after the US. It is also
the world’s fastest-growing major economy with an average annual growth rate of
about 10% over the past 30 years. The management of international capital flows
has been a key factor in supporting China’s economic miracle (see, e.g., Yu, 2010).
In the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of capital flows were due to foreign direct
investment, but since the early 2000s equity and bond flows have grown significantly.
For example, the surge in bond flows is related to China’s accumulation of large
foreign exchange reserves and the dramatic increase of foreign bond purchases by
Chinese financial institutions. The surge in equity flows is due to recent structural
reforms of the equity market and the wave of initial public offerings of Chinese
enterprises abroad, especially in the Hong Kong stock exchange.
Despite the increased prominence of China’s economy in the last three decades,
in terms of the relative importance of push and pull factors for portfolio flows, China
is close to the world average. Specifically, the empirical results reported in Tables
1.5 to 1.8 indicate that the pull factor for China accounts for 17.5% of the variation
in bond flows and 5.8% for equity flows. These are similar to the world average value
of the pull factor, which is 17% for bond flows and 11% for equity flows. Hence our
analysis shows that China is a rather typical country in terms of the push-pull factor
decomposition.
India
India is the tenth-largest economy in the world by nominal GDP and, over the last
decade, it is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Portfolio flows were
liberalized in the early 1990s, when in the face of a balance of payments crisis,
India followed an IMF structural adjustment program (see, e.g., Shah and Patnaik,
2010). This resulted in a sustained increase of equity inflows primarily by foreign
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institutional investors increasing their holdings of Indian companies. There has also
been a large increase of bond outflows by massive purchases of US Treasury bills
and other foreign assets by the Indian central bank in building its foreign exchange
reserves. At the same time, however, debt inflows have been hampered as India has
no sovereign debt program.
In this context, our empirical results indicate that the pull factor for India ac-
counts only for 4.2% of the variation in both bond and equity flows. This is far
below the world average value of the pull factor of 17% for bond flows and 11% for
equity flows. Therefore, our analysis shows that India’s portfolio flows are largely
dominated by global economic forces.
Brazil
Brazil is the world’s sixth largest economy by nominal GDP, the largest in Latin
America and one of the fastest-growing major economies in the world. In recent
years, Brazil has dominated capital inflows to Latin America due its deep capital
markets, very high interest rates (11.25% in 2010) and the accumulation of large
foreign exchange reserves. As estimated by the IMF (2011), these conditions have
reinforced the effect of pull factors as, for example, high domestic interest rates have
increased carry trading activity investing in Brazilian bonds.
This is clearly confirmed by our empirical results, which indicate that the pull
factor for Brazil accounts for an enormous 64.0% of the variation in bond flows,
which is the second highest among all countries and 47% higher than the world
average. In contrast, Brazil’s pull factor for equity flows is 11.5%, which is roughly
equal to the world average. Hence our analysis shows that Brazil is quite a distinct
country as bond flows are largely determined by domestic economic conditions.
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Beyond the Numbers
Literature built during the 1990s and 2000s have agreed that the significant increase
in capital flows into the developing world has been driven by both push and pull
factors. In particular, the last decade has been a combination of rapid EMEs growth
and less attractive financial conditions in advanced economies. Added to that, con-
tinuous financial integration and improvement of institutional quality of EMEs has
also encouraged more capital to these economies.
According to WorldBank (2006a), the BRICS are amongst the top ten recipients
of portfolio flows to the developing world. The comparison with other developing
countries is astonishing not only at the levels: in 2010, the BRICS showed a much
higher increase on their net capital inflows (around 75%) compared to the increase
in the other 125 countries (around 58%). However, despite being considered as
the major developing countries, the BRICS also differ amongst each other, hence
capital flows into each individual member would be expected to be driven by different
factors, or at least by different degrees of their common factors.
More specifically, whilst China is the least indebted of the BRICS, Brazil is the
most heavily indebted in relation to export earnings. In terms of income there are
also important differences: although India is the poorest of the BRICS and Russia
the richest, the literature still consideres both countries as comparable capital flow
recipients. In terms of shares of the total, China has received the highest portion of
the aggregate equity flows that has been received by the BRICS in the last decade
(WorldBank, 2006a).
Goldfajn and Minella (2005) note that Brazil has shown much greater volatility
of the portfolio component compared to the FDI component of its capital account.
Furthermore, sudden stops in Brazil have been much more pronounced during do-
mestic crises compared to the responses observed in capital flows during the other
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external crises that the Brazilian economy has faced.16
With regards to India, this is an intermediate case between China and Brazil. As
mentioned above, India started increasing its financial openness in the 1990s. How-
ever, this is a still ongoing process compared to the Brazilian experience (Economist,
2007). As noted by Mohan (2008), the potential for sudden stops and reversals had
kept Indian authorities cautiously handling the international financial trade require-
ments. India has increased more than five times its gross capital flows as percent of
GDP in 2000s. As most EMEs, India has favoured of sustained fundamentals that
might have attracted flows. However, contrary to most EMEs that have seen FDI
flows increases in the last decades, India has received relatively much more equity
flows. This is consistent with the search for yield due to the low interest rates in
advanced economies as push factors.
To sum up, the interesting feature about the BRICS – and the reason for
analysing Brazil, India and China as country cases – is that, although represent-
ing some of the greatest EMEs, not only they differ in terms of economic structure
and policy frameworks, but also in terms of capital flow drivers. The latter is cor-
roborated with our results.
1.7 Push Factors, Pull Factors and Macroeconomic In-
formation
Having identified the variance contribution of push and pull factors, we turn to the
economic determinants of these latent factors. The first question we address is about
the push factor: which observed US macroeconomic indicators can explain the push
factor for portfolio flows from the US to other countries? We answer this question
by regressing combinations of the monthly common (global, bond and equity) fac-
tors on six monthly macroeconomic variables: (i) the US industrial production gap
16The authors identify the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1998,
and the Argentinean crisis in 2001.
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estimated using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter, which is based on season-
ally adjusted US industrial production data taken from the Federal Reserve Board;
(ii) the US 7-year nominal bond yield also taken from the Federal Reserve Board;
(iii) the ratio of the 12-month returns of the US/World MSCI stock market indices
taken from Datastream; (iv) the 12-month change in the VIX index (∆VIX) taken
from Bloomberg, which is based on the 1-month model-free implied volatility of the
S&P 500 equity index and is generally regarded as a measure of global risk ap-
petite (e.g., Brunnermeier et al., 2009); (v) the TED spread, which is a measure of
liquidity defined as the difference between the 3-month LIBOR interbank market
interest rate and the 3-month risk-free T-bill rate both taken from Bloomberg;17
and (vi) a lagged value of the factors. Conditioning on this set of variables allows
us to determine whether US forces relating to the real economy, long interest rates,
performance of the US stock market relative to the world, global risk aversion and
liquidity can explain the push of flows from the US to other countries.
Table 1.9 reports the results for the global factor, the bond factor and the equity
factor.18 We can summarize our main results as follows. First, the effect of the
global factor in determining flows from the US to other countries is higher when US
industrial production is low, the US stock market performs worse relative to the rest
of the world, and liquidity is high (i.e., the TED spread is low). Second, the effect of
the bond factor in determining bond flows from the US to other countries is higher
when US long bond yields are low, the US stock market performs better than the
rest of the world, and global risk aversion increases (i.e., high ∆VIX). Finally, the
effect of the equity factor in determining equity flows from the US to other countries
17The LIBOR rate reflects uncollateralized lending in the interbank market that is subject to default
risk, whereas the T-bill rate is generally considered riskless because it is guaranteed by the US
government. When banks face liquidity problems the TED spread typically increases, and the
T-bill yield often falls due to “flight-to-liquidity” or “flight-to-quality” (e.g., Brunnermeier et al.,
2009).
18We do not report results for the global plus bond factor and the global plus equity factor because
these summations are not equal to the push factor for bonds and equities, respectively. Recall that
the latter are weighted by the relevant factor loadings so that they are specific to each flow and
country (see Eq. (1.8)).
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is higher when US industrial production is low, US long bond yields are high, and
global risk aversion decreases.
These results tend to be consistent with what we would expect ex ante based
on standard economic theory. In particular, high equity outflows are related to
slow economic activity in the US and an underperforming US stock market. High
bond outflows are related to low US interest rates. High liquidity facilitates higher
outflows. And finally, when global risk aversion increases there are higher bond
outflows, whereas when it decreases there are higher equity outflows. In short,
therefore, our findings seem to make perfect economic sense.
Overall, the adjusted R2 values indicate that the macroeconomic variables can
explain 61% of the global factor, 38% of the bond factor, and 13% of the equity fac-
tor. We conclude, therefore, that observed US macroeconomic variables at best can
explain about half (or less) of the variation of the latent common factors. This mo-
tivates our use of a latent factor model since a considerable amount of the variation
of the latent factors is difficult to explain by observed variables.19
The second question we address is about the pull factor: which domestic macroe-
conomic indicators can explain the pull factor for portfolio flows for each individual
country? We answer this question by estimating a panel regression of all monthly
pull factors on a set of domestic monthly macroeconomic variables for each individual
country. The explanatory variables for each country include: (i) real annual eco-
nomic growth rate, which is seasonally adjusted and taken from Datastream; (ii) the
nominal 7-year bond yield taken from Datastream; (iii) the monthly MSCI national
stock index return taken from Datastream; (iv) the Chinn and Ito (2008) measure
of capital account openness taken from Hiroyuki Ito’s website; and (v) lagged values
19To back up this conclusion, we test whether these variables are redundant for the equations estimated
for each factor, we estimated a AR(1) model for each case. The coefficients of the lagged global,
bond and equity factor were respectively 0.74, 0.56 and 0.14, and the adjusted R2 were 51%, 22%,
and 0% respectively – only lagged global and bond factors were significant. The Wald test for the
null hypothesis of the macroeconomic variables coefficients being jointly equal to zero (to which
results are also summarised in Table 1.9) indicates that the variables chosen are relevant in the
model, and that the improvement of the goodness of fit is economically significant.
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of the pull factors. Due to lack of data availability for some countries, the panel
regressions include 26 of the 55 countries for a sample that begins in January 1996
and ends in July 2009. For this reason, we also use the same sample range of January
1996 to July 2009 for the push factor results in Table 1.9 discussed above. This way
the results in Table 1.9 on the push factor and Table 1.10 on the pull factor are
directly comparable in terms of sample range.20
The results in Table 1.10 on the pull factor indicate the following. The growth
rate is positively related to the pull factor: the higher the domestic growth the higher
the effect of the pull factor in attracting flows into a country. The long bond yield
is significantly positively related to the pull factor: the higher the domestic interest
rate, the more important the pull factor, and this is the carry trade effect. The
openness degree is positively related to the pull factor: the more open an economy
is the more important the pull factor in determining international portfolio flows.21
The lagged country factors also have a significant positive effect. Note, however, that
of these variables only the long interest rate and the lagged pull factor are significant,
with the openness degree being borderline insignificant. Finally, the adjusted R2 in
this panel regression is 9.8% indicating that the observed macroeconomic variables
capture a rather small portion of the explanatory power of the latent pull factors.
Again, this further motivates the use of a latent factor methodology to capture the
dynamics of international portfolio flows.
1.8 Conclusion
An important challenge to policymakers across the world is the design of effective
policies that deal with movements in international portfolio flows. These policies
20The panel regressions include the following 26 countries: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands,
Norway, Philippines, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand and
United Kingdom.
21See, also, Kose et al. (2009), who find that capital account openness has a strong effect on output
growth.
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are better informed if we can empirically disentangle the relative importance of
push factors that are external to the economies receiving the flows and pull factors
that are internal. Our study contributes to the debate on what drives international
portfolio flows by estimating a dynamic latent factor model using more than 20 years
of monthly international bond and equity flows from the US to 55 other countries.
The advantage of this model is that it provides a flexible way for assessing the
relative importance of the contribution of push and pull factors to the variation in
international bond and equity flows.
We find that the push factor dominates the pull factor by explaining more than
80% of the variance of international portfolio flows. This holds for the vast majority
of countries, all geographic regions and for both bond and equity flows. The strength
of the push factor is even more pronounced for equity flows than bond flows, and for
developing countries than advanced economies. However, the pull factor tends to be
higher for the G8, the G20 and the BRICS countries. It is even higher for countries
involved in the foreign exchange carry trade, than it is for countries with very low
or very high interest rates. Notably, over the crisis period, the role of the push
factor diminishes as on average the contribution of the pull factor to the variance of
flows effectively doubles. Furthermore, the dynamics of push and pull factors can be
explained to some extent by US and foreign macroeconomic indicators respectively.
The empirical evidence reported in this chapter essentially confirms the public
perception that forces related to financial globalization are the primary determinants
of international portfolio flows. Therefore, countries exposure to global (rather than
domestic) risks appear to be more important in informing the domestic policy re-
sponse to time-varying international portfolio flows. This suggests that compared
to domestic macroeconomic policies, capital controls may be a more effective pol-
icy tool for countries aiming to stimulate economic growth partly by managing the
consequences of international portfolio flows. Indeed, the new institutional view of
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the IMF announced in November 2012 recognizes that this may be the case. Al-
though we do not explicitly provide direct evidence on the effectiveness of capital
controls, our empirical findings contribute to this debate and lend support to the
new institutional view of the IMF on capital controls.
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Figure 1.1: International Portfolio Flows
The figure displays the cross-country average of monthly international portfolio flows from the US
to 55 other countries. The top panel shows the bond flows and bottom panel the equity flows. A
positive flow is a flow from the US to another country (i.e., a US outflow), whereas a negative flow
is a US inflow. All flows are in millions of US dollars. The sample period ranges from January 1988
to July 2009.
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Figure 1.2: Principal Components
The figure illustrates the first three principal components that explain the variance of monthly
international bond and equity flows from the US to 55 other countries. A positive flow is a flow
from the US to another country (i.e., a US outflow), whereas a negative flow is a US inflow. All
flows are in millions of US dollars. The sample period ranges from January 1988 to July 2009.
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Figure 1.3: Dynamic Push Factors
The figure shows the three dynamic push factors that explain the common variation in monthly
international portfolio flows from the US to 55 other countries. The top panel shows the global
factor, the middle panel the bond factor and the bottom panel the equity factor. The dashed lines
display the 33% and 66% quantile bands of the factors’ posterior distribution. A positive flow is a
flow from the US to another country (i.e., a US outflow), whereas a negative flow is a US inflow.
All flows are in millions of US dollars. The sample period ranges from January 1988 to July 2009.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Bond Flows
Mean St. Dev Skew Kurt AR(1)
1 Argentina 0.36 136.44 −0.23 8.79 0.16
2 Australia 68.28 468.03 0.96 8.13 0.23
3 Austria −13.17 87.97 −0.48 4.26 0.37
4 Brazil 216.04 528.12 3.59 15.70 0.53
5 Bulgaria 0.92 8.22 5.18 52.00 0.28
6 Canada −148.52 1252.70 −0.73 3.20 0.15
7 Chile −4.73 125.63 0.98 16.65 0.08
8 China 33.92 351.69 1.91 53.66 0.06
9 Colombia −2.43 46.82 4.29 41.79 0.05
10 Czech Republic −5.82 64.34 −6.41 67.81 0.34
11 Denmark −43.06 219.80 0.76 11.27 0.17
12 Ecuador −3.08 17.94 −0.93 7.48 0.18
13 Egypt 3.01 38.84 1.53 10.00 0.18
14 Finland −3.87 204.20 −2.11 19.18 0.12
15 France −158.59 1918.75 −0.19 5.36 −0.28
16 Germany −109.02 1604.79 0.74 10.02 0.41
17 Greece 3.38 73.26 −0.30 8.28 0.14
18 Guatemala −0.53 5.72 4.69 56.99 0.16
19 Hong Kong −86.83 1757.36 −2.28 13.49 0.52
20 Hungary −1.17 36.70 3.05 40.01 0.02
21 India 23.82 307.92 −0.39 36.09 0.15
22 Indonesia 11.95 76.42 1.24 11.20 0.17
23 Israel 26.90 198.72 0.04 24.84 0.14
24 Italy −55.10 579.94 −1.93 7.34 0.61
25 Jamaica −1.62 6.32 −3.84 24.96 0.33
26 Japan 656.71 2562.90 0.23 2.13 0.66
27 Lebanon −3.59 15.17 −0.86 4.19 0.10
28 Liberia 13.86 75.71 3.78 19.46 0.41
29 Malaysia 23.85 121.58 1.13 5.92 0.29
30 Mexico 4.46 384.02 0.05 3.85 0.41
31 Morocco 0.10 9.07 −7.78 79.74 0.06
32 Netherlands −236.62 1074.97 −3.69 33.99 0.13
33 Norway −150.14 429.23 −2.57 9.34 0.57
34 Pakistan 3.46 22.97 2.14 10.98 0.35
35 Panama −38.11 317.77 −14.23 220.69 0.00
36 Peru 6.46 73.94 8.65 117.51 0.09
37 Philippines 9.28 35.82 −0.18 12.51 0.22
38 Poland 4.49 23.35 1.39 5.31 0.46
39 Portugal 7.08 118.74 3.65 43.39 0.06
40 Romania −0.76 15.16 −15.53 246.97 0.01
41 Russia −0.13 91.36 0.37 13.06 0.30
42 Serbia-Montenegro 0.44 10.56 4.14 93.09 0.01
43 Singapore −165.98 1410.48 −0.42 6.25 0.44
44 South Africa 25.36 123.41 3.56 34.21 0.29
45 South Korea 64.23 343.44 −0.90 6.47 0.32
46 Spain −41.17 334.43 −1.38 5.32 0.25
47 Sweden −88.34 595.00 −0.46 4.72 0.50
48 Switzerland −101.22 912.54 −0.56 6.60 0.38
49 Taiwan 164.62 849.86 5.61 40.33 0.57
50 Thailand 5.93 57.40 −0.77 8.44 0.20
51 Trinidad-Tobago −1.44 15.83 −1.56 13.59 −0.34
52 Turkey 22.06 147.21 4.98 44.83 0.20
53 United Kingdom −594.78 4546.91 −0.28 2.60 0.20
54 Uruguay −14.52 36.84 1.05 19.64 0.37
55 Venezuela −3.11 94.04 3.29 30.01 −0.04
World −12.30 453.93 0.04 30.98 0.23
The table reports descriptive statistics for the monthly bond flows from the US to 55 other countries.
A positive number implies a flow from the US to another country (i.e., a US outflow). All flows are
in millions of US dollars. World is the average across all 55 countries in the sample. The sample
period ranges from January 1988 to July 2009. AR(1) is the first order autocorrelation.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
Equity Flows
Mean St. Dev Skew Kurt AR(1)
1 Argentina −34.33 440.30 0.82 4.94 0.22
2 Australia 121.35 1357.02 1.57 7.35 0.20
3 Austria −38.19 378.46 0.36 6.90 0.22
4 Brazil −364.77 2853.28 −0.09 16.81 0.53
5 Bulgaria −2.18 30.59 −0.22 30.15 −0.01
6 Canada −494.82 2514.62 0.35 2.59 0.09
7 Chile −85.92 352.26 −1.90 13.21 0.21
8 China −3343.89 5921.25 −2.09 7.09 0.69
9 Colombia 1.66 442.99 2.49 18.77 0.09
10 Czech Republic −37.41 219.62 −0.80 13.00 0.05
11 Denmark −34.67 596.59 3.21 25.33 −0.04
12 Ecuador −1.36 80.47 5.17 40.10 0.04
13 Egypt −14.18 195.57 1.51 14.39 0.01
14 Finland 5.28 255.63 2.21 14.69 0.13
15 France −232.30 2244.60 −0.18 4.78 0.17
16 Germany −715.02 2322.77 1.04 6.77 0.20
17 Greece −48.42 287.61 −4.46 35.99 0.25
18 Guatemala 0.05 60.21 1.39 17.60 0.06
19 Hong Kong −1485.59 2187.97 −1.12 2.19 0.63
20 Hungary 13.29 244.99 5.18 64.71 0.18
21 India −22.98 458.33 −0.82 14.78 0.15
22 Indonesia 24.51 406.97 0.92 4.94 0.16
23 Israel −42.28 644.40 −0.36 4.83 0.18
24 Italy −158.93 811.19 0.85 7.33 0.03
25 Jamaica −9.52 61.29 2.79 19.54 0.17
26 Japan −4449.34 8412.84 −1.24 2.92 0.54
27 Lebanon −4.71 23.07 −0.92 25.74 0.17
28 Liberia −24.15 108.88 −3.05 18.52 0.34
29 Malaysia −56.14 617.19 −0.96 6.43 0.39
30 Mexico −363.81 1882.65 −1.63 12.94 0.06
31 Morocco 14.51 71.82 1.72 6.28 0.63
32 Netherlands 90.46 1478.02 0.97 4.12 0.07
33 Norway −292.21 3565.08 −0.50 10.19 0.22
34 Pakistan 10.90 61.96 8.95 105.20 0.26
35 Panama −55.92 182.42 2.52 12.45 0.20
36 Peru −66.97 244.14 −1.40 19.85 0.41
37 Philippines 3.81 259.04 0.84 4.80 0.06
38 Poland −55.49 463.90 −1.23 12.12 0.02
39 Portugal −47.41 292.55 3.30 37.45 0.17
40 Romania −18.29 141.25 −0.54 7.54 −0.10
41 Russia −324.46 1388.36 −0.53 8.92 0.58
42 Serbia-Montenegro −4.12 37.28 0.00 19.29 0.12
43 Singapore −393.85 1554.00 −0.40 0.49 0.02
44 South Africa 21.54 204.82 3.24 38.03 0.13
45 South Korea −291.63 1683.12 2.15 16.05 0.31
46 Spain −149.34 1423.61 −0.21 3.86 0.37
47 Sweden −84.15 888.72 −0.22 22.15 0.02
48 Switzerland −273.53 1318.48 −1.81 18.50 0.11
49 Taiwan −552.31 1531.45 0.29 3.21 0.38
50 Thailand −22.24 692.31 −0.97 24.65 0.12
51 Trinidad-Tobago −6.21 75.08 6.90 80.42 0.12
52 Turkey 4.42 585.21 0.35 5.99 −0.14
53 United Kingdom −10603.85 14037.86 −1.49 2.95 0.65
54 Uruguay −35.54 179.04 1.01 9.09 0.07
55 Venezuela −16.35 465.92 6.79 75.88 0.09
World −455.40 1258.89 0.72 18.45 0.20
The table reports descriptive statistics for the monthly equity flows from the US to 55 other coun-
tries. A positive number implies a flow from the US to another country (i.e., a US outflow). All
flows are in millions of US dollars. World is the average across all 55 countries in the sample. The
sample period ranges from January 1988 to July 2009. AR(1) is the first order autocorrelation.
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Table 1.3: Panel Unit Root Tests
Exogenous variables
Individual effects Individual effects None
and linear trends
common unit root process
Breitung (2002) −5.1∗∗∗
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) −168.7∗∗∗ −126.4∗∗∗ −111.8∗∗∗
individual unit root process
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1984) −93.7∗∗∗ −89.2∗∗∗ −93.4∗∗∗
Phillips-Perron (1988) −110.9∗∗∗ −109.6∗∗∗ −115.8∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) −133.6∗∗∗ −120.5∗∗∗
The table presents panel unit root tests for monthly bond and equity flows from the US to 55 other
countries. The null of the tests is that there is a unit root. The Breitung (2002) and Levin, Lin
and Chu (2002) tests are for a common unit root. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (Said and Dickey,
1984), Philips-Perron (1988) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) tests allow the serial correlation to
be different across flows. All test statistics are asymptotically normally distributed. *** indicates
statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample period ranges from January
1988 to July 2009.
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North America 0.37 0.26
Latin America 0.34 0.23
Asia and Oceania 0.36 0.22
Africa 0.34 0.20
G8 countries 0.32 0.21
non-G8 countries 0.35 0.23
G20 countries 0.35 0.21
non-G20 countries 0.34 0.24
BRICS countries 0.42 0.15
non-BRICS countries 0.33 0.24
WORLD 0.34 0.23
The table shows the posterior means of the serial correlation parameters (ρ1 and ρ2 for two lags)
in the dynamic factors. These include the global factor, the flow (bond/equity) factor and regional
averages of the country factors. Europe includes Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Serbia-Montenegro, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. North America is Canada
and Mexico. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Asia and Oceania include Aus-
tralia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines,
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. Africa includes Egypt, Liberia, Mo-
rocco and South Africa. World is the average across all 55 countries in the sample. The sample
period ranges from January 1988 to July 2009.
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Argentina 77.8 21.5 99.3 0.7 Liberia 84.0 14.7 98.7 1.3
Australia 12.5 49.4 61.9 38.1 Malaysia 1.0 96.8 97.8 2.2
Austria 0.6 1.4 2.0 98.0 Mexico 6.1 78.6 84.7 15.3
Brazil 16.2 19.8 36.0 64.0 Morocco 43.4 41.6 85.0 15.0
Bulgaria 5.2 78.4 83.6 16.4 Netherlands 12.4 50.4 62.8 37.2
Canada 75.3 17.0 92.3 7.7 Norway 6.5 82.2 88.7 11.3
Chile 8.7 87.9 96.6 3.4 Pakistan 27.9 40.6 68.5 31.5
China 66.6 15.9 82.5 17.5 Panama 16.9 64.0 80.9 19.1
Colombia 56.3 25.4 81.6 18.4 Peru 11.1 65.6 76.7 23.3
Czech Rep. 89.3 8.0 97.3 2.7 Philippines 55.6 17.4 73.0 27.0
Denmark 1.3 96.9 98.2 1.8 Poland 28.7 58.4 87.0 13.0
Ecuador 26.0 43.6 69.6 30.4 Portugal 32.3 65.4 97.7 2.3
Egypt 4.1 88.7 92.7 7.3 Romania 25.3 69.8 95.1 4.9
Finland 7.5 62.7 70.2 29.8 Russia 5.2 93.3 98.5 1.5
France 16.0 67.8 83.8 16.2 Serbia-Montenegro 33.4 43.2 76.6 23.4
Germany 42.5 36.3 78.8 21.2 Singapore 15.2 77.3 92.5 7.5
Greece 6.6 86.0 92.6 7.4 South Africa 34.3 21.4 55.7 44.3
Guatemala 14.6 84.1 98.7 1.3 South Korea 12.3 86.2 98.5 1.5
Hong Kong 50.4 27.0 77.4 22.6 Spain 67.7 30.9 98.7 1.3
Hungary 7.7 84.7 92.4 7.6 Sweden 1.1 95.7 96.9 3.1
India 88.4 7.5 95.8 4.2 Switzerland 7.2 56.0 63.2 36.8
Indonesia 89.6 7.2 96.8 3.2 Taiwan 24.9 71.3 96.2 3.8
Israel 17.2 79.8 97.0 3.0 Thailand 89.4 8.4 97.8 2.2
Italy 17.6 22.6 40.2 59.8 Trinidad-Tobago 64.4 26.5 90.9 9.1
Jamaica 9.8 84.1 93.9 6.1 Turkey 5.7 92.8 98.5 1.5
Japan 9.5 71.4 80.9 19.1 United Kingdom 16.5 24.0 40.5 59.5
Lebanon 88.5 8.0 96.5 3.5 Uruguay 51.4 35.7 87.2 12.8
Venezuela 73.3 12.2 85.5 14.5
The table presents the percent contribution of the push and pull factors to the variance of international bond flows for each country. The variance contribution of the push factor
is the sum of the contributions of the global and bond factors. The pull factor is the country factor. The push and pull factor variance contributions sum up to 100%. The sample
period ranges from January 1988 to July 2009.
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Argentina 29.8 67.7 97.5 2.5 Liberia 2.4 93.1 95.5 4.5
Australia 52.0 34.1 86.2 13.8 Malaysia 48.3 49.4 97.7 2.3
Austria 64.5 28.8 93.3 6.7 Mexico 92.5 5.4 97.9 2.1
Brazil 22.2 66.4 88.5 11.5 Morocco 46.2 35.0 81.2 18.8
Bulgaria 12.2 69.5 81.7 18.3 Netherlands 43.9 34.8 78.8 21.2
Canada 74.4 23.7 98.1 1.9 Norway 13.6 27.5 41.1 58.9
Chile 82.3 4.6 87.0 13.0 Pakistan 47.8 41.4 89.2 10.8
China 1.8 92.4 94.2 5.8 Panama 55.2 30.4 85.6 14.4
Colombia 70.2 25.8 96.1 3.9 Peru 2.0 93.1 95.1 4.9
Czech Rep. 26.2 73.0 99.2 0.8 Philippines 98.7 0.6 99.3 0.7
Denmark 53.6 15.9 69.5 30.4 Poland 18.9 79.8 98.8 1.2
Ecuador 2.4 90.1 92.5 7.5 Portugal 73.8 25.0 98.9 1.1
Egypt 91.4 4.6 96.0 4.0 Romania 95.3 3.8 99.2 0.8
Finland 23.8 42.8 66.6 33.4 Russia 58.8 22.3 81.1 18.9
France 89.5 4.2 93.7 6.3 Serbia-Montenegro 53.4 41.2 94.6 5.4
Germany 1.9 88.3 90.2 9.8 Singapore 94.0 5.3 99.3 0.7
Greece 1.9 92.9 94.8 5.2 South Africa 9.9 64.8 74.7 25.3
Guatemala 92.3 5.0 97.3 2.7 South Korea 54.0 28.8 82.9 17.1
Hong Kong 14.4 76.1 90.5 9.5 Spain 11.1 50.8 61.9 38.1
Hungary 60.7 32.4 93.1 6.9 Sweden 30.8 62.4 93.2 6.8
India 9.0 86.7 95.8 4.2 Switzerland 31.2 54.0 85.1 14.9
Indonesia 11.2 79.6 90.8 9.2 Taiwan 73.4 13.2 86.6 13.4
Israel 21.5 62.4 83.9 16.1 Thailand 86.2 6.2 92.4 7.6
Italy 93.0 4.0 97.1 2.9 Trinidad-Tobago 6.6 91.2 97.8 2.2
Jamaica 32.0 63.6 95.6 4.4 Turkey 51.8 27.4 79.3 20.7
Japan 7.6 71.5 79.2 20.8 United Kingdom 85.3 9.3 94.6 5.4
Lebanon 12.6 62.1 74.7 25.3 Uruguay 42.4 54.3 96.7 3.3
Venezuela 79.8 15.2 95.0 5.0
The table presents the percent contribution of the push and pull factors to the variance of international equity flows for each country. The variance contribution of the push factor
is the sum of the contributions of the global and equity factors. The pull factor is the country factor. The push and pull factor variance contributions sum up to 100%. The sample
period ranges from January 1988 to July 2009.
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Table 1.7: Push and Pull Factors for Regional Flows





















Europe 19.8 59.4 79.2 20.8 45.2 40.5 85.7 14.3
North America 40.7 47.8 88.5 11.5 83.4 14.6 98.0 2.0
Latin America 35.5 47.5 83.1 16.9 43.1 50.6 93.7 6.3
Asia and Oceania 43.3 44.3 87.5 12.5 42.2 47.3 89.5 10.5
Africa 41.4 41.6 83.0 17.0 37.5 49.4 86.8 13.2
G8 countries 26.1 47.5 73.6 26.4 58.6 31.9 90.5 9.4
non-G8 countries 32.8 51.5 84.3 15.7 42.7 46.1 88.8 11.2
G20 countries 34.8 43.1 77.9 22.1 43.8 45.7 89.5 10.5
non-G20 countries 30.7 54.5 85.2 14.8 45.2 43.6 88.8 11.2
BRICS countries 42.1 31.6 73.7 26.3 20.3 66.5 86.9 13.1
non-BRICS countries 31.0 52.9 83.9 16.1 47.2 42.0 89.2 10.8
WORLD 32.0 51.0 83.0 17.0 44.8 44.3 89.0 11.0
The table presents the percent contribution of the push and pull factors to the variance of international portfolio flows for each region. The variance contribution of the push factor
is the sum of the contributions of the global and bond or the global and equity factors. The pull factor is the country factor. The push and pull factor variance contributions sum
up to 100%. The regional figures are averages across all countries in that region. World is the average across all 55 countries in the sample. The sample period ranges from January
1988 to July 2009.
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Table 1.8: Push and Pull Factors for Regional Flows over the Crisis Period





















Europe 32.2 30.0 62.2 37.8 37.0 38.0 75.0 25.0
North America 21.6 31.8 53.4 46.6 8.8 38.2 47.0 53.0
Latin America 29.5 38.4 67.9 32.1 46.0 31.8 77.8 22.2
Asia and Oceania 35.5 39.8 75.3 24.7 44.8 32.9 77.7 22.3
Africa 31.5 38.2 69.7 30.3 42.8 37.5 80.3 19.7
G8 countries 35.7 27.7 63.4 36.6 35.5 31.7 67.2 32.8
non-G8 countries 31.7 36.8 68.5 31.5 41.7 35.6 77.3 22.7
G20 countries 33.0 32.0 65.0 35.0 47.6 28.1 75.7 24.3
non-G20 countries 31.7 37.6 69.3 30.7 37.0 39.0 76.0 24.0
BRICS countries 22.8 41.8 64.6 35.4 49.8 31.2 81.0 19.0
non-BRICS countries 33.2 34.8 68.0 32.0 39.9 35.4 75.3 24.7
WORLD 32.2 35.5 67.7 32.3 40.8 35.0 75.8 24.2
The table presents the percent contribution of the push and pull factors to the variance of international portfolio flows for each region over the crisis period defined as July 2007 to
March 2009. The variance contribution of the push factor is the sum of the contributions of the global and bond or the global and equity factors. The pull factor is the country
factor. The push and pull factor variance contributions sum up to 100%. The regional figures are averages across all countries in that region. World is the average across all 55
countries in the sample.
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Table 1.9: The Push Factor and Macroeconomic Information
Global Bond Equity
Factor Factor Factor














































The table reports results of OLS regressions of monthly dynamic common factors on a set of US
monthly macroeconomic variables. The macroeconomic variables include: (i) the US industrial
production gap measured using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter; (ii) the US 7-year nominal
bond yield; (iii) the ratio of the 12-month returns of the US/World MSCI stock market indices; (iv)
the 12-month change in the VIX index; (v) the TED spread; and (vi) the lagged value of the factor.
All variables have been demeaned and standardized and hence no constant is estimated in the
regression. Newey-West (1987) standard errors computed using 4 lags are reported in parentheses.
F-test corresponds to the Wald test which null hypothesis tests whether coefficients of all variables
– except the lagged factor – are jointly equal to zero. P-values are reported in squared brackets. ***
indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The sample begins in January
1996 and ends in July 2009.
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Table 1.10: The Pull Factor and Macroeconomic Information
Panel Regression
for All Dynamic Country Factors
Constant −0.113
(0.132)
Real Annual Growth Rate 0.439
(0.135)
∗∗∗
7-year Bond Yield 0.465
(0.114)
∗∗∗









The table reports panel regression estimates of all monthly pull (country) factors on a set of monthly
macroeconomic variables for each country, which include: (i) the real annual economic growth rate;
(ii) the 7-year nominal bond yield; (iii) the monthly MSCI stock index return; (iv) the Chinn and
Ito (2008) capital account openness degree; and (v) lagged values of the country factors. The panel
regressions include the following 26 countries: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway,
Philippines, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand and United
Kingdom. Newey-West (1987) standard errors computed using 4 lags are reported in parentheses.
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The sample begins in




Market Behaviour in Emerging
Markets: The Case of the
Chilean Peso
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the associations between exchange rates and order flow1 in different
markets has been a concern amongst researchers for several reasons. Firstly, exam-
ining the explanatory power of order flow for exchange rates has allowed literature
on exchange rate modelling to solve differences between theoretical models and em-
pirical findings. Thus considering order flow as a key determinant of exchange rate
returns could improve policy and investment assessments. Secondly, research on the
interrelations between order flow and exchange rate also provides evidence regarding
price formation and market participant dynamics.
Several studies have addressed questions on foreign exchange (FX) microstruc-
ture for developed countries. Data limitations have constrained research on emerging
market economies (EMEs) using a microstructure approach. However, knowledge
on EMEs have become more valuable recently, as these countries have experienced
increasing participation in the global economy, shown resilience during the global
crisis, and in some cases become strongly financially developed (Kose and Prasad,
2010).
1Order flow is the net of buyer-initiated orders and seller-initiated orders.
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Our research aims to contribute to the literature with new empirical evidence
about EMEs through the analysis of the associations between exchange rates and
order flow in the Chilean FX market. Chile is a small open economy under inflation
target and flexible exchange rate regimes, and one of the largest copper producer
countries in the world. Furthermore, one of the few countries that used official FX
intervention as unconventional policy response during 2008-2009 financial crisis. In
addition, we count with a novel dataset at tick frequency which to the best of our
knowledge has never been analysed before. We propose to answer the following
questions: What is the contemporaneous relationship between order flow and ex-
change rate movements in the Chilean FX market? Are there non-linearities in the
order flow impact on exchange rate? Is there an anticipation, pressure or feedback
effect? Is there evidence of the degree of informativeness behind the order flow of
different participants? Is there a long-run relationship between order flow and ex-
change rates? In doing so, we aim to provide directions for the development of FX
microstructure research for other EMEs.
The association between order flow and exchange rates has been extensively
documented. In their seminal paper, Evans and Lyons (2002b) analyse the contem-
poraneous relationship between the Deutsche mark - US dollar (USD) rate and order
flow, and show that interdealer order flow has strong explanatory power for exchange
rate returns at daily frequency. Whilst Evans and Lyons (2005, 2006, 2008) have
further analysed the features of their micro-based model, several other studies have
confirmed the link between order flow and exchange rate for other currency pairs.2
In this setting, causality runs strictly from order flow to price, which is consistent
with all the canonical models (see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985),
2In fact, there is a large list of papers that examine the relationship between exchange rate and
order flow from different perspectives and using different estimation strategies. Some relevant pa-
pers for this study are Payne (2003), Bjønnes, Rime, and Solheim (2005), Boyer and van Norden
(2006), Dan´ıelsson and Love (2006), Killeen, Lyons, and Moore (2006), Berger, Chaboud, Cher-
nenko, Howorka, and Wright (2008), King, Sarno, and Sojli (2010), and Chinn and Moore (2011).
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where price innovations are a function of order flow innovations. In these models,
the underlying driver of order flow is non-publicly available information, such as
uncertain demands or payoffs, and order flows are the channel through which this
type of information is incorporated into prices.
However, the timing of order flow in relation to price adjustments can be seen in
three ways: (1) order flow precedes price adjustments; (2) order flow is concurrent
with price adjustments; (3) order flow lags price adjustments. These three adjust-
ment mechanisms are known respectively as the anticipation, pressure, and feedback
hypotheses. Statistically, they translate into three possible causality patterns: the
first hypothesis implies that order flow causes prices changes; the second allows for
bi-directional causality; the third implies that price adjustment causes order flows.
Empirically, these causality patterns between order flow and exchange rate returns
have been examined for the French franc - Deutsche mark rate by Killeen et al.
(2006). They find that, under a flexible exchange rate regime, order flow Granger
causes returns, but not the other way round. However, Dan´ıelsson and Love (2006)
argue that feedback trading is an inevitable result when aggregating the data. Fur-
thermore, Sager and Taylor (2006) proposes that in the FX market there are push
and pull customers. The former initiate price rises and falls, the latter are those
agents that are attracted by these movements in prices.
Indeed, the price impact of order flow can vary with agent types. Osler (2008)
explains that opposite price impacts of commercial and financial customers order
flow are due to the nature of their trade responses, i.e. whether they are driven by
demand pressures of goods or assets. Bjønnes et al. (2005) observe that the different
relationships between exchange rates and financial or non-financial customer order
flow indicate the side from which liquidity is provided. King et al. (2010) note
that the order flow of financial clients are always positively related to exchange rate
returns and those of commercial clients are negatively related. This is due to the
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fact that commercial and non-financial clients are liquidity providers, matching the
financial client demands.
Besides the different disaggregated order flow effects on exchange rates, it has
also been seen that the price impact can vary throughout the day and across time
(see, e.g., Berger et al. 2008). In addition, the goodness of fit of such linear mod-
els usually improves at lower frequencies, benefit that arises with the reduction of
microstructure noise.3 Knowledge on the relationship between order flow and ex-
change rate has also been enriched with the investigation of short versus long-run
relationships. Studies of this kind usually test for cointegrating relationships be-
tween exchange rate and the order flow accumulated from a fixed initial period in
each point in time (see, e.g., Bjønnes et al., 2005; Boyer and van Norden, 2006;
Killeen et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2008; and Chinn and Moore, 2011). Most of
the cases, a long-run relationship between order flow and exchange rate cannot be
rejected.
There are not many studies on FX microstructure available for EMEs. For in-
stance, the cases of Brazil, Czech Republic and Russia are studies by Wu (2012),
Scalia (2008) and Melvin, Menkhoff, and Schmeling (2009) respectively. The find-
ings for different EMEs have differed and led to ambiguous evidence for this group
of countries. In fact, Menkhoff and Schmeling (2008) examine the permanence of
the order flow effects on price for different countries, concluding that the effects
of order flows on exchange rate returns vary across regions. Therefore, relying on
the literature to characterise the Chilean FX market is not plausible. There are no
studies on the intraday behaviour of its FX market in a microstructure framework
for the Chilean case.4 Hence examining the relationship between exchange rate and
3Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006) provide a broader framework in which they note that changes in
horizon would impact the strength of the relationship between exchange rates and order flow.
4The available studies for the FX market in Chile are by Tapia and Tokman (2004), Schmidt-Hebbel
(2006), Abarca, Alarco´n, Pincheira, and Selaive (2007) and Cowan, Rappoport, and Selaive (2007).
Of these studies, none analyse the market intraday features, nor focus on the relationships between
exchange rate and order flow.
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order flow in this market is both a contribution to the literature and of interest for
policy makers.
The data we employ in this chapter records all spot USD transactions in terms
of Chilean pesos (CLP) in the Chilean FX market during two periods of time: July
2008, and June to mid July 2009. These data consist of price and volume for each
transaction recorded, the exact time at which each transaction was executed, the
trader category for each transaction, and the type of transactions (sell or buy). The
type of transactions allows us to construct an order flow series and investigate its
relationship with exchange rate returns. Combining the several approaches men-
tioned above in the context of the intraday CLP/USD market, our findings are
listed as follows. First, we find evidence supporting the contemporaneous relation-
ship between exchange rate returns and order flow found in the literature at different
frequencies. That is, net purchases of CLP are associated with appreciation of the
Chilean currency. Second, we also evaluate the time-of-the-day effect on the relation-
ship between exchange rate returns and order flow. We find that the more active the
market is the lower the impact of order flow on exchange rate returns. This coincides
with the liquidity patterns throughout the day and is consistent with the findings
of Payne (2003) and Berger et al. (2008). Furthermore, a rolling window estima-
tion suggests that the effects of order flow varied throughout each sample analysed.
Third, Granger causality tests support the anticipation hypothesis found in most
of the literature for major currencies, and remain unaltered when considering only
interbank trading activity. As throughout the analysed period the Central Bank of
Chile (CBC) also carried out interventions, we also evaluate the causality dynamics
between private order flow and the CBC order flow: Granger causality tests provide
evidence of causality from order flows of CBC to the rest of the market in 2008.
Fourth, we evaluate the impact of order flow of different market participants, find-
ing that interbank trades have a much smaller effect on exchange rate returns than
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total order flow. We observe that the inclusion of the CBC order flow dampens the
effect of private order flow. Additionally, we find that a decrease of 1 minute in the
average trading intensity is associated with an extra increase in exchange rate return
of over 10 basis points. Fifth, our examination of the existence of cointegration rela-
tionships between exchange rate and cumulative order flow through the estimation
of a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) suggested by Johansen cointegration
tests indicates that between 0.2% and 0.4% of the deviations from a long-run trend
dissipate each 15 minutes.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we provide the lit-
erature review. In Section 2.3, we describe the Chilean FX market and the data
employed. In Section 2.4, we show preliminary descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 re-
ports the findings of the examination of the short and long-run relationship between
order flows and the changes in exchange rates for different horizons and specifica-
tions. The last section concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
If there is consensus in the FX literature, it is that conventional exchange rate models
fail on empirical grounds. It is also agreed that the FX microstructure literature has
provided an acceptable alternative to explain fluctuations in exchange rates both
theoretically and empirically. Evans and Lyons (2002a, 2002b) are one of the first to
introduce a theoretical microstructure framework and test it in order to demonstrate
that there is a relationship between exchange rate returns and order flow. In their
work, the authors propose that the intraday dynamics of the FX market provides
information that is relevant to understand movements in exchange rates. They
provide a model of price formation and explain the rationale behind the behaviour
of different participants of the FX market. Particularly, order flow – defined as the
net of buyer- and seller-initiated FX trades – conveys non-public information from
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dealers’ quotes to interdealer trades. The empirical exercise in Evans and Lyons
(2002b) consists of regressing daily exchange rate returns of major currencies on
interdealer order flow and the change in the nominal interest rate differential – the
interest differential accounts for public information. They find that the explanatory
power of their regressions is mainly due to order flow: regressing exchange rate
returns only on public information results with adjusted R2 of less than 1%, and the
inclusion of order flow in such regressions improves it to up to 60%.
After Evans and Lyons, similar results for currencies of developed countries have
been found by different authors, using different data sources and frequencies. For
example, Killeen et al. (2006), Berger et al. (2008), King et al. (2010) and Rime
et al. (2010) find that order flow is a determinant of exchange rate movements at
daily frequency. This evidence is also found with intraday data by Payne (2003),
Dan´ıelsson and Love (2006) and Berger et al. (2008). Furthermore, the unidirectional
causality from order flow to exchange rate is found to be certain for major currencies
by Bjønnes et al. (2005), Killeen et al. (2006), Boyer and van Norden (2006) and
Berger et al. (2008).
Another important stylized fact in the FX microstructure is pointed out by Osler
(2008). It is found that order flows of different participants might have different
impact on exchange rate returns. Specifically, financial customer flow is positively
related to exchange rate whereas commercial customer flow is negatively related.
The reasons for this could be that, on the one hand, commercial customers respond
to the impact of relative prices of international trade on exchange rates and on
the demand pressures in the FX market, hence the negative correlation of their
order flow with exchange rate returns. On the other hand, financial customers
provide overnight liquidity motivated by the state of the economy, hence the positive
correlation between financial order flow and exchange rate returns. Bjønnes et al.
(2005) evaluate whether different participants play different roles in the intraday
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dynamics of exchange rates, finding that financial customers are more likely to be
overnight liquidity providers. They use the concepts of push and pull customers
introduced by Sager and Taylor (2006) to rationalise it. Push customers are initiators
of rises or falls in prices, whereas pull customers are those who are attracted by
prices that suit their investment expectations. Thus, push customer order flow
is positively correlated to price movements, whereas pull customer order flow is
negatively correlated. King et al. (2010) also distinguish customer category in their
analysis, and find that the price impact of order flow is positive for financial clients,
and negative for commercial clients and interbank trades. The negative impact of
the interbank order flow on the exchange rate found in King et al. (2010) contrasts
with the literature. The authors explain that one of the reasons for obtaining such
an unusual result is the double-counting given that this order flow might be reflecting
transactions with customers from previous trade rounds. Additionally, there could
also be a problem of correctly signing trades more pronounced for interbank trades.
It has been also observed in some cases that, unlike suggested by Evans and
Lyons, cumulative order flow5 does not net to zero each day. According to Chinn
and Moore (2011), this could mean that dealers are providing liquidity overnight;
therefore dealers may not be acting just as intermediaries – if dealers are providing
liquidity overnight, it might be profitable to do so. In this context, Evans and Lyons’
model would imply the existence of a long-run relationship between exchange rates
and cumulative order flow. This hypothesis has been studied in Bjønnes et al.
(2005), Boyer and van Norden (2006), Killeen et al. (2006), Berger et al. (2008)
and Chinn and Moore (2011). Basically, these studies test for cointegration between
cumulative order flow and exchange rates. Particularly, Bjønnes et al. (2005) analyse
the Swedish krona within a cointegration framework, finding that between 5% and
49% adjustment takes place daily, depending on the horizon. Their model explains
5Cumulative order flow is defined as the sum of all flows between time 0 and time t, where t =
{0, 1, 2, ..., T}.
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nearly 70% of the exchange rate variations. Killeen et al. (2006) find similar results,
also at daily frequency. They show that over 25% of the departures from the long-
run trend is dissipated daily in the French case, with a goodness of fit of 25%. Chinn
and Moore (2011) use monthly data, and find supporting evidence of cointegration
in the Japanese market.
Studies for emerging markets are much harder to find. Scalia (2008) analyses the
Czech FX market in a microstructure context. He estimates a two-equation system
on intraday exchange rate returns and order flow for the Czech krona - Euro rate.
Although the analysis particularly focuses on the effects on intervention, his find-
ings on the associations between exchange rates and order flows are in line with the
literature for developing countries. Another example is the work of Menkhoff and
Schmeling (2008), who examine the permanence of order flow effects on price in dif-
ferent countries. They find that the impact of order flows on exchange rate returns of
certain regions is very short-lived. Melvin, Menkhoff, and Schmeling (2009) analyse
the Russian case, also focusing on intervention. Amongst their results, they observe
that there is a positive significant impact of order flow on exchange rates, which
decreases (but does not vanish) during official intervention days. Kohlscheen (2012)
and Wu (2012) explore the properties of the Brazilian FX market. Using daily data,
Kohlscheen (2012) estimates simple linear regressions in order to examine the effects
of customer and central bank order flows on the exchange rates. He corroborates
the existence of order flow and exchange rate associations. From his estimations
without controls for public information, the explanatory power of order flow reaches
10%. Wu (2012) examines the short and long-run relationships of the main players
in the Brazilian market. Through the estimation of a structural model, he finds that
commercial customer flow is negatively related to exchange rates, whilst financial
customer flow is positively related. The impact of central bank order flow is also
found to be positive.
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Analysis on the FX market in Chile is also limited. The most recent papers
to examine the Chilean market are the ones by Cowan et al. (2007) and Abarca
et al. (2007). These studies are also the closest in addressing the Chilean market
from a high frequency perspective. On the one hand, Cowan et al. (2007) estimates a
VECM for the CLP/USD nominal exchange rate and high frequency proxies for fun-
damentals using daily data. They find that CLP/USD rate is highly correlated with
the commodity prices. They also argue that the investment decisions of the biggest
players in the Chilean financial markets (such as pension fund managers) would con-
tribute to changes in the trend of the exchange rate. On the other hand, Abarca
et al. (2007) evaluate the in- and out-of-sample predictive power of a set of tech-
nical analysis indicators for daily returns of the exchange rate. They find evidence
supporting the relevance of technical analysis indicators for explaining CLP/USD
movements, and that the relative strength index is particularly good at forecasting
at different horizons. Concerning the main features of the intraday behaviour of the
Chilean FX market, there are still no studies available in the literature.
2.3 Preliminaries: Market and Data
2.3.1 The Chilean FX Intraday Market
The main foreign currency traded in the Chilean FX market is the USD. Since
2003, there have been two main trading platforms operating in Chile: the Santiago
Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Electronic Exchange (EE). In these platforms, both
interbank (IB) and non-bank (NB) trades are performed. The NB participants would
include broker dealers and financial institutions (i.e. investment banks, mutual funds,
pension funds, and hedge funds). Although traditionally banks would choose the SSE
to trade large amounts of USD, the use of the EE has increased across time. In fact,
since 2003 the market share of EE rapidly grew until that, in 2008, SSE and EE
shared similar portions of the spot market. Moreover, nowadays more than 90% of
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the market transactions in the EE platform. The price levels in both markets have
not shown major differences on daily averages. Between 2001 and 2009, the price
differences between SSE and EE oscillate within ±1 CLP/USD, which is equivalent
to no more than 0.2% of the average price of the whole period. The exception
was the period prior to the USD purchase programme carried out by the CBC in
2008, where the price differences between SSE and EE were predominantly negative,
between 0.5 and 2.5 CLP/USD. In both platforms, the transactions recorded are
mainly interbank trades; for instance, around 80% of the total monthly volume was
traded amongst banks in 2008. In Chile, NB trades are fundamentally operations
made by pension fund managers and broker-dealers. The former can only trade
with banks, and they are not allowed to trade in the EE. The broker-dealers act as
brokers and as investors. CBC trades were also traditionally carried out in the SSE
and it corresponded to about 10% of the total monthly volume traded during the
USD purchase programme in 2008. The last time the CBC traded in the SSE was
as a fiscal agent in 2009, whilst selling USD on behalf of the Chilean Government.
The most recent USD purchase programme carried out by the CBC was in 2011,
and for the first time it was done in the EE.
2.3.2 Data
To analyse the intraday behaviour of the Chilean FX market, we use data extracted
from the SSE system. The data consist of all USD spot transactions covering the
periods July 2008 and June to mid July 2009.6 The information recorded in these
data includes exact time of transaction, price and volume of transactions, the trade
sign and market type. Trade sign indicates whether the respective amount (volume)
of USD was purchased or sold. One of the advantages of having the sign of each
trade is that with this data, which are order flows, we compute the cumulative order
6Data collection from the SSE system is usually limited, partly due to privacy policies, and partly due
to the strictness of the procedure involved in the data collection itself. In particular, we collected
these short span data on a daily basis directly from the money desk of the CBC to which access
was granted to us for a limited period of time, and for research purposes only.
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flows, so that the long-run relationship between exchange rates and order flow can be
tested. Market type indicates whether the transaction was made between dealers,
i.e. IB, or whether it included at least one non-dealer participant, i.e. NB. Note
however that, in addition to these two types of players in this market, our data also
allows us to identify the CBC trades as during the period covered in this chapter the
CBC intervened in the FX market.7 The CBC trades currencies only with banks.
Another feature of our data is that they are irregularly spaced, i.e. the time
passed between transactions varies throughout the market opening times, that are
from 8am to 6pm. We compute what we call the durations, corresponding to the
seconds passed between transactions. That is, as the first transaction recorded in
our data set in July 2008 occurred at 08:07:08hrs, 428 seconds passed since the
opening hour until the first trade was made. The second transaction was recorded
at 08:14:02hrs, therefore the duration between the first and the second transaction
was 414 seconds. Durations are a measure of the trading intensity of this market.
If the agents in this market had the same information and formed expectations
in similar ways, this variable would be irrelevant as each agent would be able to
anticipate the other’s behaviour creating an uniformly distributed intensity. If this
is not the case, we would expect that duration would also have explanatory power
for the return series.
2.3.3 Descriptive Analysis
Table 2.1 shows how transactions in the SSE are distributed over the Chilean FX
market opening times in our samples for 2008 and 2009. Columns 2 and 3 show
the percentages of total transactions, and Columns 4 and 5 indicate the average
duration of transactions expressed in seconds. We observe here an intraday pattern:
7Noteworthy to mention that the only participant specifically identified in our data is the CBC;
information about the other banks and institutions is not available to us as this type of information
is proprietary and confidential. One drawback of our data sets is that knowing whether a NB trade
was made between a bank and a non-bank participant, or between two non-bank participants, is
not possible.
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there are less transactions recorded during opening hours and in the afternoon. This
pattern is also observed in terms of durations. Hence, according to the distribution
of the number of trades and trade durations shown in Table 2.1, the most trading
intensive period in the Chilean FX market is between 9am and 2pm.
A statistical summary of the intraday log returns and volumes of USD spot
transactions in the SSE is presented in Table 2.2 at 15 minutes frequency. On
average, duration, order flow, returns and volume seem not to greatly differ between
the sample periods analysed. Whilst according to Table 2.2 the average order flow
in 2008 was lower than 0, the data indicates that on average it would have actually
fluctuated between 8 million USD purchases and 4 million USD sales. In 2009, order
flow would have fluctuated between sales by 7 million USDs and purchases by 4
million USDs. In disaggregate terms, IB volume traded is usually larger than NB
volume traded, but returns and standard deviations remain similar across markets
and transaction types.
Correlation matrices are shown in Table 2.3. Now we examine two alternative
measures of order flow: trade and volume based order flow. Each measure of order
flow is calculated as purchases minus sales. In the case of trade based order flow,
this is equal to 1 when the type of transaction is a ‘buy’ and -1 when it is a ‘sell’.
Likewise, the volume based order flow will be signed accordingly and multiplied by
volume traded, i.e. if the transaction is a purchase of 0.5 million USD, the volume
based order flow equals 0.5, whereas a sale of 0.5 million USD would be equal to
-0.5. Additionally, we distinguish between total trade and volume based order flow
(OFt and V OFt, respectively),
8 IB order flow (OF IBt and V OF
IB
t , respectively),
and NB order flow (OFNBt and V OF
NB
t , respectively).
Table 2.3 shows that the correlation between exchange rate returns and all order
flow types is positive, which suggests that the CLP tends to depreciate with respect
8Total order flow is the sum of CBC, IB and NB trades.
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to the USD under buying pressures, regardless of who initiates the trade. It also
suggests that there is no clear push or pull agent behaviour. On average, the cor-
relations between order flows and exchange rates are higher in 2008 with respect to
2009. Particularly, the correlation between exchange rate returns and trade based
total order flow is only slightly higher than the trade based IB or NB order flow in
most of the cases. This is not necessarily true for volume based order flows; however
the differences are very small. Note that the correlation between OFt and OF
IB
t is
around 90% in both periods, whereas the correlation between OFt and OF
NB
t can
go from 46% to 73%. These results are consistent with the fact that IB transac-
tions account for about 80% of the SSE market. The correlation between V OFt and
V OF IBt is much lower relative to trade based order flows in both periods. This could
be associated with the fact that in both periods the CBC traded large amounts in
the FX market. Overall, durations do not appear to be highly correlated with either
returns or order flow of any kind.
2.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we show the results of the estimations of the relationship between
order flow and exchange rate and related statistical tests, in order to answer the
questions mentioned earlier in this chapter. In what follows, we aim to verify whether
the findings in the literature apply for the case of Chile, to understand the results
from an economic perspective, and to discuss their implications.
2.4.1 What is the Contemporaneous Relationship Between Order
Flow and Exchange Rate Movements?
We start estimating the basic contemporaneous relationship between the CLP/USD
rate and total order flow as:
∆st = α1 + β1xt + ε1,t (2.1)
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for our samples of 2008 and 2009 at tick and 15 minutes frequency, using ordinary
least squares (OLS). In Equation (2.1), ∆st represents the percentage change of
log exchange rate, xt the total order flow – trade or volume based –, and εt the
error term. The results for Equations (2.1) are presented in Table 2.4. The β
coefficients on order flow are interpreted as the percentage changes of the CLP/USD
rate responding to a net sales (of 1 million USD in the case of volume based order
flow). We first notice that trade based order flow has higher explanatory power for
the exchange rate returns than volume based order flow: net purchases of the CLP
are associated with an appreciation of 34 and 18 basis points respectively. This
response comes down to 14 basis points both in 2008 and 2009 when order flows are
scaled by volume traded.
To test this contemporaneous relationship between order flow and exchange rate,
we also regress ∆st as in Equation (2.1) on 8 leads and lags for xt separately. Figure
2.1 shows the results of running these regressions for both sample periods for trade
and volume order flows at 15 minutes frequency. The coefficient estimates are shown
with their respective significance ranges at 5% level. The most notorious relationship
in terms of significance of all alternatives is the contemporaneous relationship, i.e.
when no leads or lags are specified for the explanatory variable xt. We find some
cases of significant correlations between exchange rate and order flow at different
leads and lags, however the adjusted R2 associated with each of these regressions
are lower than the one that depicts the contemporaneous relationship.
As we cannot ignore that exchange rate movements respond to fundamentals,
we estimate augmented specifications of Equations (2.1) as follows:
∆st = α2 + β2xt + γ2zt + ε2,t (2.2)
where zt represents other fundamentals. In our case, we estimate three additional
specifications of Equation (2.2) for each order flow measure. In each specification,
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zt represents the interest rate differentials (it − i
∗
t ) (lagged or in first differences)
and the first difference of copper price in logarithm ∆copt. In this setting, it is the
1 year domestic swap rate, i∗t is the 1 year foreign swap rate,
9 and copt is the 3
month copper price. These variables were chosen such that we can investigate the
value added of order flow to the potential explanatory power of fundamentals and
public information on exchange rate returns. Particularly, we choose the copper
price as macroeconomic fundamentals following King et al. (2010), who note that
the exchange rate of a commodity exporter country is closely related to the exported
commodity price. Furthermore, the inclusion of copper price in the equation is also
consistent with Cowan et al. (2007) who show that copper prices are related to the
real cycle of the Chilean economy and the terms of trade. The estimation results
for Equation (2.2) are shown in Table 2.5. The inclusion of interest rate differential
does not increase the adjusted R2 in both periods, neither does the copper price
change in 2008. However, in 2009 the impact of changes in copper price appears to
be significant and greater than order flow effect on exchange rate returns, which also
increases the adjusted R2 in 1%.10
The adjusted R2 of our regressions of the returns on trade based order flow
reach 21% for 2008 and 8% for 2009, and 5% in both periods for volume based
order flow. Comparing with the results of Berger et al. (2008), where the excess
of buyer-initiated trades of 1 billion USD at 15 minute horizon would be associated
with 50-60 basis points of rising prices for the euro and the yen against the US dollar
and reaching adjusted R2 of almost 50%, our results seem insignificant. However, it
is worth mentioning that an adjusted R2 of 20% or even 5% can hardly be achieved
9The 1 year swap rates are the shortest terms that are found simultaneously available at intraday
frequency.




2,t compared to estimations for ∆st = α2+β2xt+γ2∆copt+
ε2,t for our two order flow measures indicates that γ
∗
2 = −1.13, significant at 1% level, is smaller
than the γˆ2 in Table 2.5. However, the associated adjusted R
2 is smaller than 1%. We also
evaluate whether order flow and copper price correlation could be inflating their explanatory power
for exchange rate returns when included simultaneously in Equation (2.2). The variance inflation
factors are usually smaller than or close to unity, so we discard severe multicollinearity in our model.
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by any other variable in exchange rate regressions at high frequency. The results
found by Evans and Lyons (2002a), which ranged between 45% and 80%, were of
regressions for daily returns of major currencies. Other studies at daily frequency
also found relatively high adjusted R2 for advanced economies. For instance, King et
al. (2010) find adjusted R2 around 25% for the Canadian dollar; Rime et al. (2010)
find adjusted R2 up to 44% in their study for the UK sterling, the euro, and the
Japanese yen markets. Indeed, the evidence indicates that higher data frequency are
usually accompanied by lower adjusted R2: the 50% found at 15 minutes frequency
by Berger et al. (2008) decreases to 35% at 1 minute frequency; the 25% reached by
King et al. (2010) at daily frequency increases to 40% when they consider weekly
observations.
It is fairer to compare our results to those found for EMEs, given that the size
and depth of the market may influence the agents behaviour. Melvin et al. (2009)
find that the impact of 10 million USD purchases is of 2.5 basis points exchange
return increase in the Russian rouble at 30 seconds frequency. Scalia (2008) finds
that net purchases of 10 million euros depreciates the Czech krona in 7.6 basis points
at hourly frequency, effect that is highly persistent. Kohlscheen (2012) uses daily
data to examine the Brazilian FX market, and finds that “a 1 b[illio]n USD sale by
an end-used is associated with a 0.25% appreciation of the Real”. His estimations
include controls for public information, however they indicate that the explanatory
power of order flow without controls is around 10% . Given these results, and
considering that the average turnover of a 15 minutes interval in the Chilean FX
market between the most trading intensive hours is of 17 and 15 million USD in
2008 and 2009 respectively, our results indicate that there is a strong relationship
between order flow and the CLP/USD rate.
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2.4.2 Are There Non-linearities in the Order Flow Impact on Ex-
change Rate?
The low explanatory power of these models could also be due to non-linearities
present. Simple scatter plots of exchange rate returns and order flows, and the
corresponding Kernel fit are shown in Figure 2.2. Clearly, the relationship between
returns and order flows is positive, but not necessarily linear at 15 minutes frequency,
as suggested by the non-parametric Nadaraya-Watson estimator. The trading inten-
sity asymmetry would suggest that the determinants of the orders at different times
of the day or across time might differ. For example, we could think of the orders
placed in the early and last hours of the day as obeying to speculative behaviour.
Throughout the most trading intensive hours there could be differences due to other
non-idiosyncratic factors. The impact of order flow may also vary throughout the
days. To evaluate whether there are differences of this kind, we extend our basic
model to consider time-of-the-day effects, and we also estimate the basic model for
rolling windows.
2.4.2.1 Time-of-the-day Effect
We evaluate the effects of time-of-the-day on the relationship between exchange rate
and order flow. To do so, we construct ten dummy variables that equal 1 at each
hour of the trading day (from 8am to 6pm). Then, we regress the log exchange rate







t xt + εt (2.3)
where Ih=it is an indicator function that equals 1 when the hour at which the trade
takes place is equal to i = 1, ..., 10 such that i = 1 represents 8am, i = 2 represents
9am, and so on. Thus, the subindexes of the βs also represent each hour of the day,
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from 8am to 5pm.11 The results of the estimation of Equation (2.3) for the tick data
are displayed in Table 2.6. We obtain results similar to Payne (2003) and Berger
et al. (2008): in all cases, the βs are significant at 1% level in the first 6 trading
hours. Interestingly, we have observed in the previous section that this is the most
intensive trading period of the day. This is consistent with the liquidity provided
during the day, which actually concentrates between 9am and 1pm.
The estimations of Equation (2.3) at 15 minutes frequency for trade and volume
based order flow are illustrated in Figure 2.3. The results indicate that the effects of
order flows at the first trading hour and near lunch-time were notoriously greater in
2008 and 2009, compared to the following trading hours. Differences in the results
between the samples could be related to the fact that the economic conditions at
which the market operated in 2008 were different than in 2009. In 2008, EMEs
were more cautious about foreign economies, some even responded anticipatively
to a possible worsening of the global environment. In 2009, markets had already
incorporated a good portion of pessimism. That said, we realise that as we do not
provide a behavioural model in this chapter, we cannot state whether the differences
between the results seen in Figure 2.3 are due to changes in the agents behaviour.
However, according to what we observe in the data, in the first trading hours the
exchange rate volatility was also high and the number of trades were only around
3% of the total traded on average each day (see Table 2.1). Therefore, although
these results could be seen as good news for a policy maker or major agent aiming
to impact the CLP/USD rate, we do not interpret our results as meaning that
by trading large amounts throughout those times of the day a trader would fully
accomplish such an objective.
11Note that, in this notation, i = 1 contains all transactions recorded from 08:00:00 to 08:59:59hrs,
i = 2 contains all transactions recorded from 09:00:00 to 09:59:59hrs, and so on.
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2.4.2.2 Impact over Time
To further evaluate possible non-linearities in the response of exchange rates to order
flow, we estimate Equation (2.1) for rolling windows of one week of trading activity,
such that each window starts at 08:00:00hrs of its first corresponding day, and finishes
at 14:00:00hrs of its fifth corresponding day. This is to say that each window contains
125 observations and the step between each window is of 25 observations. The
results are shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. Understanding the limitations in terms
of comparability of rolling window estimations, we focus on the results for non-
overlapping samples.
It is clear from Figures 2.4 and 2.5 that the impact of order flow on exchange
rate could differ from 10 to 20 basis points across time, and its significance is also
changing. Particularly, the impact of volume based order flow across time appears
to be notoriously less significant in 2008 compared to 2009, relative to trade based
order flow. Interesting to note that in 2009 the period when the impact of order flow
was highest (and significant) is clearly identified: around the week when the CBC
did not trade in the market (the neighborhood of the 20th window).
2.4.3 Is There an Anticipation, Pressure or Feedback Effect?
We have seen previously that there is a strong relationship between order flow and
exchange rate during the most intensive trading hours, although this seems to vary
over time. We continue to study the intraday behaviour of the Chilean FX market
by running bivariate Granger causality tests between exchange rate returns and all
customers trade based order flow (OFt). With these tests, we examine the exis-
tence of anticipation, pressure or feedback effects. Recall that when the causality
runs from order flow to exchange rate, there is an anticipation effect; when it runs
from exchange rate to order flow, that indicates feedback trading; and when there
is bi-causality, we are talking about pressure effect. As shown in Dan´ıelsson and
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Love (2006), feedback trading can be a result of data aggregation. Taking this into
account, this type of causality cannot occur at tick frequency.
Table 2.7 summarises the results of Granger causality tests for 2008 and 2009 at
different frequencies.12 Wu (2012) finds that in the case of the Brazilian FX market,
bi-directionality cannot be rejected when testing separately for order flow of different
customer types and exchange rates using daily data, supporting the presence of
stabilising feedback trading with their structural model. However, according to our
results, there is no evidence supporting the feedback trading at 15 minutes frequency
as we do not reject the hypothesis that order flow does not cause exchange rate
returns. This is also found by Killeen et al. (2006) for the French franc - Deutsche
mark rate.
We also evaluate the bi-causality between participant types, finding interesting
results: whilst in 2008 there is no supporting evidence of order flow leadership
amongst participant types, this is not the case for 2009. In fact, for the 2009 sample
we cannot reject the hypothesis that central bank flow causes interbank flow, and
that the latter causes non-bank flow. Indeed, the motives behind the CBC trade in
2009 were different than in 2008, as in 2008 the CBC was carrying out its official
intervention programme, whereas in 2009 it was perceived as another agent of this
market, who traded important volumes compared to the daily averages.
To understand whether the positive contemporaneous impact of order flow on
exchange rate returns differs across participants, we further investigate the agent
type flow effect.
2.4.4 Is There Evidence of the Degree of Informativeness of Order
Flows from Different Participants?
We estimate four further specifications including order flow of different participants
and durations to the basic model. That is, to the Equation (2.1) we add the IB
12The Granger regressions are estimated with 2 lags, based on Schwarz information criteria. The
regressions with 1 and 3 lags do not alter the results significantly.
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flows (OF IBt ); the CBC flows (OF
CB
t ); and the durations of transactions (Durt),
all variables interacting with total order flow (OFt). The most general specification
that we estimate is as follows:
∆st = α+ βOFt + γOFt ∗OF
IB
t + δOFt ∗OF
CB
t + θOFt ∗Durt + εt (2.4)
Tables 2.8 summarises the results of the estimations at 15 minutes frequency.13
The aggregation to 15 minute intervals is computed as follows: returns and order
flows within the corresponding 15 minute intervals are summed, durations are av-
eraged. Overall, the positive impact of an increase of net purchases of USD on the
exchange rate returns found in the previous section remains significant when we add
the order flows of IB and CBC to the model.
As total order flow includes both IB and CBC order flow, the impact of IB order
flow on the exchange rate returns corresponds to (β + γ) and the impact of the
CBC order flow on the exchange rate returns corresponds to (β + δ). In addition,
θ corresponds to the additional impact of an increase of the duration by 1 minute
has on exchange rate changes. The coefficients associated with OF IBt and OF
CB
t
are interpreted as follows. First, the incorporation of the order flow interaction with
IB trades indicates that almost 24% of the total effect corresponds to IB trades in
2008 as OF IBt is associated with 22 basis points impact on the exchange rate, and
38% in 2009 given its impact of 13 basis points. Second, when the CBC trades are
also considered as part of the explanatory variables, the impact of IB trades reduces
in 2008, but not in 2009. This indicates that official intervention could have been
effective through the damping channel as known in the literature.
The estimation of the full specification as in Equation (2.4) indicate that net IB
purchases of USD are associated with 10 basis points relative depreciation of the
CLP in 2008, and 8 basis points in 2009. Besides, the CBC purchase orders in 2008
13In this table, the duration series is re-scaled to minutes for purposes of illustration.
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are associated with 6 basis points depreciation of the CLP, whilst its sale orders in
2009 are associated with 18 basis points appreciation of the CLP. The latter could
indicate that the actual official interventions of 2008 had a smaller impact than the
CBC trades in 2009. Note however that the results of the CBC flow effect in 2009
are significant at 7%. The positive effect of duration on returns show that when
trading intensity decreases (i.e. duration increases), the exchange rate returns tend
to increase. However, this effect is relatively small as it is measured as per minutes
passed, and as seen in Table 2.1, the average duration within the more trading
intensive hours is bellow 1 minute.
We estimated the same specifications at higher frequencies. The coefficients de-
crease in magnitude with respect to the 15 minute samples, as seen in the literature,
but remain significant for both order flow measures. We also carried out these es-
timations at both frequencies using volume based order flow measures. The results
become less significant, supporting the idea exposed by Sager and Taylor (2006)
that trade based customer order flow (also called sign order flow) is more informa-
tive than volume based customer order flow (that consider the nominal value of the
trades), due to the different aspects of this group of participants.
2.4.5 Is There a Long-run Relationship Between Order Flow and
Exchange Rate?
In microstructure theory, a permanent effect of order flow on exchange rate implies
that order flow play a role on absorbing public information about macroeconomic
news and fundamentals, and channel it into prices (Killeen et al., 2006; Love and
Payne, 2008). In FX terms, this is to say that the price of the foreign currency
in t is determined by the accumulated order flows up to period t. An alternative
point of view is that order flows only convey information about the deviations of
exchange rate from fundamentals, which are related to transitory effects (Froot and
Ramadorai, 2005; Berger et al., 2008). Furthermore, market clearing theory implies
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that the cumulative order flow would revert to zero, however depending on the
size of a market, order imbalances might not be resolved within a day (Wu, 2012).
Empirical research has tested these hypotheses using cointegration tests, examining
the relationship between exchange rate and cumulative order flow, providing mixed
evidence so far.14
Figure 2.6 shows the exchange rate and cumulative order flow in our samples
for 2008 and 2009. The relationship between these two series in both periods is
rather difficult to define: in many periods they seem highly correlated, but this
is not a general rule. Given they are non-stationary, we test whether these series
are cointegrated.15 The results for Johansen cointegration tests between CLP/USD
rate and the cumulative trade and volume base order flow are summarised in Table
2.10.16
The results of cointegration tests according to Johansen’s trace and maximum
eigen value tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating relationships. This
would imply that cumulative order flow might influence exchange rate beyond few
seconds around each trade. If these cointegrating relationships were in fact present,
a VECM would be a better model for representing the short- and long-term effects
of order flow on exchange rate.
We estimate a VECM whose long-run equation includes log exchange rates, log
copper price and cumulative order flow measured as Xt =
∑t
i=1 xi, where xi is the
order flow in period i. From the long-run equation, the error correction term would
be a representation of the deviations from the long-run estimated trend. In the
14Whilst Bjønnes et al. (2005), and Killeen et al. (2006) find evidence in favour of cointegration
between exchange rate and cumulative order flow, Berger et al. (2008) do not find supporting
evidence for cointegration. Chinn and Moore (2011) find weaker evidence of cointegration for the
euro than for the yen.
15For unit root tests, see Table 2.9. From the results, we corroborate the evidence found in the
literature that exchange rate levels are usually non-stationary, whilst exchange rate returns overall
show a stationary behaviour. Furthermore, order flows are stationary, but the presence of unit root
in its cummulative representation cannot be rejected.
16The optimal lag length for the cointegration tests is determined by the Schwarz information criterion.
In general the lag length selected according to all criteria are short relative to the frequency of our
data, ranging between 3 and 7 lags.
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short-run equation, the exchange rate log returns is the dependent variable, and
the lagged error correction term, and 2 lags of the first differences of exchange rate
and cumulative order flow are the explanatory variables.17 We consider the total
order flow series as an additional and exogenous variable on the right hand side
of the short-run equation. Estimation results of such VECM would suggest that
the velocity of reversion oscillates between 0.2% and 0.4%, considering trade and
volume based order flow, respectively. These results are far from the evidence found
by Bjønnes et al. (2005), Killeen et al. (2006) and Chinn and Moore (2011), whose
daily reversal reach between 20-25%. However, the goodness of fit of our VECMs is
very low, and in all cases the lags of cumulative order flows are not found to have
statistically significant impacts.
This leaves us with the following question: why is it that cumulative order flows
do not revert to zero each day? As mentioned earlier, Wu (2012) provides a possible
explanation, that in small sized markets such as the Brazilian FX market, order
imbalances might not be resolved within a day. In addition, this could possibly be
because providing liquidity overnight is profitable. We compute de deviations of the
cumulative order flow at the end of each trading day from the average inventory on
a daily basis, to check whether more than usual overnight holdings are profitable.
Comparing these daily deviations with the overnight exchange rate return, we ob-
serve a correlation of -7% in 2008 and 18% in 2009 between overnight exchange rate
return and cumulative order flow.
2.5 Conclusion
Although the microstructure literature on FX is vast, questions in this area have been
addressed mostly for developed countries and little is known for emerging markets
mainly due to data limitations. This fact has constrained researchers to understand
17Although according to several information criteria the optimum lag length is 1 or 4 in few cases,




In this chapter we present new evidence on the microstructure of exchange rates
in emerging markets. We employ a novel dataset that, to the best of our knowledge,
has never been analysed before. With this data we are able to examine the features
of all spot USD transactions recorded in the Chilean FX intraday market over four
weeks in mid 2008 and six weeks in mid 2009. We evaluate the impact of order flow
on exchange rate returns and analyse the behaviour of such relationship throughout
the day and across time. We also evaluate the differences amongst the impact of
dealers, non-dealers and central bank order flow on exchange rates.
Our findings suggest the existence of a statistically significant relationship be-
tween CLP/USD rate and its order flow. Furthermore, the domestic currency tends
to depreciate with USD buying pressures, regardless of who initiates the trade. Trade
based order flow has higher explanatory power than volume based order flow, as sug-
gested by Sager and Taylor (2006) for customer flows. The impact concentrates in
the most intensive trading hours, which is consistent with the liquidity provided dur-
ing the day. The order flow impact is also changing across time, both in magnitude
and significance. Differences in the results between the samples could be related to
the fact that the economic conditions at which the market operated in 2008 were
different than in 2009. Interesting to note that in 2009 the period when the impact
of order flow was highest is around the week were the CBC did not trade in the
market.
Unlike evidence found for some EMEs, our findings do not support bi-causality
between order flow and exchange rate. However, we find weak evidence suggesting
order flow leadership from central bank to dealer, and from dealer to non-dealer
trades in 2009. According to our results, the interbank order flow effects are no
more than one quarter of the total order flow effect, and trading intensity has also
minor impact during the first trading hours. Our findings also suggest that the
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official intervention in 2008 had an effect on damping the price effect of interbank
order flow, whereas the direct effects of the CBC order flow on exchange rates seem
to be stronger in 2009. Regarding the existence of a long-run relationship between
exchange rate and cumulative order flow, Johansen’s test rejects the hypothesis of
no cointegration. Our VECM estimations indicate that between 0.2% and 0.4% of
the deviations from the long-run trend return to equilibrium at 15 minute frequency.
Due to the nature of our data, defining who the liquidity providers in this market
are is not an easy task. The presence of the CBC in the market impacts the order
flow dynamics in the short run: the interbank order flow effect decreases during
official intervention periods, and contents an important portion of the total order
flow effect as a fiscal agent. These conclusions are not conditional on the volume
traded by the CBC. Overall, our analysis provides directions on future analysis of FX
intraday markets in EMEs. As our results imply that the Chilean FX market works
differently from some EMEs, future investigation should consider the evaluation of
possible extensions to Evans and Lyons’ model applicable to small FX markets.
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The figure shows the estimation results of the regressions of exchange rate returns (CLP per USD) on order flow leaded and lagged up to 8 periods, separately. The regressions are
estimated by OLS at 15 minutes frequency using Newey-West standard errors. The coefficients (blue bars, left vertical axis) show the changes of the exchange rate returns in basis
points of net purchases (trade based order flow, top charts) and 1 million USD purchased (volume based order flow, bottom charts), at each time of the day. The confidence interval
(red lines, left vertical axis) corresponds to the coefficient estimates plus (top line) and minus (bottom line) two times the standard deviations. Adjusted R2 (right vertical axis) are
plotted as black markers. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’)
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This figure shows a non-parametric estimation of the relationship between exchange rate returns
and order flows. The blue circles are the flow and return pairs, the red line is the kernel fit found
using Nadaraya-Watson estimator. The top panel shows data for June 2008, bottom panel shows
data for June-July 2009.
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The figure shows the estimation results of the contemporaneous relationships between the exchange rate returns (CLP per USD) and order flow measures interacting with time-of-
the-day dummies. The regressions are estimated by OLS at 15 minutes frequency. The coefficients show the changes of the exchange rate returns in basis points of net purchases
(trade based order flow, top charts) and 1 million USD purchased (volume based order flow, bottom charts), at each time of the day. Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis. ***
indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled
‘2009’).
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Trade Based Order Flow                                                   Volume Based Order Flow
The figure shows the estimation results of the contemporaneous relationships between the exchange
rate returns (CLP per USD) and order flow measures for different 5-days subsamples. The rolling
window regressions are estimated by OLS at 15 minutes frequency. The coefficients show the changes
of the exchange rate returns in basis points of net purchases (trade based order flow, left hand side
charts) and 1 million USD purchased (volume based order flow, right hand side charts), for different
weeks across time. Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008.
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Trade Based Order Flow                                                   Volume Based Order Flow
The figure shows the estimation results of the contemporaneous relationships between the exchange
rate returns (CLP per USD) and order flow measures for different 5-days sub-samples. The rolling
window regressions are estimated by OLS at 15 minutes frequency. The coefficients show the changes
of the exchange rate returns in basis points of net purchases (trade based order flow, left hand side
charts) and 1 million USD purchased (volume based order flow, right hand side charts), for different
weeks across time. Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample period ranges from 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009.
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The figure shows the spot exchange rate, measured as CLP per USD, and cumulative trade based
order flow. Spot exchange rates (blue lines) are on the left vertical axis, cumulative trade based
order flow (red lines) are on the right vertical axis. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to
31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008m7’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009m6-2009m7’).
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Table 2.1: Trading Intensity
Nbr of Trades Durations
2008 2009 2008 2009
8 to 9 3.47 2.78 7.39 7.45
9 to 10 18.76 16.63 1.91 2.14
10 to 11 23.27 26.20 1.04 0.66
11 to 12 22.95 23.45 0.99 0.82
12 to 13 22.28 20.67 1.22 0.87
13 to 14 8.33 9.17 5.23 2.27
14 to 15 0.62 0.68 11.79 13.31
15 to 16 0.17 0.19 22.82 20.04
16 to 17 0.09 0.20 16.73 20.60
17 to 18 0.05 0.04 12.83 19.05
The table shows trades and duration frequencies of the Chilean FX market based on SSE data. It
considers all intraday transactions. Column 1 shows hour ranges from opening to closing hours of
the SSE trading platform. Columns 2 and 3 show the percentages of total transactions made within
these ranges. Columns 4 and 5 show the average duration of transactions made within these ranges.
The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009
(labeled ‘2009’).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
2008
Durations Order Flows Returns Volume
Mean 55.41 -0.04 -0.03 1.10
Median 4.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00
Maximum 3036.00 1.00 26.45 40.00
Minimum 0.00 -1.00 -39.86 0.10
Std. Dev. 159.21 1.00 2.31 2.00
Skewness 8.46 0.08 -0.63 11.05
Kurtosis 109.55 1.01 34.42 174.04
JB p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(1) 0.29 *** 0.63 *** -0.014 * 0.18 ***
Observations 8641 8641 8641 8641
2009
Durations Order Flows Returns Volume
Mean 50.42 0.08 -0.01 0.84
Median 5.00 1.00 0.00 0.50
Maximum 3380.00 1.00 37.72 50.00
Minimum 0.00 -1.00 -144.45 0.01
Std. Dev. 163.06 1.00 1.99 1.71
Skewness 9.87 -0.17 -23.93 14.78
Kurtosis 136.60 1.03 1839.82 312.63
JB p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(1) 0.23 *** 0.66 *** -0.05 *** 0.22 ***
Observations 15443 15443 15443 15443
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the information recorded for each transaction in the
SSE platform. The data are aggregated to 15 minutes frequency and consider only transactions
within the most intensive trading hours, i.e. between 8am and 2pm. Durations correspond to the
time passed between transactions, measured in seconds. Order Flows are measured as the number
of buys minus the number of sells. Returns are the CLP/USD log returns in basis points (i.e.
multiplied by 10,000), and Volume are expressed in millions of USD. JB p-value is the probability
for the null hypothesis of the Jarque-Bera test for normality. AR(1) is the first order autocorrelation.
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample period ranges















V OFt 0.18 0.48 1.00
OF IBt 0.26 0.88 0.41 1.00
V OF IBt 0.18 0.56 0.64 0.63 1.00
OFNBt 0.23 0.46 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00
V OFNBt 0.20 0.37 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.82
Dur -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.00 1.00











V OFt 0.04 0.44 1.00
OF IBt 0.11 0.85 0.38 1.00
V OF IBt 0.06 0.53 0.60 0.62 1.00
OFNBt 0.07 0.52 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00
V OFNBt 0.06 0.43 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.80 1.00
Dur -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00
15 minutes statistics











V OFt 0.24 0.60 1.00
OF IBt 0.40 0.97 0.55 1.00
V OF IBt 0.28 0.76 0.71 0.79 1.00
OFNBt 0.46 0.68 0.36 0.51 0.37 1.00
V OFNBt 0.09 0.13 0.32 0.08 0.08 0.27 1.00
Dur -0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02 1.00











V OFt 0.22 0.67 1.00
OF IBt 0.26 0.96 0.62 1.00
V OF IBt 0.25 0.83 0.73 0.86 1.00
OFNBt 0.26 0.73 0.45 0.53 0.44 1.00
V OFNBt 0.03 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.07 0.33 1.00
Dur -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 1.00
The table shows pairwise correlations for intraday data of the CLP/USD log returns in basis points
(∆st in Chilean pesos per US dollars), total, interbank and non-bank trade based order flows (OFt,
OF IBt , and OF
NB
t , respectively), total, interbank and non-bank volume based order flows (V OFt,
V OF IBt , and V OF
NB
t , respectively), and durations (Durt, calculated as seconds passed between
transactions). In bold, correlations that are not significantly different from zero. The sample period
ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
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Table 2.4: Exchange Rate and Order Flow: Basic Relationship
∆st = α1 + β1xt + ε1,t
Tick data 15 min data
OFt 2008 2009 2008 2009
β 0.78 0.26 0.34 0.18
Stand. Err. (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)***
Adj.R2 0.11 0.02 0.21 0.08
Tick data 15 min data
V OFt 2008 2009 2008 2009
β 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.14
Stand. Err. (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)***
Adj.R2 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.05
The table shows the estimations of the contemporaneous relationships between the exchange rate
returns (CLP per USD) and order flow measures. The regressions are estimated by OLS at tick
and 15 minute frequency, according to Equation (2.1). The coefficients show the changes of the
exchange rate returns (∆st) of net purchases (trade based order flow) and 1 million USD purchased
(volume based order flow). Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical
significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to
31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
105
Table 2.5: Exchange Rate, Order Flow and Macroeconomic Fundamentals
2008
OFt V OFt
I II III IV V I II III IV V
xt 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)***
(i− i∗)t−1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆(i− i∗)t 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
∆copt 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.45 0.47 0.44
(1.28) (1.28) (1.27) (1.41) (1.28) (1.4)
Adj.R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
2009
OFt V OFt
I II III IV V I II III IV V
xt 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
(i− i∗)t−1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆(i− i∗)t -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
∆copt -1.08 -1.08 -1.12 -1.14 -1.14 -1.17
(0.37)*** (0.37)*** (0.39)*** (0.39)*** (0.39)*** (0.40)***
Adj.R2 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
The table shows the estimations of the contemporaneous relationships between the exchange rate returns (CLP per USD) and order flow measures and macroeconomic fundamentals.
The regressions are estimated by OLS at 15 minute frequency, augmenting Equation (2.1) as to consider as additional explanatory variables the lag and first differences of interest
rate differential. The coefficients on order flow show the changes of the exchange rate returns (∆st) of net purchases (trade based order flow) and 1 million USD purchased (volume
based order flow). Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008
to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
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t xt + εt
2008 2009
OFt V OFt OFt V OFt
β1 1.45 *** 0.54 *** 0.62 *** 0.46 **
β2 0.76 *** 0.16 *** 0.54 *** 0.09 ***
β3 0.73 *** 0.12 *** 0.39 *** 0.10 ***
β4 0.62 *** 0.15 *** 0.39 *** 0.11 ***
β5 0.77 *** 0.32 *** 0.42 *** 0.17 ***
β6 0.94 *** 0.55 *** 0.56 *** 0.43 ***
β7 1.43 1.09 0.91 0.30
β8 2.86 ** 3.77 ** 1.82 ** 1.54 ***
β9 4.98 * 9.56 1.42 1.82 ***
β10 2.75 ** 5.59 ** 8.19 *** 8.15 ***
Adj.R2 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.02
The table shows the estimations of the contemporaneous relationships between the exchange rate
returns (CLP per USD) and order flow measures interacting with time-of-the-day dummies, as in
Equation (2.3). The regressions are estimated by OLS at tick frequency. The coefficients show the
changes of the exchange rate returns in basis points of net purchases (trade based order flow) and 1
million USD purchased (volume based order flow), at each time of the day. Newey-West standard
errors in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009
(labeled ‘2009’).
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Table 2.7: Granger Causality Tests
2008 2009
∆st does not Granger cause OFt 5.09*** 4.44***
OFt does not Granger cause ∆st 0.12 1.29
∆st does not Granger cause OF
IB
t 3.31** 2.59**
OF IBt does not Granger cause ∆st 0.05 1.41
OF IBt does not Granger Cause OF
CB
t 0.4 0.61
OFCBt does not Granger Cause OF
IB
t 1.68 2.68**
OFNBt does not Granger Cause OF
IB
t 0.34 1.19
OF IBt does not Granger Cause OF
NB
t 0.06 2.77**
The table shows the results of F-statistics of testing causality a la Granger between exchange rate
returns, all customers trade based order flow (OFt), IB trade based order flow (OF
IB
t ), NB trade
based order flow (OFNBt ), and CBC trade based order flow (OF
CB
t ), at 15 minute frequency.
First column states the hypothesis tested. Lag length chosen according to the Schwarz information
criteria. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample
period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled
‘2009’).
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Table 2.8: Trade Based Order Flow and Exchange Rate Returns
2008
Constant -0.107 -0.274 -0.167 -0.303
(0.323) (0.331) (0.330) (0.325)
OFt 0.343 0.914 1.011 0.833
(0.040)*** (0.138)*** (0.160)*** (0.181)***
OFt ∗OF
IB








Adj.R2 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.27
Observations 575
2009
Constant -0.447 -0.423 -0.381 -0.457
(0.256)* (0.258) (0.259) (0.236)**
OFt 0.181 0.349 0.327 0.227
(0.017)*** (0.055)*** (0.054)*** (0.070)***
OFt ∗OF
IB








Adj.R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10
Observations 900
The table shows the estimations at 15 minute frequency of the contemporaneous relationships
between the exchange rate returns (CLP per USD) and trade based order flow as in Equation
(2.4). The regressions are estimated by OLS. The coefficients show the changes of the exchange
rate returns (∆st) in basis points of net purchases (trade based order flow). Newey-West standard
errors in parenthesis. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009
(labeled ‘2009’).
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Table 2.9: Unit Root Tests
2008 2009
DF-GLS Aug.DF DF-GLS Aug.DF
Exogenous: Constant Constant and Constant None Constant Constant and Constant None
Linear trend Linear trend
Variable:
st -0.042 -0.451 -3.122** -1.137 -0.17 -1.387 -0.916 -0.941
∆st -24.30*** -24.32*** -24.31*** -24.29*** -31.03*** -31.04*** -31.03*** -31.03***
OFt -19.43*** -19.53*** -19.46*** -19.42*** -13.27*** -13.36*** -13.48*** -13.25***
Cummulative OFt 0.228 -1.036 0.002 0.267 1.279 -1.413 -1.73 1.338
V OFt -21.90*** -21.93*** -22.02*** -21.86*** -27.23*** -27.22*** -27.22*** -27.24***
Cummulative V OFt 0.999 -0.737 -2.468 1.115 -1.15 -1.254 -1.176 -1.147
The table shows the t-statistics of Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for the null hypothesis of unit root, for CLP/USD rate level and returns
(st and ∆st, respectively), and single and cumulative trade and volume base order flow series (OF , Cummulative OFt, V OF and Cummulative V OFt, respectively). Columns
2, 4, 6 and 8 allow for an exogenous constant. Columns 3 and 7 allow for exogenous constant and linear trend. Columns 5 and 9 do not account for exogenous variables. Lags
selection according to Schwarz criterion. *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% according to MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values for Augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests, and according to Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (1996) for Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS tests. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled
‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
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Table 2.10: Johansen Cointegration Tests
2008 2009
OFt V OFt OFt V OFt
Trace 27.71** 22.76*** 22.10** 18.60**
Max-Eigen 19.08* 15.99** 20.32*** 10.93
The table shows the results of Johansen unrestricted cointegration rank (trace and maximum eigen-
value) tests, for CLP/USD rate and cumulative trade and volume base order flow series (OF and
V OF , respectively). The null hypothesis of no-cointegration is evaluated. Columns 2 to 5 show the
trace and maximum eigenvalue (Max-Eigen) statistics for testing the hypothesis of no cointegrating
relationships for 15 minutes frequency data. All tests allow for an intercept and a trend. Lags
selection according to Schwarz criterion. Results that allow only for a drift, linear trend, quadratic
trends, or no intercept or trend, are not substantially different, and are available upon request. ***
indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10% according to MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) p-values. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’),
and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
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Chapter 3




What are the effects of official intervention in foreign exchange (FX) markets? This
question has motivated researchers and policy makers for many years generating
a wide range of literature on the topic, mainly for advanced economies. However,
in the last decade FX intervention had become more popular amongst developing
economies compared to the developed world, particularly after the latest global fi-
nancial crisis, when FX intervention has been one of the main policy responses of
emerging market economies (EMEs) (Ishii, Canales-Kriljenko, Guimara˜es, and Kara-
cadag, 2006; Menkhoff, 2012). Intervention in the FX market occurs for different
reasons, such as to stabilise a misaligned exchange rate, calm stressed markets, or
accumulate international reserves (Ishii et al., 2006).1 Therefore, a comprehensive
examination of the effects of FX intervention on all aspects of FX markets is nec-
essary in order to assess whether this policy response has improved the market’s
condition beyond having moved the target towards the desired direction.
The literature in this field usually focuses on understanding through which chan-
1In other words, FX intervention can be seen as an alternative or complementary policy tool against
inflation in periods of turmoil. An example of this situation would be when misalignments of
the exchange rate require changes in interest rates that are not consistent with output gap and
inflationary pressures.
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nel sterilised FX intervention2 is most effective. According to the literature, these
channels are: portfolio balance, signaling or expectations, co-ordination, and order
flow or microstructure channels (see, e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Archer, 2005).
The portfolio balance channel suggests that the sterilisation operations alter the com-
position of the portfolios of the agents in the economy. The signalling or expectations
channel suggests that agents change their exchange rate expectations responding to
communication of policy decisions. This channel is seen as effective when interven-
tion announcements are followed by unusual daily changes in the exchange rate. The
co-ordination channel suggests that monetary authorities’ communications that are
co-ordinated with market views help moving the target in a desired direction. The
order flow or microstructure channel suggests that interventions alter the order flow
dynamics in the domestic FX market when the monetary authority places its own
orders as part of the intervention programme. Neely (2008) surveys a heterogeneous
sample of 22 central banks in order to capture their beliefs on the effects of FX
intervention. In his study, most central banks usually agree that intervention affects
exchange rates through co-ordination and signaling channels.3
Typically, the effectiveness of an intervention in the FX market is measured by
its effect on the level or volatility of the exchange rate. For instance, an interven-
tion consisting of selling (purchasing) foreign currency would expect the domestic
currency to appreciate (depreciate) with respect to the foreign currency sold (pur-
chased). Moreover, the intervention can be carried out in order to accelerate, mod-
erate or reverse an appreciation or depreciation trend. With respect to the volatility,
usually a reduction is expected with the intervention (see, e.g., Payne and Vitale,
2003; Dominguez, 2006; Dominguez and Panthaki, 2007; Fratzscher, 2005, 2006,
2In most cases, policy makers that choose to intervene in the FX market opt for sterilised intervention.
Sterilised intervention occurs when the monetary authority complements orders in the FX market
with operations involving other assets, in order to offset the effects of changes in official foreign
asset holdings on the domestic monetary base.
3These beliefs are supported by the literature for advanced economies. For instance, Beine, Bos,
and Laurent (2007) find evidence supporting the signalling channel, and Reitz and Taylor (2008)
provide evidence in favour of the coordination channel.
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2008; Fatum, 2008; Neely, 2011).
In addition, evidence suggesting that FX intervention can increase volatility in
the short run and affect other currencies has been found.4 Furthermore, the lit-
erature suggests that oral interventions in advanced economies are more effective
than actual interventions, and that intervention effectiveness increases when there
is co-ordination amongst central banks, or in periods of high volatility and market
uncertainty (see, e.g., Payne and Vitale, 2003; Dominguez, 2006: Dominguez and
Panthaki, 2007; Fratzscher, 2008). There is also evidence on the effects of inter-
ventions on trading dynamics. Dominguez and Panthaki (2007) find that FX inter-
vention impacts the trading frequency of intraday operations. Fatum and Pedersen
(2009) and Fatum, Pedersen, and Sørensen (2013) find that unannounced interven-
tions have an effect on the market perception, thus affecting exchange rate spreads.
Marsh (2011) finds that the relationship between the exchange rate and order flow
varies during intervention periods.
Emerging markets are interesting cases of study. Usually, their currency markets
are smaller than those of advanced economies. Therefore, central bank interventions
could be more effective (for instance, through the portfolio channel) compared to
the effects that actions of monetary authorities in advanced economies could have on
their currency markets. However, most of the papers available analyse the impact of
intervention on FX markets using daily data for advanced economies, who intervene
on a regular basis, or whose data is publicly available. For developing countries,
interventions occur more sporadically, hence research on the effects of intervention
on their FX market is rare. This gap in the literature may be due to both data
availability issues and the scarcity of intervention events.5 Overall, the evidence
4In his survey, Neely (2008) indicates that central banks mostly agree that intervention affects
currencies other than the one in which it is conducted, and it is effective on reducing (or at least
not increasing) its volatility and restoring liquidity. Beine et al. (2007) also show that intervention
tends to primarily raise volatility, whilst Nikkinen and Va¨ha¨maa (2009) notes that intervention
ultimately increases the correlation between the domestic currency with foreign currencies other
than the one purchased.
5Recent theoretical papers that study the intervention strategies of EMEs focus on modelling these
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found for EMEs is mixed. On the one hand, in most of the cases announcements
have an impact on exchange rate returns. On the other hand, actual interventions
could in some cases move the exchange rate levels, reduce its short-term volatility and
spreads, and change the price impact of private order flows. However, in other cases
a reversal or slowing down of the appreciation trend is not obtained and increases
in volatilities are observed.
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of official interventions in the Chilean
FX market at intraday frequency. Chile is a case of interest given that it has more
than a decade of experience in intervention on FX markets. Since the adoption of
a flexible exchange rate regime, the Chilean monetary authority kept its right to
intervene in the FX market. However, it had not actively participated nor inter-
vened in the market for several years until the early signs of the last global financial
crisis. When it did intervene, in 2008 and 2011, these policy responses were pre-
viously announced as precautionary actions of international reserve accumulation.6
Chile is an inflation-targeting small open economy, whose real sector strength relies
heavily on commodity trade (copper), and official intervention is discretional yet
pre-announced. There is not much work focussing on the effects of intervention on
the Chilean FX market during and posterior to the financial crisis at a microstruc-
tural level.7 Given the lack of research available for Chile and the novelty of our
data, we believe that this study contributes to the literature on official intervention
with new evidence that provides some directions for other EMEs.
For our analysis, we continue to explore our novel dataset that records all spot US
economies assuming that their unconventional monetary policy responses are driven by exchange
rate rules (see, e.g., Parrado, 2004; Ho, 2004; Gal´ı and Monacelli, 2005; Kumhof, 2010; Benigno
and Fornaro, 2012; Benes, Berg, Portillo, and Vavra, 2013). However, given the heterogeneous
nature of the intervention mechanisms observed in the developing world, such theoretical models
lack applicability. Unfortunately, comprehensive empirical work on FX intervention of EMEs has
been limited. The most common country cases studied are: Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Mexico, Russia, and Turkey. We expose a more comprehensive literature review on intervention in
EMEs in Section 2.
6In addition, the intervention in 2011, was the largest in terms of duration in the Chilean history.
7The existing studies for Chile are by Morande´ and Tapia (2002), Gregorio and Tokman (2004),
Tapia and Tokman (2004) and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006). These studies provide a description of the
effectiveness of interventions and announcements up to 2004, using daily data.
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dollar (USD) transactions in the Chilean FX market during two subperiods within
2008 and 2009 respectively. Our intraday data report price, volume and type of each
transaction, and the exact time of transaction. The characteristics of this dataset
allows us to analyse the impact of intervention from different perspectives: first, we
evaluate the effect of central bank order flow on exchange rate returns through linear
regression analysis;8 then we carry out an event study where we incorporate leads
and lags of intervention into the order flow regressions in order to examine time
delay/anticipation of the effect of intervention on intraday exchange rate returns.
Lastly, we examine the effectiveness of intervention in 2008 and the effects of central
bank trades in 2009, according to the different success criteria for exchange rate
movements and order flow changes. We find that the impact of central bank order
flows on the intraday returns of the spot rate is significant but small in comparison
with the effects of the order flows of other agent types. Central bank order flows
also have an indirect impact in the private order flow dynamics, which corroborates
intervention effectiveness through microstructure channel. Furthermore, our event
study on an intraday basis shows that the effect of the participation of the central
bank in the market is incorporated two hours prior to its occurrence when precau-
tionary intervention takes place. Finally, the rates of intervention success indicate
that intervention is successful in moderating exchange rate and order flow trends.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a detailed
literature review on official intervention in EMEs and describes the Chilean FX
market and official intervention. Section 3 describes the data employed. Section
4 provides the empirical results from the daily and intraday analyses. Section 5
concludes.
8Expanding the work done in chapter 2 of this thesis.
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3.2 Official Intervention in Emerging Economies
3.2.1 Literature Review
Literature on the intraday effects of intervention in the FX market of EMEs is
rare. This could be due to data limitations, low frequency of intervention events
observed, or even the heterogeneity of intervention motives, objectives and mech-
anisms. Lately, predominance of intervention activity in developing countries has
motivated comparison across countries. Adler and Tovar (2011) study sterilised in-
tervention effectiveness in a group of Latin American and Asian countries. Given
that not all the countries under analysis used the same intervention mechanisms,
their estimation strategies incorporate a reaction function for intervention in those
cases when such a policy was not announced. In addition, as not all countries
would pursue the same objective9 their study would evaluate regressions of both
first and second moments of the exchange rates on a set of domestic and external
macroeconomic variables and intervention indicators. They find that interventions
have had an impact on the second moments of exchange rates, and that on average
intervention effectiveness depends on the degree of capital account openness.
A broader analysis of unconventional policy responses is found in Calani, Cowan,
and Garc´ıa (2011). They investigate the monetary and non-monetary policy mea-
sures implemented by a set of 9 inflation targeting countries during the 2008-09
financial crisis. Their estimation strategy involves the evaluation of the individual
impact of these measures on three areas: nominal exchange rates, on-shore inter-
est rates, and deposit rates. According to the authors intervention was one of the
three major responses to the crisis of the analysed countries. The evidence of in-
tervention effectiveness is mixed. For countries such as Chile and Colombia either
announcements or implementation of such policy show a significant impact on the
9This is to say that intervention could either aim to move the exchange rates to certain levels or
decreasing its volatility.
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nominal exchange rates; Brazil, Mexico and South Korea show no such impact. In
some cases, inconclusive results are related to ambiguity of the expected impact,
or inability to differentiate whether the impact is also due to other unconventional
policies applied during the same period.
Amongst the papers that focus on individual country cases, the most common
cases studied are Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey.
Kohlscheen (2012) and Wu (2012) contribute to the literature of intervention in
EMEs analysing the Brazilian case. Both studies examine the case from a mi-
crostructure perspective, using different estimation strategies. Kohlscheen (2012)
uses simple linear regressions to evaluate the effects of intervention through exam-
ining the changes in the relationships between order flows and exchange rates. He
finds that the link between order flow and exchange rate weakens on days where the
Central Bank of Brazil intervenes, an effect that is stronger when the size of inter-
vention is large. Wu (2012) develops a theoretical model to describe the Brazilian
FX market and estimates a structural VAR, focusing on the effect of unexpected
overnight positions shocks on the exchange rate dynamics. He finds evidence that
the Central Bank of Brazil tends to lean against the wind, and to provide liquidity,
concluding that the management of Brazilian exchange rates has been a contributor
to the resilience of this country.
The Colombian case is analysed in Kamil (2008). The paper suggests that the
motives behind the discretionary FX interventions in Colombia are not consistent
across time. In periods when the central bank aimed to lean against the wind,
slowing or even reversing an exchange rate trend, the effects of intervention were
more significant than in those periods when the monetary authority aimed to correct
deviations of the exchange rate from its target.
The case of the Czech Republic is recently addressed by Disyatat and Galati
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(2007) and Scalia (2008).10 These two papers differ in the data and methodology
used. Whilst Disyatat and Galati (2007) employ daily data and a two stage IV
estimation strategy, Scalia (2008) uses intraday data to evaluate the impact of in-
tervention with a microstructure approach. The results of Scalia (2008) show that
intervention has a highly significant effect on exchange rates through order flows.
This is not fully captured by Disyatat and Galati (2007), whose findings suggest
statistically weak effects of intervention on exchange rates.
The results for Mexico by Karacadag and Guimara˜es (2004) also show that the
effects of sales intervention are significant, tending to increase short and long-term
volatility, but varies across time. Unlike the Mexican case, Melvin et al. (2009) show
that, for the Russian case, automated intervention has a positive effect on volatility
in the first few minutes after intervention, but overall reduces daily volatility.
Studies for the Turkish case are found in Karacadag and Guimara˜es (2004) and
Tuna (2011). Karacadag and Guimara˜es (2004) evaluate the effects of interven-
tions carried out over the period 2001-2003. Amongst their results, they note that
sales interventions seem to reduce volatility in the short-term, and tend to increase
volatility on the long-term. Tuna (2011) expands the period analysed to include
interventions in 2005. She finds no evidence of intervention impact on the exchange
rate level, as in Karacadag and Guimara˜es (2004). She also finds that the probabil-
ity of intervention is affected by increases in exchange rate volatility when analysing
sale and purchase interventions separately, supporting the leaning against the wind
idea.
In summary, the evidence for EMEs is not conclusive. On the one hand, inter-
vention mechanisms and tools vary from country to country. Some countries are
found to lean against the wind, whilst others have a strong rule-based policy. On
the other hand, intervention motives also differ, leading to mixed conclusions on
10In the early 2000s, Holub (2004) provided a comprehensive description and statistical analysis of
the Czech case under inflation targeting.
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whether intervention is effective, due to the ambiguity of the results regarding the
effects on exchange rate levels and volatilities. Furthermore, data availability issues
limit the research at higher frequency levels in some cases, leaving the question open
as to whether intervention affects market behaviour on an intraday basis, and if the
latter is relevant.
3.2.2 The Chilean Case
The exchange rate in Chile was fixed until 1984, when a bands regime was adopted.
The Central Bank of Chile (CBC) would intervene in cases when an overreaction of
the exchange rate would be considered to be a threat for the economy. However,
even under intervention, the exchange rates did not remain within its bands, hence
this regime became less credible. With the depreciation pressures brought on by the
Asian crisis, the CBC applied spot non-sterilised intervention in June 1998, narrow-
ing its range of flotation. In September 1999 the monetary authority abandoned the
bands, leading to flexible exchange rates. This has been the regime up to this date.
Currently, the CBC has the right to intervene in the FX market if it considers that
there is a persistent misalignment of the exchange rate identified or judged as an
overreaction that could be damaging for the economy (Morande´ and Tapia, 2002;
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006).
Since the flexible exchange rate regime was adopted, the CBC has intervened
on very few occasions: between August and December 2001, October 2002 and
February 2003, April and September 2008, and during the whole of 2011. In these
occasions, the CBC used 3 different instruments to carry out its interventions: the
spot exchange rate, bonds of the CBC denominated in dollars for different maturities,
and announcements.11
As explained by Gregorio and Tokman (2004), in 2001 and 2002 the exchange
rate depreciation was excessive compared to the expected rate given the evolution of
11Announcements are considered here as instruments of the signalling channel.
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its fundamentals. In 2001 the CBC decided to intervene in the FX market in a period
of financial turmoil in Argentina and the Chilean peso (CLP) depreciating from 550
to 650 pesos per USD (around 18%) in 6 months. The programme of sterilised
intervention in 2001 consisted of sales of USDs in the spot market. Only 40% of the
total amount announced was actually sold,12 and this represented close to 5% of the
total stock of international reserves in that period. The intervention consisted of 15
events throughout the four months defined. In 2002 the CBC announced a potential
intervention in the Chilean FX market whilst uncertainty surrounded the Brazilian
economy. The programme announced was similar to that of 2001, aiming to be
completed within 4 months, after observing a 7% depreciation of the local currency
over the month previous to the intervention. The CBC finally did not carry out the
intervention programme announced, it only issued debt denominated in USDs, thus
international reserves remained unchanged. In this intervention, an appreciation of
2.3% of the exchange rate was observed on the day of the announcement.
Between 2003 and 2007, Chilean economy was in good conditions: monetary and
credit aggregates were growing at a steady rate, domestic stock index and currency
became stronger, real sector was expanding, and inflation rate stayed close to its tar-
get.13 However, in 2008 the CBC announced a programme of international reserves
accumulation, aiming to strengthen the international liquidity position of the Chilean
economy given the growing uncertainty brought by the increasing detriment of in-
ternational conditions.14 The objective of this reserve accumulation programme was
to acquire a total of 8 billion USDs, through purchasing 50 million USDs on a daily
basis. The daily purchases of USDs would be accompanied by a programme of sales
of CBC bonds denominated in USD at different maturities. The programme, sched-
12The total amount announced to be sold was 2 billion USDs. Only 803 million USDs were actually
sold.
13According to several issues of the Monetary Policy Reports published by the CBC throughout the
last decade.
14Interestingly, the CBC did not explicitly use the word “intervention” in this announcement.
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uled initially to be completed by December of that year, was stopped in September
coinciding with Lehman Brothers’ collapse. This time, around 72% of the 8 billion
of USDs announced were actually purchased.
Between March and July 2009, the CBC initiated a two-stage programme of sales
of USDs owned by the Chilean Government. The fiscal authority aimed to finance
its fiscal stimulus plan with these resources. On this occasion the CBC acted as
an intermediary between the Government and the market, i.e. a fiscal agent. This
programme is not considered an official intervention given that the currency traded
was not property of the monetary authority, thus there were no expected effects on
the exchange rates through the signalling channel. However, we include this event
into our analysis since it could have had an effect on the exchange rates similar to
the portfolio channel. This programme was fully accomplished with 3 billion USDs
auctioned in its first stage through 50 million USDs being sold on a daily basis. The
second stage started one week after the first stage finished and it aimed to auction
on other 4 billion USDs through daily sales of 40 million USDs each.
In the first days of 2011 another reserve accumulation programme was announced
for 12 billion USDs. Its objective was two-fold: first, to strengthen the Chilean
international liquidity position, bringing it to levels that were similar to comparable
economies; second, it was believed that “the intervention would soften the effects
of the exchange rate adjustment on the economy” (CBC, 2011a). The intervention
consisted of daily auctions of 50 million USDs, over the 240 trading days of 2011.
Throughout this period, not including the last quarter, the quantity demanded by
commercial banks was three times the CBC USD supply and the nominal exchange
rate moved around 470 CLPs per USD. The depreciation and higher volatility of
the CLP observed in the last quarter of 2011 was due to external conditions and
coherent to the trends of other commodity exporters and emerging economies (see,
e.g., CBC, 2011b). Compared to the first 3 quarters of the year, in the last quarter
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the average of the domestic currency was nearly 8% higher, whilst the quantity of
USDs auctioned by the CBC decreased on average by 20 million.
When comparing the interventions in the FX market during the last 5 years, we
observe that there were some differences with regards to the time of the day at which
the CBC would intervene.15 In 2008 the CBC explicitly announced the specific time
of the day at which it would initialise the USD auctions in the market. A few days
later, another announcement communicated that the intervention would be done
within a range of hours. Within this range, generally the auction would be initiated
under appropriate conditions (price, volatility, news arrival, etc.), monitored by the
operators of the CBC’s money desk. However, in 2009 the time at which the auction
would be initiated would be subject to non-fundamental factors.16
As mentioned above, there are no studies that examine the effects of the USD pur-
chase and sale programmes after 2003 in Chile, either at daily or intraday frequency.
However, there are several reasons why analysing the impact of these intervention
events on the Chilean market is highly interesting. First, Chile is an emerging market
that operates under inflation target and flexible exchange rate regimes. In addition,
the CLP can be said to be a commodity currency due to the strong influence of the
copper price in determining the exchange rate. Contrary to other comparable coun-
tries, despite the CBC having the right to intervene in the Chilean spot market, it
only intervened on a few occasions after adopting flexible exchange rates. Moreover,
its interventions were pre-announced in order to meet transparency requirements.
15Note that intraday data for 2011 is not available to us. Therefore, we are unable to provide specific
details with regards to the time at which intervention took place in that year. Informal discussions
with the operators of the money desk at the CBC would indicate that the auctions in 2011 took
place between 9 am and 1 pm, or when the trading activity of the market was observed to be more
intense.
16For instance, the client (i.e. Chilean Government) requiring one of its representatives be present to
monitor and approve the auction process.
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3.2.3 Institutional Environment of the Chilean FX Market
The Chilean FX market is a relatively young market. It has been very dynamic in
the last 30 years, yet there are no studies that describe its main characteristics, such
as who the traders are, trading venues available, or limitations of the trading process.
Whilst in Chapter 2 we give a general description of this market, in this section, we
give further details about this market, focusing on its institutional environment.17
The institutional environment of the Chilean FX market has changed dramat-
ically along side the increase in its trading activity. In the 1980s, all transactions
were dealt through telephone, mainly for hedging since the exchange rate was fixed
at the time. Electronic systems appeared as alternative venues for trading only
in the 1990s, reducing in great manner telephone usage as means for trading. An
example of one of the first electronic platforms to be launched in the 1990s is the
SSE. This platform grew rapidly, becoming the main venue for currency trading
in that decade. The EE as a trading platform was launched in 1989 and was the
first institution in Latin America to implement an electronic system that allowed
fixed income instrument transactions in real time. Although this important innova-
tion helped decrease the costs of updating relevant information for trading decisions
(as the trader no longer needed to go to a physical place to get informed), USD
transactions only became possible through the EE in 2003.
The surge of the EE as a competitor of the SSE for USD transactions in early
2000s coincides with the transition from fixed to flexible exchange rate regimes in
Chile. As explained in Section 2.3.1 of this thesis, the EE market share increased
substantially since it started USD transactions, reaching its peak in 2008. During
the financial crisis, SSE and EE shared similar portions of the spot market. After
17Given that there is no existing literature that describes the Chilean FX market and its institutional
environment, in this section the sources of information used are the websites of the trading platforms
available in this market, i.e. the Santiago Stock Exchange (SSE, www.bolsadesantiago.com) and the
Electronic Exchange (EE, www.bolchile.cl). Additionally, we gathered information through informal
conversations with money desk analysts of the CBC.
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that, the EE market share started increasing once again. Nowadays, over 95% of
the USD transactions are carried out through the EE.
Regarding the agents who trade in the Chilean FX market, there has been not
as many changes as those observed for the trading venues. The Chilean FX market
has basically had two types of agents; banks and broker-dealers.18 Traditionally,
banks would trade in the SSE and the EE, whereas broker-dealers would close their
deals mainly using the EE. The CBC can also become a trader for a short period
of time, whenever it decides to intervene in the FX market or act as a fiscal agent.
The pre-Lehman FX intervention of the CBC throughout 2008 was carried out in
the SSE platform. On that occasion, more than 80% of the transactions were made
between banks in normal trading hours. During intervention minutes, only banks
were authorised to participate in the auctions carried out by the CBC. As the EE
gained more participation of the total market trades, the CBC also moved to the
EE platform to conduct the auctions for the intervention in 2011. Although broker-
dealers were also present during interventions, banks were still the main participants
in the CBC auctions.
Having two platforms could potentially open arbitrage opportunities. To ex-
amine whether these opportunities took place, it is worth observing what the price
differences between the SSE and the EE occurred in the periods when they co-existed
as equally preferred trading platforms. As explained in Chapter 2, the price levels
registered in these platforms have not shown major differences between 2003 and
2008. The exception was seen during the 2008 intervention period when the daily
average price in the SSE was predominantly lower than that observed in the EE.
However, at the same period of time, the intraday movements did not show price
corrections in the EE once the intervention in the SSE finished. Moreover, broker
dealers usually would not trade in the SSE. Added to that, it is possible that even if
18Broker-dealers are agents who trade on behalf of their investment institutional clients but also their
own positions.
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there were arbitrage opportunities, the unfavourable external conditions around the
financial crisis provided no incentives for selling the acquired USD at a higher price
due to the liquidity constraints agents faced. In parallel, around those same years,
the EE also faced domestic market problems: for a short period of time, agents other
than those who trade in the FX market (possibly institutional investors) had access
to EE monitors. This fact possibly allowed for a decreasing on the information
asymmetry between traders and their clients, thus pushing away traders who could
potentially see their profits decrease whilst trading in the EE. In other words, there
could also be a possibility that participants of the EE market decreased during that
time due to idiosyncratic factors. That said, the lack of more detailed information
on the agents of the EE market limits us to further examine this phenomenon.
3.3 Data
In this chapter, we employ a data set at intraday frequency that consists of all
USD spot transactions measured in CLPs covering July 2008 and June-July 2009,
recording exact time, price, volume, trade sign, and market type of each transac-
tion. Trade sign indicates whether the respective amount of USD (volume) was
purchased or sold. This data is extracted from the Santiago Stock Exchange (SSE)
data system.19 One of the advantages of having sign and volume of trade is that
this information allows us to construct different measures of order flows with which
the relationship between exchange rates and order flow can be studied. Market type
indicates whether the transaction was made between dealers, i.e. interbank (IB), or
whether it included at least one non-dealer participant, so that it will correspond to
a non-bank trade (NB).20 In addition, our data also identifies CBC transactions.21
19Data collection from the SSE system is usually limited, partly due to privacy policies, and partly due
to the strictness of the procedure involved in the data collection itself. In particular, we collected
these short span data on a daily basis directly from the money desk of the CBC to which access
was granted to us for a limited period of time, and for research purposes only.
20One drawback of our data set is that identification of whether a NB trade was made between a
bank and a non-bank participant, or between two non-bank participants, is not possible.
21Noteworthy to mention that the only participant identified in our data is the CBC. Information
about the other banks and institutions is not available to us as this type of information is proprietary
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The CBC trades currencies only with banks.
3.4 Impact of FX Intervention in Chile
In this section we present results of the empirical exercises carried out based on
different approaches, for the Chilean FX market at intraday frequency, using the
dataset previously detailed.
3.4.1 Intraday Results
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the intraday data used in this study covers June 2008,
and June-July 2009. According to our data, in 2008 the daily turnover was on
average 431 million USDs. Excluding the CBC trades, 52% of the trades were sales.
Overall, 84% of the negotiations were IB. During this period, the CBC’s auctions
were adjudicated to four banks on average. The auctions were adjudicated to a
greater number of banks usually in the first and last days of the month, and on
the same day of the monetary policy meeting. In 2009, the daily turnover was on
average 410 million USDs. Excluding the CBC, 55% were purchases. On those days
when the CBC did not sell USDs, the volume traded was on average higher. The
CBC auctions of USD sales were adjudicated to 4 banks on average each day. On
two occasions, the auctioned USDs were distributed amongst a larger number of
banks (above 6) not coincident with the monetary policy meeting. On 4 occasions,
the amount auctioned would be adjudicated to a single bank.
Order Flows and Intervention
In chapter 2, we examined the effects of order flow of different market agents on
intraday exchange rate returns (see Table 2.8). The estimations with and without
the CBC’s order flows showed that net buying pressure for the USD was associated
with appreciation of the USDs with respect to the CLP. The results also suggest
that the order flows of the CBC have significant effects on exchange rate returns in
and confidential.
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2008 and 2009 (although in 2009 these effects are significant only at 7%).
Comparing the results for the two specifications for each year, we notice that
when including central bank order flows, the effect of interbank order flows on ex-
change rate intraday returns decreases in 2008. Although different in magnitude,
this result provides evidence for the order flow channel and is similar to the one of
Kohlscheen (2012) for the case of Brazil.22
An event study for the intraday data can provide additional information regard-
ing the degree to which agents could anticipate the CBC’s interventions, and the
duration of the potential intervention effects.
Event Study
Our event study follows Payne and Vitale (2003) and Dominguez and Panthaki





′δ + εt (3.1)
where ∆st are the exchange rate intraday returns, It+i is the intervention indicator
variable which corresponds to the interaction between total order flows and central
bank order flow, and X ′δ represents other relevant variables, that in our case are the
other order flow interactions and lags of the exchange rate returns, as in Equation
(2.4) of the previous chapter. Table 3.2 includes the results of these regressions at 15
minutes frequency for 2008 and 2009. We choose q = 8 for the intervention indicator
in order to examine the effects within a range of 2 hours around the intervention.
From our results, there seems to be a significant impact of actual interventions
in 2008 according to the Wald test of joint significance of the leads and lags of
the intervention variable. In 2009, the participation of the CBC in the FX market
appears not to significantly affect the exchange rates. The results for individual
22In his paper, Kohlscheen (2012) indicates that a damping effect on prices occurs when the partici-
pation of the central bank in the market induces changes in the pricing process.
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leads and lags show that there is a significant impact of the 1st, 4th and 5th lags for
the 2008 sample, suggesting that the effect of central bank orders remain over an
hour. The results for 2009 indicate that the response to the central bank orders is
more immediate, and they do not last long.23
Strictly speaking, the contemporaneous effect not being significant in all the
specifications does not mean that there was no contemporaneous or first lag effect
on the returns. This could be due to the nature of the intervention process in Chile.
As explained in Section 3.2, the auctions lasted 3 minutes. Given that we aggregated
the data to 15 minutes frequency, it could happen that intervention events were in
the first, the last, or somewhere in the middle of the 15 minutes interval of which
they belonged. Additionally, from the data we know that during the 3 minutes
that intervention would take place, neither IB nor NB trades were recorded. On
the one hand, this is because the IB agents were the ones competing to sell USDs
to the CBC. On the other hand, as the NB were not able to participate in the
auction, it is reasonable to think that they waited until the auctions concluded to
react. The negative lagged coefficient could indicate that after the intervention,
the agents adjust their expectations downwards. Overall, 2 hours previous to the
intervention the spot rate returns would show a decrease and within the 2 hours
after the intervention occurred, any further adjustments downwards in the exchange
rate would be compensated.
Thinking of 2008 as a year of higher volatility in global FX markets, and assuming
that the criterion for measuring the effectiveness of 2008 intervention is its ability
to reverse the appreciation trend of the CLP, these results would be comparable
with Fratzscher (2008) who states that in periods of higher market uncertainty, the
23For 2008, the 7th lead is also found to be significant, which would suggest that the intervention was
expected with almost 2 hours in advance. This could be intuitive given that from April to June,
the market could have learnt to predict the times at which the CBC would intervene. However,
the fact that the other leads are not significant weakens this hypothesis. The strongly significant
first lead found for 2009 would suggest that the agents would anticipate the CBC entrance to the
market. It could have been the case that the agents learnt to anticipate the CBC’s behaviour from
the 2008 intervention.
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success of intervention tends to increase. That could be a reason to explain why the
2009 “with the wind” operations of the CBC showed weaker results, in contrast with
Fratzscher (2005).
To summarise, the results of this event study help to understand intraday market
behaviour providing evidence of the existence of intraday effects of intervention on
exchange rates in Chile. However, the fact that these effects vary depending on the
sample analysed adds uncertainty about whether these results usually vary across
time, or whether they are related to the nature of the CBC trades. Such questions
cannot be answered through linear regression analysis. Therefore, we proceed to
examine the success rates of interventions.
Measuring Intervention Success
Although the CBC promotes and practices a transparency policy in terms of com-
municating its policy decisions, this only means that the general public will learn
about how the CBC will operate, and the primary objectives of its actions. How-
ever, the objectives with regards to the particular policy instrument used may vary.
That is, through reserve accumulation the authority could be seeking a reversal or
moderation of any appreciation/depreciation trend observed, or aiming to affect the
dynamics of its quantities demanded and supplied, i.e. the dynamics of FX order
flows. In fact, accumulation of international reserves could be either to create a
cushion under the uncertainty of future worsening of the economic conditions of
the global economy, or just a way of implicitly promoting economic growth through
exports.
Given that the particular objectives behind the intervention in the FX market
may vary, here we evaluate the effectiveness of the interventions in Chile using
two sets of success criteria, on the response of exchange rate and order flow as in
Fratzscher (2005) and Marsh (2011), respectively.
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Fratzscher (2005) proposes four criteria to evaluate the success of the intervention
through examining the changes in the nominal exchange rate around the intervention
events. These criteria are known as the event, direction, reversal and smoothing
criteria, and are explained bellow:
- The event criterion states that during the intervention event the direction of
the exchange rate change is consistent with the direction of the intervention
itself. That means that if the intervention consists of buying foreign currency,
the nominal exchange rate (measured as domestic versus foreign currency)
increases during the event.
- The direction criterion evaluates whether after the intervention event the nom-
inal exchange rate moved in the same direction as the intervention.
- The reversal criterion states that the success of the intervention depends on
whether the nominal exchange rate trend reverses after the intervention takes
place.
- The smoothing criterion evaluates whether the nominal exchange rate trend
‘slows down’ after the intervention event.
Marsh (2011) brings these success criteria to a microstructure view in order to
evaluate the effects of FX intervention on order flows. He defines nine success criteria
of which five are related to the performance of order flows, and four are related to
the value of sales and purchases, that is, order flows and exchange rate combined.
Marsh’s criteria are defined as follows. In terms of the order flows performance:
- net flow out of the domestic currency: an intervention that aims to
weaken the domestic currency would be successful if net purchases of foreign
currency are observed contemporaneously with the intervention event;
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- reversing the direction of the net flow: an intervention that aims to
weaken the domestic currency would be successful if it changes the order flow
direction – i.e. if it was into the domestic currency before the intervention, it
goes out of the currency after the intervention;
- accentuating/moderating the net flow: an intervention that aims to
weaken the domestic currency is leaning with the wind, it would be considered
successful if order flow that is out of the domestic currency is accentuated; if
such intervention is leaning against the wind, it would be considered successful
if it moderates the order flow that is out of the domestic currency;
- general success criterion for net flows: an intervention aiming to weaken
the domestic currency would be successful if order flows are also out of the
domestic currency or, if not, at least less into the domestic currency than they
were.
In terms of order flows and prices:
- increasing in the domestic currency sales: an intervention consisting of
buying foreign currency is successful if the value of the domestic currency sales
increases;
- decreasing in the domestic currency purchases: an intervention con-
sisting of buying foreign currency is successful if the value of the domestic
currency purchases decreases;
- success criterion for gross flow: an intervention consisting of buying for-
eign currency is successful if the value of domestic currency sales increases and
the value of domestic currency purchases decreases; and
- success criterion for flow proportions: an intervention consisting of buy-
ing foreign currency is successful if the proportion of domestic currency sales
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increases compared to the period before the intervention.
Table 3.3 summarises the results of applying these criteria to our intraday data
on order flow, aggregated to daily frequency, for a preliminary overview. Note that
our intraday data for 2008 only contains information for 22 trading days, and in all
these days the CBC intervened in the FX market. Also note that we only count with
33 trading days for 2009, and the CBC traded on 29 of these days. Recalling that in
2009 the direction of the CBC trades was opposite to the trades in 2008, in order to
analyse the impact of CBC trades of 2009 we consider the inverse of the criteria ex-
plained above. The table shows that in 2008 only 36% of the daily average exchange
rates followed the direction of the intervention on the same day and the day after the
intervention events. However, 50% of the cases showed a smoothing on the trend. In
terms of reversal criteria, the proportion of the total number of cases is 23% consid-
ering price, and 33% when examining the order flow performance. Nevertheless, a
higher proportion of successes is observed when considering the increase/decrease in
CLP sales/purchases as criteria for intervention success: proportionally to the total
of the day, more than 50% of the intervention events would have succeeded.
The problem with the analysis of success rates with data aggregated at daily
frequency is that it does not allow us to evaluate whether the success rates are sta-
tistically significant. In the particular case of Chile, where interventions are carried
out on a daily basis and for a long period of time, the statistical significance of inter-
vention events can be obtained through examining the data at intraday frequency.
Therefore, we increase the frequency of our intraday data to 15 minutes intervals.
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 summarise the results. The first row of each criterion shows the
number of cases that meet the success criterion (successes). Rows two and three
show the correspondents percentage of the total observations at which intervention
‘succeeded’ according to each criteria, conditional to the sample and to the pop-
ulation sizes (conditional % and unconditional %, respectively). Row four shows
133
the p-value of observing the number of successes given the sample size, population
size and the unconditional success rate, using hypergeometric function, as in Marsh
(2011). The columns pre-event and post-event correspond to the averages of the
results of computing each success criterion at 1 to 8 leads and lags separately, in
order to identify whether the intervention had anticipated or delayed effects. The
population size, which corresponds to the total number of transactions observed in
each period, is 501 in 2008, and 786 in 2009. The sample size corresponds to the
number of times the CBC operated in the market, and that is 22 times in 2008 and
29 in 2009. Significant comparisons between the conditional and the unconditional
success rates are defined as when the p-value is lower than 0.05 or higher than 0.95.
According to Tables 3.4 to 3.6, actual interventions in 2008 appear to have had
little effect on exchange rate or order flow. The only significant result at 5% signif-
icance is a moderation effect on order flow within the 15 minutes interval at which
interventions took place, with a conditional success rate (22.7%) much higher than
the expected (13%). If we considered a 10% confidence level, the actual interven-
tions in 2008 would have also had effects on the value of order flows. Interestingly,
the effects of USD sale programme in 2009 appears to have had a stronger effect.
For example, the reversal on order flow dynamics appears to have taken place at a
much higher rate (27.6%) than the expected (17.7%). In addition, the decrease in
the value of CLP sales amongst market agents is around 33% more frequent than
usual. The USD sales by the CBC on behalf of the Chilean Government not only
decreased in value of CLP sales in absolute terms, but also increased the value of
CLP purchases from 21.4% to nearly 45% of the cases. As a proportion of the value
of buys and sales combined, the decrease in value of CLP sales slows its frequency
from 40.7% to 13.8%.
Overall, our results suggest that if the objective of the CBC was to moderate
the FX order flow, actual interventions in 2008 were successful. However, the par-
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ticipation of the CBC in the market has effects per se on decreasing the value of
sales. If trades in 2009 would have been part of an intervention programme, then
leaning with the wind would have been more effective than leaning against the wind
reversing the order flow direction and changing its value.
3.5 Conclusion
According to the literature, the effects of official FX intervention on exchange rates
are mixed. A great portion of the research available focuses on the effects of in-
terventions of advanced economies, mainly due to data availability issues and the
fact that in the last decade this practice has been observed to be more common
amongst developing countries. Our study seeks to provide new evidence that can
help filling this gap. Emerging markets are interesting because, given the smaller
size of their currency markets relative to advanced economies, their official FX in-
terventions could be more effective, for instance through the portfolio channel, than
the same policy carried out in an advanced economy. In this sense, Chile is an in-
teresting case. Taking advantage of our novel dataset, we propose a comprehensive
analysis of the effects and success of official intervention in the Chilean FX market.
In our analysis we explore the latest techniques on microstructure data to evalu-
ate the intraday effects of intervention on the Chilean FX market. Our intraday data
had not been previously available to scholars, therefore its sole statistical analysis
is an important contribution to the literature. This data set records all spot USD
transactions on the main trading platform of Chilean FX market, for two samples;
one from 2008 and another from 2009. What is interesting in our data is that in
2008 the CBC intervened in the FX market aiming to accumulate reserves to pre-
vent future worsening of the global economy conditions. In 2009, however, the CBC
traded in the market as a fiscal agent, and sold USDs from the Chilean government.
To evaluate the effects of intervention on the intraday exchange rate returns we
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firstly employ a standard event study. The results indicate that in 2008 the effect
of intervention on the market price returns was felt 2 hours after the intervention
occurred, whereas in 2009 effects of central bank trades on exchange rate were in-
corporated within the next 15 minutes on average. The anticipation of 2008’s events
could be due to acquired knowledge of the traders since the intervention programme
started that year in April. Overall, our results provide evidence in favour of the
microstructure channel of intervention as the inclusion of central bank orders has an
impact on intraday returns and indirectly changes the pricing process of the private
market.
We then analyse the intervention success rates in terms of exchange rate move-
ments and order flows. This sort of analysis helps us evaluate the nature of the
impact on these variables, i.e. reversals, moderation or accentuation of trends in
exchange rates and order flows observed previous to the intervention. In terms of
changes in success rates, official intervention appears to have only a moderation
effect on the order flow dynamics on the days of intervention. The effects of the
USD sales in 2009 appears to have had a stronger effect on the reversal of order flow
dynamics and on changes in the value of sales and purchases of CLP in the market.
This could imply that CBC trades have an effect on private order flows per se, which
usually is not considered as an input to the policy decision process.
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Table 3.1: Intervention Dates and Exchange Rate Variations
2008 2009 2011
Announcement Apr 11th Mar 19th Jan 3rd
Actual Interventions Apr 14th - Aug 29th stage 1: Mar 27th - Jun 22nd Jan 5th - Dec 16th
or CBC participation stage 2: Jul 1st - Nov 20th
30 days prior -5.21 -4.60 -2.61
announcement (a)
First days post 3.34 -1.26, -2.78 -0.42, 4.02
announcement (b)
30 days post 5.16 -0.72, 2.75 -3.46
announcement (c)
Throughout the 15.11 -6.75, -6.31 6.62
programme
The table shows the dates of oral (announcements) and actual interventions or participation of the
CBC in the FX market in 2008, 2009 and 2011, in the top panel, and percentage changes of the
spot exchange rate is the bottom panel. A negative value indicates appreciation of the domestic
currency (CLP) against the foreign currency (USD). Since the announcements were published at the
end of each corresponding day, (a) corresponds to the percentage change between the exchange rate
level on the day of the announcement with respect to the exchange rate level on the 30th day prior
the announcement. Given that in 2009 and 2011 actual operations started 6 and 2 days after the
announcement respectively, (b) shows both the exchange rate return the day after the announcement
and the percentage changes between the first actual intervention day and the announcement day.
As the purchase programme of the Government USDs in 2009 was carried out in 2 stages, in column
3 the 30 days posterior exchange rates variations (c) correspond to the percentage changes 30 days
after the first day of each stage.
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Constant -0.233 (0.495) -0.685 (0.385)***
It−8 0.027 (0.210) -0.229 (0.322)
It−7 0.391 (0.277) -0.193 (0.192)
It−6 -0.049 (0.339) 0.118 (0.121)
It−5 -0.529 (0.268)** 0.051 (0.213)
It−4 0.888 (0.387)** -0.100 (0.249)
It−3 0.121 (0.442) -0.342 (0.239)
It−2 -0.583 (0.444) -0.011 (0.170)
It−1 -0.803 (0.481)*** -0.126 (0.217)
It -1.340 (0.311)* -0.652 (0.252)*
It+1 -0.570 (0.297)*** 0.409 (0.244)***
It+2 -0.802 (0.334)** -0.128 (0.372)
It+3 -0.130 (0.340) 0.235 (0.346)
It+4 0.009 (0.347) -0.258 (0.255)
It+5 -0.778 (0.508) 0.159 (0.471)
It+6 -0.043 (0.436) 0.048 (0.216)
It+7 -0.742 (0.342)** -0.306 (0.295)
It+8 0.031 (0.375) -0.217 (0.531)
∆st−1 -0.016 (0.042) -0.034 (0.034)
∆st−2 -0.010 (0.049) 0.010 (0.022)
OFt 0.909 (0.201)* 0.223 (0.071)*
OFt ∗OF
IB
t -0.821 (0.210)* -0.147 (0.071)**




βi = 0 4.21 ** 1.10
The table shows the OLS estimations at 15 minute frequency as in Equation (3.1), of the contem-
poraneous relationships between the exchange rate returns measured as CLPs per USDs, and trade
based order flow. The coefficients show the changes of the exchange rate returns (∆st) in basis
points of net purchases (trade based order flow). Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis. ***
indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample period ranges
from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
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Order flow based criteria




general criterion 42.86 42.86
Order flow and price based criteria
increase sales/buys 47.62 42.86
decrease buys/sales 47.62 50.00
success gross 33.33 17.86
success proportions 52.38 50.00
The table shows the percentage of the total observations at which intervention ‘succeeded’ according
to the criteria of Fratzscher (2005) and Marsh (2011), using daily data on trade based order flow and
nominal exchange rate CLPs versus USDs. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008
(labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009 to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
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Table 3.4: Intervention Success Evaluation, Intraday Observations
2008 2009
pre-event event post-event pre-event event post-event
Price based criteria
event and direction successes 68 11 84 91 17 105
conditional % 38.64 50.00 47.73 39.22 58.62 45.26
unconditional % 37.85 48.30 37.23 36.40 46.18 36.37
p-value 0.54 0.65 0.85 0.65 0.94 0.88
reversal successes 38 6 39 43 5 49
conditional % 21.59 27.27 22.16 18.53 17.24 21.12
unconditional % 18.54 21.36 16.54 17.22 20.23 16.33
p-value 0.62 0.83 0.72 0.62 0.45 0.82
smoothing successes 57 8 61 73 11 78
conditional % 32.39 36.36 34.66 31.47 37.93 33.62
unconditional % 28.79 37.33 28.92 28.80 35.88 27.78
p-value 0.72 0.56 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.74
The table shows the number of cases that meet each success criteria (successes), the correspondents percentage of the total observations at which intervention ‘succeeded’ according
to each criteria, conditional to the sample and the population sizes (conditional % and unconditional %, respectively), and the p-value of observing the number of successes given the
sample size, population size and the unconditional success rate, using hypergeometric function, as in Marsh (2011). The results showed in this table correspond to these calculations
using intraday data on trade based order flow and nominal exchange rate CLP/USD. A window of 8 leads/lags is used to cover the pre and post-event evaluations. The population
size is 501 observations in 2008, and 786 in 2009. The sample size is 22 in 2008 and 29 in 2009. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009
to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
140
Table 3.5: Intervention Success Evaluation, Intraday Observations (cont.)
2008 2009
pre-event event post-event pre-event event post-event
Order flow based criteria
out of/in the CLP successes 68 9 81 64 12 101
conditional % 38.64 40.91 46.02 27.59 41.38 43.53
unconditional % 36.25 47.31 36.13 31.00 40.97 32.59
p-value 0.61 0.35 0.88 0.43 0.60 0.89
reversal successes 29 5 33 35 8 44
conditional % 16.48 22.73 18.75 15.09 27.59 18.97
unconditional % 14.20 17.96 14.57 14.23 17.68 14.54
p-value 0.62 0.81 0.80 0.61 0.95 0.77
accentuation successes 14 2 20 14 1 26
conditional % 7.95 9.09 11.36 6.03 3.45 11.21
unconditional % 8.26 9.98 7.83 6.66 8.02 6.98
p-value 0.45 0.62 0.76 0.41 0.31 0.87
moderation successes 22 5 28 35 7 38
conditional % 12.50 22.73 15.91 15.09 24.14 16.38
unconditional % 12.05 12.97 15.37 14.84 16.41 17.18
p-value 0.50 0.95 0.55 0.57 0.91 0.42
general criterion successes 52 8 54 58 10 75
conditional % 29.55 36.36 30.68 25.00 34.48 32.33
unconditional % 26.80 34.53 25.32 24.57 32.06 24.54
p-value 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.58 0.69 0.86
The table shows the number of cases that meet each success criteria (successes), the correspondents percentage of the total observations at which intervention ‘succeeded’ according
to each criteria, conditional to the sample and the population sizes (conditional % and unconditional %, respectively), and the p-value of observing the number of successes given the
sample size, population size and the unconditional success rate, using hypergeometric function, as in Marsh (2011). The results showed in this table correspond to these calculations
using intraday data on trade based order flow and nominal exchange rate CLP/USD. A window of 8 leads/lags is used to cover the pre and post-event evaluations. The population
size is 501 observations in 2008, and 786 in 2009. The sample size is 22 in 2008 and 29 in 2009. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009
to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
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Table 3.6: Intervention Success Evaluation, Intraday Observations (cont.)
2008 2009
pre-event event post-event pre-event event post-event
Order flow and price based criteria
increase sales/buys successes 77 14 85 76 13 119
conditional % 43.75 63.64 48.30 32.76 44.83 51.29
unconditional % 40.54 50.30 37.60 37.07 44.66 43.19
p-value 0.61 0.93 0.84 0.32 0.59 0.78
decrease buys/sales successes 61 8 93 98 23 104
conditional % 34.66 36.36 52.84 42.24 79.31 44.83
unconditional % 34.01 40.32 38.95 38.47 46.06 34.61
p-value 0.52 0.44 0.90 0.70 1.00 0.91
success gross successes 33 5 48 39 13 60
conditional % 18.75 22.73 27.27 16.81 44.83 25.86
unconditional % 17.27 21.36 17.61 17.76 21.37 18.05
p-value 0.68 0.68 0.93 0.40 1.00 0.87
success proportions successes 12 4
conditional % 54.55 13.79
unconditional % 44.71 40.71
p-value 0.88 0.00
The table shows the number of cases that meet each success criteria (successes), the correspondents percentage of the total observations at which intervention ‘succeeded’ according
to each criteria, conditional to the sample and the population sizes (conditional % and unconditional %, respectively), and the p-value of observing the number of successes given the
sample size, population size and the unconditional success rate, using hypergeometric function, as in Marsh (2011). The results showed in this table correspond to these calculations
using intraday data on trade based order flow and nominal exchange rate CLP/USD. A window of 8 leads/lags is used to cover the pre and post-event evaluations. The population
size is 501 observations in 2008, and 786 in 2009. The sample size is 22 in 2008 and 29 in 2009. The sample period ranges from 1/7/2008 to 31/7/2008 (labeled ‘2008’), and 1/6/2009
to 20/7/2009 (labeled ‘2009’).
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Concluding Remarks
An important challenge to policymakers across the world is the design of effective
policies that deal with movements in international portfolio flows. These policies
are better informed if we can empirically disentangle the relative importance of
push factors that are external to the economies receiving the flows and pull factors
that are internal. The first chapter of this thesis contributes to the debate on what
drives international portfolio flows by estimating a dynamic latent factor model using
more than 20 years of monthly international bond and equity flows from the US to
55 other countries. The advantage of this model is that it provides a flexible way
for assessing the relative importance of the contribution of push and pull factors to
the variation in international bond and equity flows.
We find that the push factor dominates the pull factor by explaining more than
80% of the variance of international portfolio flows. This holds for the vast majority
of countries, all geographic regions and for both bond and equity flows. The strength
of the push factor is even more pronounced for equity flows than bond flows, and for
developing countries than advanced economies. However, the pull factor tends to be
higher for the G8, the G20 and the BRICS countries. It is even higher for countries
involved in the foreign exchange carry trade, than it is for countries with very low
or very high interest rates. Notably, over the crisis period, the role of the push
factor diminishes as on average the contribution of the pull factor to the variance of
flows effectively doubles. Furthermore, the dynamics of push and pull factors can be
explained to some extent by US and foreign macroeconomic indicators respectively.
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The empirical evidence reported in the first chapter essentially confirms the pub-
lic perception that forces related to financial globalization are the primary determi-
nants of international portfolio flows. Therefore, countries exposure to global (rather
than domestic) risks appear to be more important in informing the domestic policy
response to time-varying international portfolio flows. This suggests that compared
to domestic macroeconomic policies, capital controls may be a more effective pol-
icy tool for countries aiming to stimulate economic growth partly by managing the
consequences of international portfolio flows. Indeed, the new institutional view of
the IMF announced in November 2012 recognizes that this may be the case. Al-
though we do not explicitly provide direct evidence on the effectiveness of capital
controls, our empirical findings contribute to this debate and lend support to the
new institutional view of the IMF on capital controls.
Within the economic context of the last decade, knowledge on EMEs have be-
come more valuable, as these countries have experienced increasing participation in
the global economy, shown resilience during the global crisis, and in some cases be-
come strongly financially developed. Understanding how FX markets work in these
countries and what have been the effects of official FX intervention used as responses
to the latest global crisis, are other two key aspects that can contribute to further
policy design.
In the second chapter of this thesis we present new evidence on the microstructure
of exchange rates in emerging markets. We employ a novel dataset that, to the best
of our knowledge, has never been analysed before. With this data we are able
to examine the features of all spot USD transactions recorded in the Chilean FX
intraday market over four weeks in mid 2008 and six weeks in mid 2009. We evaluate
the impact of order flow on exchange rate returns and analyse the behaviour of such
relationship throughout the day and across time. We also evaluate the differences
amongst the impact of dealers, non-dealers and central bank order flow on exchange
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rates.
Our findings suggest the existence of a statistically significant relationship be-
tween CLP/USD rate and its order flow. Furthermore, the domestic currency tends
to depreciate with USD buying pressures, regardless of who initiates the trade. Trade
based order flow has higher explanatory power than volume based order flow, as sug-
gested by Sager and Taylor (2006) for customer flows. The impact concentrates in
the most intensive trading hours, which is consistent with the liquidity provided dur-
ing the day. The order flow impact is also changing across time, both in magnitude
and significance. Differences in the results between the samples could be related to
the fact that the economic conditions at which the market operated in 2008 were
different than in 2009. Interesting to note that in 2009 the period when the impact
of order flow was highest is around the week were the CBC did not trade in the
market.
Unlike evidence found for some EMEs, our findings do not support bi-causality
between order flow and exchange rate. However, we find weak evidence suggesting
order flow leadership from central bank to dealer, and from dealer to non-dealer
trades in 2009. According to our results, the interbank order flow effects are no
more than one quarter of the total order flow effect, and trading intensity has also
minor impact during the first trading hours. Our findings also suggest that the
official intervention in 2008 had an effect on damping the price effect of interbank
order flow, whereas the direct effects of the CBC order flow on exchange rates seem
to be stronger in 2009. Regarding the existence of a long run relationship between
exchange rate and cumulative order flow, Johansen’s test rejects the hypothesis of
no cointegration. Our VECM estimations indicate that between 0.2% and 0.4% of
the deviations from the long-run trend return to equilibrium at 15 minute frequency.
Due to the nature of our data, defining who the liquidity providers in this market
are is not an easy task. The presence of the CBC in the market impacts the order
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flow dynamics in the short run: the interbank order flow effect decreases during
official intervention periods, and contents an important portion of the total order
flow effect as a fiscal agent. These conclusions are not conditional on the volume
traded by the CBC. Overall, our analysis provides directions on future analysis of FX
intraday markets in EMEs. As our results imply that the Chilean FX market works
differently from some EMEs, future investigation should consider the evaluation of
possible extensions to Evans and Lyons’ model applicable to small FX markets.
According to the literature, the effects of official FX intervention on exchange
rates are mixed. A great portion of the research available focuses on the effects of
interventions of advanced economies, mainly due to data availability issues and the
fact that in the last decade this practice has been observed to be more common
amongst developing countries. In the third chapter of this thesis we seek to provide
new evidence that can help to fill this gap. Emerging markets are interesting because,
given the smaller size of their currency markets relative to advanced economies, their
official FX interventions could be more effective, for instance through the portfolio
channel, than the same policy carried out in an advanced economy. In this sense,
Chile is an interesting case. Taking advantage of our novel dataset, we propose
a comprehensive analysis of the effects and success of official intervention in the
Chilean FX market.
In our analysis we explore the latest techniques on microstructure data to evalu-
ate the intraday effects of intervention on the Chilean FX market. Our intraday data
had not been previously available to scholars, therefore its sole statistical analysis is
a great contribution to the literature. This data set records all spot USD transac-
tions on the main trading platform of Chilean FX market, for two samples; one from
2008 and another from 2009. What is interesting in our data is that in 2008 the
CBC intervened in the FX market aiming to accumulate reserves to prevent future
worsening of the global economy conditions. In 2009, however, the CBC traded in
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the market as a fiscal agent, and sold USDs from the Chilean government.
To evaluate the effects of intervention on the intraday exchange rate returns we
firstly employ a standard event study. The results indicate that in 2008 the effect
of intervention on the market price returns was felt 2 hours after the intervention
occurred, whereas in 2009 effects of central bank trades on exchange rate were in-
corporated within the 15 minutes on average. The intervention events in 2008 were
anticipated almost two hours before, on average. The latter could be due to ac-
quired knowledge of the traders since the intervention programme started that year
in April. Overall, our results provide evidence in favour of the microstructure chan-
nel of intervention as the inclusion of central bank orders has an impact on intraday
returns and indirectly changes the pricing process of the private market.
We then analyse the intervention success rates in terms of exchange rate move-
ments and order flows. This sort of analysis helps us evaluate the nature of the
impact on these variables, i.e. reversals, moderation or accentuation of trends in
exchange rates and order flows observed previous to the intervention. In terms of
changes in success rates, official intervention appears to have only a moderation
effect on the order flow dynamics on the days of intervention. The effects of the
USD sales in 2009 appears to have had a stronger effect on the reversal of order flow
dynamics and on changes in the value of sales and purchases of CLP in the market.
This could imply that CBC trades have an effect on private order flows per se, which
usually is not considered as an input to the policy decision process.
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